Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

State of Utah v. Gary Duhaime : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
G. Fred Metos; Counsel for Appellant.
Jeanne B. Inouye, Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Joy E. Natale;
Summit County Attorney\'s Office; Counsel for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Duhaime, No. 20091017 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2057

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 20091017-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Gary Duhaime,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from convictions for possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah,
Summit County, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck presiding.
B. INOUYE (1618)
Assistant Attorney General
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

JEANNE

G. FRED METOS
Attorney at Law
10 West Broadway. Suite 650
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

JOY E. NATALE
Summit County Attorney's Office

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee
Oral Argument Requested

Case No. 20091017-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Gary Duhaime,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from convictions for possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah,
Summit County, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck presiding.
B. INOUYE (1618)
Assistant Attorney General
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

JEANNE

G. FRED METOS
Attorney at Law
10 West Broadway. Suite 650
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

JOY E. NATALE
Summit County Attorney's Office

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee
Oral Argument Requested

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

13

THE TRAFFIC STOP AND THE ENSUING DRUG INVESTIGATION
WERE SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION

13

A. The traffic stop was justified at its inception because the officer
observed a traffic violation

14

B. The traffic stop, including the officer's drug investigation, was
executed in a reasonable manner

18

CONCLUSION

32

ADDENDA
Addendum A: Memorandum Decision (on Motion to Suppress)
Addendum B: Unofficial transcript of video recording of traffic stop
Addendum C: Transcript of evidentiary hearing (R34)
Addendum D: United States v. Morneau,
Fed. Appx.
, 2010 WL
3330505 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)
United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 334 Fed. Appx. 880,2009 WL
1579798 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)
United States v. Diaz, 356 Fed. Appx. 117,123,2009 WL
4730422 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)
i

United States v. Arana-Duarte, 244 Fed. Appx. 121,2007 WL
1852139 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished)
State v. Bennett, 2006 WL 2381646 (Ohio App. 2006)
(unpublished)
United States v. Avezov,
F. Supp. 2d
, 2010 WL 3022909
(N.D. Okla. 2010)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009)

14,19

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)

27
13,14,27

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)

31

State v. Bennett, 2006 WL 2381646 (Ohio App. 2006) (unpublished)
State v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120,1129 (10th Or. 2005)

ii
31

United States v. Arana-Duarte, 244 Fed. Appx. 121,2007 WL 1852139 (9th
-•~ii. ±*jyj, j

V u.ii^vi^iiJiltVAJ...

11, s-~t

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002)
United States v. Avezov,

F. Supp. 2d

passim
, 2010 WL 3022909 (N.D.

Okla.2010)

ii, 25

United States v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2005)
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc)

25
14

United States v. Diaz, 356 Fed. Appx. 117,2009 WL 4730422 (10th Cir.
2009) (unpublished)

i,24

United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275 (7th Cir. 1996)

23, 25

United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 334 Fed. Appx. 880,2009 WL 1579798
(10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)

i, 24

United States v. Martin, 155 F. Supp. 2d 381 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
United States v. Morneau,

Fed. Appx.

25

, 2010 WL 3330505 (9th Cir.

2010) (unpublished)
United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140 (10th
Cir. 2010)
iii
United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000)

i, 31
31
19, 21

United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935 (10th Or. 2009), cert, denied, 130 S.Ct.
1721(2010)

31

United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2001)

18

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)

20

STATE CASES

Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622 (Utah App. 1993)

22

Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, 217 P.3d 733

16

Marinaro v. State, 2007 WY123,163 P.3d 833

25, 26

Nathan v. State, 805 A.2d 1086 (Md. 2002)

23

State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115,182 P.3d 935, affd, 2010 UT 18,229 P.3d
650

26

State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, 229 P.3d 650

14, 21, 22

State v. Bennett, 2006-Ohio-4274,2006 WL 2381646 (Ohio App. 2006)
(unpublished)

24

State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,103 P.3d 699

1

State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650

14,15,18,19

State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1065
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,100 P.3d 1222

16,17
1

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)

18

State v. Morlock, 218 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2009)

25

State v. Riclmrds, 2009 UT App 397, 224 P.3d 733

24

Sutton v. State, 2009 WY 148, 220 P.3d 784

32

United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mt. Fonds, 2006 UT 35,
140 P.3d 1200
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991)

16
16

iv

STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-1601 (West Supp. 2008)

14

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604 (West Supp. 2008)

2,15

Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (West Supp. 2008)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West 2009)

1

v

CaseNo.2UU91017-CA
ii i i i i i

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Gary Duhuir" 0
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
S T A T E M E N T O F JUKlSUlCJ 1 I u N
.>o?'?n.\:

.LSX.-I-:::

-

..

•

_-. -.-•. -^ ..

with "!••"r'r d i - ' - ; b ' >>-• 'vu'- •" •• -f i .>- ; T | ^ S

„ > o.'.iroij^ --. : .-..ance
• •

- - •[' .Jt- •

c- "- v-

4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Were the traffic stop and the ensuing drug investigation supported by
reasonable suspicion?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews for clear error the factual findings
underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to sup pro-

^!r(r v.

Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,f11,100 P.3d 1222 (citations omitted). The Court reviews
the trial court's legal conclusions non-deferentially for correctness, including its
application or t;K . ^ i standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,1 15, 103

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant with possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana) with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2008); possession of a controlled substance
(diazepam), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West
Supp. 2008); and driving with defective equipment, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604 (West Supp. 2008). Rl-2.
Defendant, who had been stopped for a traffic violation, filed a motion to
suppress his statements to the officer during the stop and the evidence seized in a
subsequent search of his car. R27-28. Following an evidentiary hearing and
argument on the motion, see R35-61,62-89,90; see also R34 (transcript of evidentiary
hearing), the trial court filed a memorandum decision denying the motion. See R91124. The trial court also denied Defendant's motion asking the court to reconsider
the memorandum decision. See R130-32,133-36.

2

reservi ng the right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress, and the State
dismissed the other counts. R189-90 (minutes, change of plea), 182-88 (plea
statement).
. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a prison term of zero to five years,
suspended the prison term, p ^ ^ a . ^ ^ i w ; ^ , on probation, u,;^; requ^vd .rui

cause staying execution of the jail term pendine the resolution of this appeal R220,
224-25.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
*• offer ise. Oi t, J anuar} 14, 2009, just after 11 :00 p.n L, Utal i J:I^I • .
Pa-r, 1 Ofricer NielEkbergsa v\ a I i ncolnTo^ ^ • "n Cat t< • ithl exas plates *r
eastbound on 1-80 in Summit County. R34:4-5; see also R92 (findings). Gmcer

1

References to the video are references to State's Exhibit 1 fa compact disc
recorded at the time of the traffic stop), included in an envelope in the record. The
video is time-stamped (military time) and runs for approximately 32 minutes
between 11:00 p.m. and midnight on January 14, 2009. To facilitate the location of
statements on the video, staff in the Utah Attorney General's Office have prepared
an unofficial transcript of the d isc referencing approximate times.
'
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X

Ekberg ran a license plate check on the car and determined that the car was a
rental car. See 34:27; see also R92. The car's back rear license plate was very hard
to read, and the trooper noticed that it did not have a working rear plate light.
See R34:5; see also video at 23:23 (video transcript at 10) (officer's later showing
Defendant the non-working light); video at 23:38 (video transcript at 16) (officer's
later recounting the observed violation to other officers who arrived on the
scene); R92. Officer Ekberg pulled the car over at approximately 11:06 p.m.
R34:7.
Officer Ekberg approached the car from the passenger side and observed
Defendant, the driver, and an apparently sleeping woman, Defendant's wife, the
front seat passenger. R34:9; see also R93. Defendant's wife appeared to remain
sleeping for a "couple of minutes" after the officer approached, even though it was
cold and the officer had a flashlight turned on. R34:15-16; see also R93. The officer
found the passenger's behavior odd, as in his experience, even sleeping passengers
awaken when a police officer stops a car. R34:15-16. "They don't stay asleep while
[an officer is] talking to them and shining [his] light with the weather coming in and
so on." Id.
The officer made several quick observations. He saw "four cell phones and
chargers in the center console," "a large quantity of cell phones" for just two
occupants. R34:15; see also R93. The phones appeared to be "connected together."
4

R93. He saw fast food papers. R34:15; R93. He also saw that the couple's luggage
was in the back seat, rather than in the trunk. R34:14. A map and a cup of coffee
were in the center console. R34:15. The GPS was turned on. Id.
Officer Ekberg introduced himself and asked the couple where they were
headed. Video at 23:08 (video transcript at 1). Defendant said they were heading to
Chicago. Id. The officer asked where they were from, and Defendant said they were
from Oakland, traveling to visit family in Chicago. Id.
The officer then explained that he had stopped them because the driver had
made an improper lane change and because the light that should have illuminated
their rear plate was not working. Video at 23:08 (video transcript at 1-2); R93-94.
Officer Ekberg asked how long they were going to stay in Chicago, and
Defendant answered "probably for a few days/' Video at 23:09 (video transcript at
2). The officer then asked to see the rental agreement. Id. Defendant had difficulty
finding the rental agreement. See video at 23:09-23:10. Officer Ekberg talked with
Defendant as Defendant looked for the agreement. See id. The officer asked what
family members Defendant planned to visit in Chicago. Video at 23:09 (video
transcript at 3). Defendant "had a hard time telling [the officer] what family
member/7 R34:ll. Defendant answered, T m actually visiting my, my, uh, my
uncle over there/7 Video at 23:09 (video transcript at 3). "It seemed like he had a
frog in his throat and he had a hard time answering those questions/7 R34:ll.
5

Defendant"acted very nervous and unsure of these simple questions/' R34.15. This
increased the officer's suspicions about possible criminal activity. R34:10.
When Defendant finally produced the rental papers, he presented only a prerental inspection form. Video at 23:09-23:10) (video transcript at 3). As Defendant
continued to search for the actual rental agreement, Officer Ekberg continued
talking with him. Video at 23:09-23:10. Defendant produced the actual rental
agreement as the officer noted, "You're missing all the scenery here in Utah." Video
at 23:10:17 (video transcript at 3). Defendant responded, //[W]e're trying to get,
trying to do a mad drive out there." Video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4).
Reading the rental agreement, Officer Ekberg learned that the rental was for a
one-way trip from Oakland to Chicago, due back at Chicago Midway Airport in a
couple of days. R34:9; video at 23:38 (video transcript at 14-15). The agreement also
showed the cost of the rental—$1200 for the one-way trip from Oakland to Chicago.
Video at 23:20, 28 (video transcript at 9,14) (later recounting information to other
officers who arrived at the scene). The "very expensive" rental drew the officer's
attention. R34:8. In addition, based on his past experience, the officer was aware
that "drug traffickers fly from the east to the west coast, pick up the drugs and drive
them back east." R34:10. He also knew that "Interstate 80 is a known drug
trafficking corridor." R34:14. These factors increased his suspicions. See R34:10.

6

When Officer Ekberg finished looking through the rental agreement, he asked
Defendant whether he had a valid driver's license. See video at 23:10 (video
transcript at 4). Defendant said that he did. Id. As Defendant looked for his license,
the officer asked Defendant whether "[a]ll your guy[s'] luggage is just sitting in the
back seat here?" Id. Defendant said, "No." Id.2
When Defendant produced his license, it was not a California license, but a
driver's license issued by Hawaii. See video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4). The
officer then asked Defendant additional questions about where Defendant lived and
about his planned trip — why he was driving instead of flying and how he planned
to make the return trip. Video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4-5).
Defendant said that he was driving because "we are going to be
enjoying... the ride." Video at 23:11 (video transcript at 5). He also stated that he
was driving because it was "just less expensive." Id. That was not "consistent with
[Officer Ekberg's] experience." R34:13. Defendant also stated that he and his wife
might travel to Memphis and/or Birmingham, but he did not know whether they

2

The video and video transcript show that the officer asked Defendant
whether all of their luggage was on the back seat, and Defendant said that it was
not. See video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4). At the evidentiary hearing, the officer
mistakenly attributed that statement to Defendant's wife. See R34:14.
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would fly or drive if they did.

Video at 23:12-13 (video transcript at 5-6).

Defendant's wife offered that they "ha[d] no really good plan." Video at 23:12
(video transcript at 6). The officer noted that Defendant "was very, very nervous in
answering questions about his trip, his origination and his destination. He was very
unsure of his answers." R34:10. "[H]e would look up and stall as if he was seeking
and making up the answer as he was going along. He avoided eye contact when
answering those simple questions." Id.
The officer then asked whether the couple planned to stay anywhere before
they finished the trip to Chicago. Video at 23:13 (video transcript at 6). Defendant,
who had previously stated that they would likely travel another hour before
stopping, video at 23:12 (video transcript at 5), said that they would probably stop
in Utah, video at 23:13 (video transcript at 7). The officer noted that they only had
another five miles in Utah before they crossed the border into Wyoming. Id.
Finally, the officer asked again whether all of their luggage was in the back seat or
whether they had any luggage in the trunk. Video at 23:14 (video transcript at 7).
This time, Defendant said that pretty much all of their luggage was in the back seat

8

and that they had nothing in the trunk. Video at 23:14 (video transcript at 7-8).
Officer Ekberg thought that this reply was "weird/' given that Defendant had
previously stated that they did have additional luggage. R34:14; see also video at
23:10 (video transcript at 4). Officer Ekberg then told Defendant to wait while he
returned to his police car to check on the validity of the driver's license. Video at
23:14 (video transcript at 8).
At his car, Officer Ekberg called for a drug-sniffing dog, a license report, and a
criminal background check ("a triple I"). Video at 23:14-15 (video transcript at 8).
He then returned to Defendant's car and showed Defendant the non-working light
that should have illuminated the plate. Video at 23:23 (video transcript at 10).
Defendant said, "We'll get that taken care of." Id. The officer returned Defendant's
license and the rental agreement. Video at 23:23; see also R34:57. The officer asked
Defendant whether he had anything illegal in his car. Video at 23:24 (transcript at
11). Defendant said that he did not. Id. The officer asked for permission to search
the car. Id. Defendant refused consent. Id.

At the evidentiary hearing, Officer Ekberg also mistakenly attributed this
statement to the passenger. See R34:14.

9

Officer Ekberg then told Defendant that he would be detained while they
awaited a drug-sniffing dog. Id. Based on everything he had observed, the officer
believed he had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant for a few minutes to wait
for the dog. R34:20. Another officer arrived on the scene, and Officer Ekberg took
Defendant's keys and allowed him to wait in his car. Video at 23:25 (video
transcript at 12). When Officer Ekberg returned to his car, he learned that
Defendant had a criminal history for marijuana possession in the 1960's and a valid
driver's license. Id.
The drug-sniffing dog arrived about three minutes after Officer Ekberg told
Defendant that he would be detained to await it. Video at 23:24,27 (video transcript
at 11,14). When the dog alerted on the trunk, the officers opened the trunk and
found 76 one-pound vacuum-sealed bags of marijuana. R34:22; video at 23:29
(video transcript at 17).
Findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the facts
essentially as outlined above. See R92-97. The trial court found that Officer Ekberg's
testimony was credible. See R97. Specifically, the court found that the officer
testified truthfully when he testified that the license plate light was not functioning.
See R97. The court found that any minor inconsistencies in his testimony were not
"fabrication/' but possibly "exaggeration to superiors" or "a failure to communicate
precisely" or "a failure to recall specifics." See R98.
10

Although Officer Ekberg also believed that Defendant's lane changes violated
the law, see R34:6, the court concluded that the officer misunderstood the law about
lane changes and ruled that the Defendant's lane changes were legal. R98-99. But
the court ruled that the stop was valid because of the observed equipment violation.
R99.
The court rejected the State's argument that the officer's questions about
Defendant's travel itinerary were within the scope of a proper traffic stop. Rl06-07.
But the court concluded that Officer Ekberg's observations on approaching the car
gave him reasonable suspicion of some further illegality, i.e., drug trafficking, to
justify his asking Defendant questions about his travel plans. R114-20. The court
further determined that the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
justify detaining Defendant for a dog sniff of his car. R121.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, each stage of the stop —the initial
traffic stop, the questions about Defendant's travel itinerary, and the detention to
await the drug-detection dog—was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The traffic stop was reasonable because it was based on the officer's
observation of an equipment violation. The trial court found that the light that
should have illuminated the license plate on Defendant's car was not
functioning. The trial court did not clearly err in making this finding. The
11

officer testified that the light was not working. No testimony to the contrary was
offered. The video did not show whether the light was or was not functioning,
but it did show the officer pointing out the non-functioning light to Defendant
and Defendant stating, "We'll get that taken care of." Defendant cannot prevail
on his claim that the officer lied about the equipment violation and that
consequently the traffic stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion.
Moreover, an officer may ask questions about travel plans without
exceeding the proper scope of a traffic stop. And, even if questions about travel
plans were not permissible, the officer had reasonable suspicion of a further
illegality — drug trafficking— at the time he first looked in the car and before he
asked any questions about travel plans. What he saw when he first looked into
the rental vehicle —the woman passenger feigning sleep, luggage on the back
seat of the car despite its large trunk, four cell phones carried by only two
occupants, fast food wrappers indicating hurried travel, etc. —supported
reasonable suspicion and justified questioning the occupants to confirm or dispel
his suspicions.
Likewise, the detention to await a drug dog was reasonable. By the time
the officer detained Defendant for the drug dog, the officer was aware not only
of the circumstances set forth above, but also had received hesitant, evasive, and
inconsistent answers to his questions about Defendant's travel plans and had
12

observed his extreme nervousness and lack of eye contact while responding.
Thus, the detention for the drug dog was supported by reasonable suspicion.
ARGUMENT
THE TRAFFIC STOP AND THE ENSUING DRUG
INVESTIGATION WERE SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE
SUSPICION
Defendant claims that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the
traffic stop. See Br. Appellant at 1,11. He claims that the trial court erred when it
found that the officer's testimony that he had observed an equipment violation was
credible. He asserts that the officer did not observe an equipment violation and
consequently that the stop was unjustified. See id. at 11-22. He further claims that
the officer exceeded the scope of a lawful traffic stop by "questioning [him] about
his travel itinerary" and " detaining [him] to await the arrival of a drug detection
dog." Id. 24; see also id. at 1-2. Defendant cannot prevail on any of these claims.
Each stage of the stop — the initial traffic stop, the questions about Defendant's travel
itinerary, and the detention to await the drug-detection dog—was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment principles governing a traffic

stop

are

straightforward and simple. First, the stop must be "lawful at its inception," Illinois
v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005), i.e., the officer must "have probable cause or
reasonable articulable suspicion of [a] traffic violation or other criminal activity,"
13

State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18,116,229 P.3d 650, citing Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781,
784 (2009). Second, the stop must be "executed in a reasonable manner/' Cahalles,
543 U.S. at 408, i.e., "the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," Baker, 2010 UT 18, \ 17 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). "If, during the scope of [a lawful] traffic
stop, the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the
officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion." Baker, 2010 UT 18, ^f 13.
Otherwise, "the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of
the stop has concluded." Id.
A. The traffic stop was justified at its inception because the
officer observed a traffic violation,
A "traffic stop is justified at its inception when the stop is incident to a traffic
violation committed in [the officer's] presence." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 30,
63 P.3d 650 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
see also United States v. Botero-0spina, 71 F.3d 783,787 (10th Cir. 1995) {en baric) (stop
is valid at its inception if based on an observed violation). A traffic stop is also valid
at its inception where the "officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic
or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." See Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at
787.
A traffic violation occurs when an individual drives an improperly equipped
vehicle on a public highway. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1601 (West Supp. 2008).
14

Utah law provides that a motor vehicle must be equipped with "[ejither a tail lamp
or a separate lamp . . . constructed and placed so as to illuminate with a white light
the rear registration plate/7 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008).
An officer thus has reasonable suspicion that an equipment violation has occurred
when he sees a vehicle traveling on the highway and such a light is not working.
See Hansen, 2002 UT125, f 30 (holding that a stop is justified at its inception when
made in response to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence).
Defendant does not dispute that Utah law requires "[e]ither a tail lamp or
separate lamp . . . constructed and placed so as to illuminate with a white light the
rear registration plate/' Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008).
Rather, Defendant disputes only whether the trial court properly credited the
officer's testimony that he observed the tail lamp violation. See R97-98. Defendant
contends that his tail lamp was in fact working, that Officer Ekberg lied when he
testified that the light was not working, and, therefore, that the trial court clearly
erred in finding the officer credible.
Marshaling. This Court should not address Defendant's claim. When
challenging a trial court's finding of fact, a party must marshal the evidence in
support of that finding and then explain why that evidence is legally insufficient.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Proper marshaling requires a defendant to amass "every
scrap of competent evidence and reasonable inferences that support the adverse
15

decision and then show why that evidence, "even when viewjed] in a light most
favorable to the court below" is "legally insufficient." United Park City Mines Co. v.
Stichting Mayflower Mt Fonds, 2006 UT 35, I f 24 & 39,140 P.3d 1200 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,
1315 (Utah App. 1991). Consequently, "'[e]ven where [a defendant] purportjs] to
challenge only the legal ruling,... if a determination of the correctness of a court's
application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the defendant]] also ha[s]
a duty to marshal the evidence/" Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, f 22, 217
P.3d 733 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 20,100 P.3d 1177).
Here, Defendant has not marshaled the evidence relevant to his underlying
claim that the trial court erred when it found that Officer Ekberg was credible or to
his overarching claim that the evidence was therefore insufficient to demonstrate
reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation. See Br. Appellant at 12-20. For
example, Defendant ignores the portion of the videotape that recorded the officer
pointing out to him the non-functioning light, his viewing it, and his telling the
officer, "We'll get that taken care of." Video at 23:23 (video transcript at 10).
Because Defendant has not marshaled the evidence supporting the trial
court's ruling, this Court should reject his claim that the officer's testimony lacked
credibility and his related claim that the evidence was insufficient.

See State v.

Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, % 16, 989 P.2d 1065 ("On appeal, Hopkins describes only
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fragmented and selective portions of [the relevant] evidence. Because Hopkins has
not satisfied his burden to marshal the evidence, we decline to treat his contention
that the evidence was insufficient/7).
Merits. In any case, the trial court did not clearly err in finding Officer
Ekberg credible. Officer Ekberg testified that the license plate was not functioning
and that he could not see the license plate clearly. R92, 97. No testimony to the
contrary was offered. See id. Comparing Officer Ekberg's testimony and the video,
the trial court found that the officer was not fabricating his account. R97. The video
did not clearly show whether the light was or was not functioning. R92. "[T]he
license [wa]s visible [on the video], but it may [have been] from the reflection of the
headlights from Ekberg's vehicle." R92.
Moreover, as explained, the video showed Officer Ekberg taking Defendant to
the back of the car and showing him the non-working light. Video at 23:23 (video
transcript at 10). It then showed Defendant agreeing to get the light fixed. Id.
(Defendant stating, "We'll get that taken care of/'). That evidence demonstrates that
Defendant actually saw that the light was broken or had burned out. It thus
supports the trial court's finding that Officer Ekberg testified truthfully when he
said he stopped the car because the light that should have illuminated the rear
license plate was not functioning.
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Defendant has not shown that the trial court clearly erred in finding the
officer credible or in finding that the light was, in fact, not functioning. Thus, the
evidence sufficed to support the trial court's conclusions that a traffic violation had
occurred and that the violation justified the traffic stop.
B. The traffic stop, including the officer's drug investigation, was
executed in a reasonable manner.
Defendant next claims that Officer Ekberg exceeded the scope of the traffic
stop by asking questions about Defendant's travel plans before requesting and
checking his rental agreement and driver's license.

Br. Appellant at 22-28.

Defendant asserts that the officer had no reasonable suspicion of any illegality other
than the equipment violation and therefore that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to ask about the travel plans.
Typically, "an officer may request a driver's license and vehicle registration,
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation" or warning. State v. Hansen, 2002
UT125 f 31,63 P.3d 650 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An officer
may also "ran[] a warrants check." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1133 (Utah 1994).
The officer is also permitted to ask about the driver's travel plans as part of the
traffic stop detention. "[Q]uestions relating to a driver's travel plans ordinarily fall
within the scope of a traffic stop." United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262,1267 (10th
Cir. 2001). These matters are "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the interference in the first place," i.e., the traffic violation. Id. at 1266-67.
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Travel questions "are routine and may be asked as a matter of course/' United States
v. West, 219 F.3d 1171,1176 (10th Or. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).4
But "[o]nce the purpose of the initial stop is concluded . . . the person must be
allowed to depart... unless [the] officer has probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion of a further illegality/' Hansen, 2002 UT125, | 31 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, because Officer Ekberg reasonably suspected that
Defendant and his wife were involved in drug trafficking, the officer was justified in
extending the traffic stop.
In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, reviewing courts
"must look at the 'totality of the circumstances' of each case." United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273 (2002) (citation omitted). Moreover, officers are permitted
"to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from
and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well
elude an untrained person/7 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
4

In fact, an officer may even inquire ''into matters unrelated to the
justification for the traffic stop,... so long as those [actions] do not measurably
extend the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009)
(citation omitted).
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Factors that taken alone are each "susceptible of innocent explanation" may,
"[t]aken together,... form a particularized and objective basis" for a detention,
making it "reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 27778. "Although an officer's reliance on a mere 'hunch' is insufficient to justify a
stop,... the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for
probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the
evidence standard." Id. at 274 (citations and additional quotation marks omitted).
Finally, whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective inquiry. See
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) ("an officer's motive" does not
"invalidate^ objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment").
Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists to support a stop, the "actual
motivation of the individual officers involved" makes no difference. Id. at 813.
"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause [or reasonablesuspicion] Fourth Amendment analysis." Id.
Applying the above standards, Officer Ekberg's questions about Defendant's
travel plans were justified on two separate bases: first, they were permissible as
part of the traffic stop. After stopping Defendant's car, Officer Ekberg first
introduced himself. Video at 23:08 (video transcript at 1). Then, before requesting
the vehicle registration, he asked a few brief questions about the occupants' travel
plans, including where they were headed, where they were from, and how long
20

they planned to stay at their destination. Video at 23:08-23:09 (video transcript at
1-2). These questions were permissible because they were within the scope of the
traffic stop. As explained, "questions about travel plans are routine and may be
asked as a matter of course." West, 219 F.3d at 1176 (10th Or. 2000) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the trial court erred when it ruled that the
questions were not permissible as part of the traffic stop. See R106-07.
But while permissible as part of the traffic stop, the questions were also
justified by reasonable suspicion of a further illegality—drug trafficking. Based on
the observations Officer Ekberg made as he approached Defendant's car, the trial
court correctly concluded that the officer "form[ed] new reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal activity" that justified a continued detention to "investigate his
new suspicion."

Baker, 2010 UT 18, ^f 13. Based on his observations as he

approached and looked into the car, Officer Ekberg had reasonable suspicion of a
further illegality — drug trafficking—before he asked Defendant any questions. See
R120. Officer Ekberg approached the car from the passenger side and observed the
driver, Defendant, and a woman asleep in the front passenger seat. R93. The
woman appeared to "remain[] asleep a few moments, though it was cold and [the
officer] had a flash light turned on." Id. The officer could see four cell phones
evidently connected together and a charger. Id. He could see luggage in the rear
seat. Id. The vehicle had a GPS unit, and a map was visible. Id. The officer also
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saw fast food papers, "indicating to him the occupants were driving in a hurry and
not desiring to stop/' Id. In addition, the officer knew that Defendant was driving a
rental car. Video at 23:08 (video transcript at 2); see also R34:27.5
These observations, viewed together, provided "reasonable suspicion to
believe that criminal activity [drug trafficking] mfight] be afoot." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at
273 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). They justified the officer's
asking additional questions about the couple's travel plans to confirm or dispel his

5

The trial court found that Officer Ekberg approached the car from the
passenger side, saw the female passenger who appeared to be asleep "though it was
cold and [though] he had a flash light turned on," R. 93. The court found that he
saw the "luggage in the rear seat," "four (4) cell phones evidently connected
together," a GPS unit, a map, a coffee cup, and fast food wrappers. Id. Defendant
apparently asserts that this finding was clearly erroneous because the officer did not
testify that he saw these things upon approaching the car. See Br. Appellant at 2627. But the trial court is entitled not only to find the facts, but also to draw the
reasonable inferences supported by the evidence. See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622,
626 (Utah App. 1993) ("When acting as the fact-finder, the trial court is entitled to
assess the witnesses and to weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences
therefrom"). Here, Officer Ekberg testified that he approached the car on the
passenger side, the window was down, and his flashlight was "in the vehicle."
R34:15. He testified that the luggage was on the rear seat and "fast food wrappers"
and the "four cell phones and chargers" were "in plain view." R34:14-15. Under
these circumstances, the trial court could reasonably infer that the officer, who was
alone on the road near midnight, approached the car with some caution. His
flashlight being "in the window" suggests that he immediately looked about the
passenger compartment as a safety measure and, in so doing, saw the car's contents.
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suspicions.6 Based on his training and experience, the officer was entitled to
conclude that the passenger was feigning sleep when she did not awaken despite
having the passenger door window down—when she appeared to "stay[] asleep for
a couple of minutes" despite the "very cold" night air, and despite his flashing his
light into the car. See R34:15. Based on his experience, "passengers ha[d] always
been wide awake even if they [had been] sleeping" before the stop. Id. As he
explained, passengers "don't stay asleep while I'm talking to them and shining my
light with the weather coming in and so on." R34:15-16. The apparently feigned
sleep was a factor giving rise to suspicion of some possibly criminal activity because
it suggested that the passenger had something to hide and was "buying time" to
consider what she might say, if questioned. See United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275,
1280 (7th Cir. 1996) (passenger's "feigning grogginess in an attempt to avoid
answering questions" a factor contributing to reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity); Nathan v. State, 805 A.2d 1086,1096 (Md. 2002) (noting that passenger's
6

The trial court ruled that the following factors gave rise to reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity: "[Four] cell phones immediately visible, luggage in
the rear seat of a large car, and defendant was extremely nervous." R i l l . The
officer did not testify explicitly that the driver exhibited nervousness before any
questions were asked. See R34 (evidentiary hearing). The court could, however,
have inferred that from the video tape. See video at 23:08. In any case, the factors to
which the officer did testify sufficed to establish reasonable suspicion.
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"apparent pretense of sleep when the vehicle was initially stopped" was a factor, in
combination with others, supporting reasonable suspicion to support an
investigative stop).
Further, the officer's observation of four cell phones in a car with just two
occupants was a factor that, in combination with others, supported reasonable
suspicion. "[D]rug couriers are often given a phone by drug dealers for use to stay
in contact throughout the trip/7 See United States v. Arana-Duarte, 244 Fed. Appx.
121,122, 2007 WL 1852139 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). For that reason, multiple
cell phones, especially more cell phones than vehicle occupants, suggest drug
trafficking. See State v. Riclmrds, 2009 UT App 397, f 11,224 P.3d 733 (observing that
case law and officer's training indicated that the presence of multiple cell phones is
suggestive of drug trafficking); see also United States v. Diaz, 356 Fed. Appx. 117,12324, 2009 WL 4730422 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (reproduced in Addendum D)
(possession of multiple cell phones by trailer-tractor operator a factor contributing
to reasonable suspicion to believe truck contained contraband); United States v.
Lopez-Gutierrez, 334 Fed. Appx. 880, 883, 2009 WL 1579798 (10th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished) (reproduced in Addendum D) (presence in a vehicle of more cell
phones than occupants among factors giving rise to reasonable suspicion); State v.
Bennett, 2006-Ohio-4274, tH 25-26,2006 WL 2381646 (Ohio App. 2006) (unpublished)
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(reproduced in Addendum D) (officer's observation of multiple cell phones a factor
supporting reasonable suspicion).
In addition, the presence of the couple's luggage on the back seat of the
Lincoln Town Car, rather than in its large trunk, was a factor supporting reasonable
suspicion. See R34:14. Carrying luggage on the back seat, rather than in the trunk,
"indicates] the possibility that there [a]re drugs in the trunk that the [occupants]
d[o] not want to expose to the senses by repeatedly opening the trunk to access
[their] luggage." Marinaro v. State, 2007 WY123, t 6,163 P.3d 833. Moreover, as the
trial court observed, "A trained officer could readily conclude, objectively, that the
reason the luggage is in the back seat and not in the trunk of a large vehicle with
presumably a large trunk is because something else is in the trunk." R117.
Moreover, Office Ekberg knew that Defendant was driving a rental car. Video
at 23:08 (video transcript at 2); see also R34:27. "The status of a vehicle as a rentfal]
can be considered a factor to support the existence of reasonable suspicion, because
it is accepted that drug traffickers frequently use rental vehicles to transport illegal
drugs." United States v. Avezov,

F. Supp. 2d

, 2010 WL 3022909 (N.D. Okla.

2010) (citing cases) (included in Addendum D); see also United States v. Blaylock, 421
F.3d 758,769 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275,1280 (7th Or. 1996);
United States v. Martin, 155 F. Supp. 2d 381,385 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing cases); State v.
Morlock, 218 P.3d 801, 811 (Kan. 2009).
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While none of these circumstances standing alone may have sufficed to
establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, when considered in their totality
they did. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78. Moreover, Officer Ekberg was permitted to
draw inferences and deductions about the cumulative information available to him
that "might well [have] elude[d] an untrained person/' Id. at 273 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also R34:4, 10, 14, 16, 29. The trial court
therefore correctly concluded that the officer's observations, upon looking into the
car and before any questioning, gave rise to reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking
and supported an investigative stop. The officer was therefore entitled to question
the car occupants not only about the equipment violation, but also about possible
drug activity.
Finally, Defendant argues that "the detention to await the arrival and search
by a drug-detection dog exceeded the limits of a detention for a traffic stop." Br.
Appellant at 37.7 But that assertion has no significance, as the circumstances
supported not only reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, but also reasonable
7

Defendant relies on State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115,182 P.3d 935, affd, 2010
UT 18, 229 P.3d 650, for his claim that he was illegally detained to await the drug
dog. But Baker addressed the lawfulness of detaining a passenger to await a drug
dog as part of a traffic stop, not the lawfulness of detaining a driver to await a drug
dog based on reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking.
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suspicion of drug trafficking.

Reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, not

reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, justified the officer's detaining Defendant
for the dog sniff.8
Defendant's responses to the officer's questions, his wife's responses, his
demeanor, and what the officer learned from the rental agreement did not dispel the
officer's suspicions, but rather heightened them, justifying the dog sniff.
Specifically, the following circumstances increased the officer's suspicions.
(1) The officer learned that Defendant was driving from Oakland to Chicago
and flying back. R34:10. The officer was aware from his experience that drug
traffickers often pick up drugs on the west coast and drive them east—even when
they fly the east-to-west leg of their trips. R34:10. He also knew that "Interstate 80
is a known drug trafficking corridor." R34:14.
(2) When the officer asked Defendant what his travel plans were, Defendant
gave vague and somewhat contradictory responses. Defendant told the officer that
he and his wife were "trying to do a mad drive out there," to Chicago. Video at

8

Because walking a dog around a car's exterior "generally does not implicate
legitimate privacy interests," it is not a search. See Cabales, 543 U.S. at 409; see also
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,40 (2000). But where conducting the dog
sniff detains an individual, the detention must be constitutionally permissible.
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23:10 (video transcript at 4). But later, when asked why he had chosen to drive
rather than fly, Defendant stated that he was driving because they wanted "to be
enjoying the ride," suggesting a more leisurely trip. Video at 23:11 (video transcript
at 5). Moreover, when asked whether they "plan[ned] on staying anywhere in
between here and Chicago/7 Defendant stated that they would probably travel
"another hour or so" and then "pull over." Video at 23:12 (video transcript at 5).
But moments later, at a time when they were only about five minutes from the
border, Defendant said that they would probably stop somewhere in Utah. Video
at 23:13 (video transcript 6-7).
When the officer asked where Defendant was headed, he said that he was
headed to Chicago. Video at 23:08 (video transcript at 1). The officer then asked if
he was from Chicago, and Defendant said, "[N]o, I'm just visiting family there." Id.
A minute or two later, the officer asked, "|W]hat family members [are] you visiting
in Chicago?" Video at 23:09 (video transcript at 3). Defendant hesitated noticeably
in responding, "I'm actually visiting my, my, uh, my uncle over there." Video at
23:09 (video transcript at 3). Defendant, in fact, hesitated repeatedly in his
conversation with the officer. See video at 23:09-23:10 (video transcript at 2-3).
Defendant also gave very uncertain answers when asked about his return to
Oakland. When asked whether he planned to "fly back home to Oakland from
Chicago," Defendant mentioned the possibility of traveling "back down to
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Memphis" to see "a friend who lives there." Video at 23:12 (video transcript at 5).
Defendant said that "we're either going to fly back or go down to Memphis and fly
back." Video at 23:12 (video transcript at 6). The officer then asked, "Don't you
mean fly down to Memphis?" Id. Defendant responded, "We might drive. I don't
know." Id. Defendant's wife then added, "We have no really good plan." Id.
Defendant then volunteered, "We've got our grandkids down in, uh, in
Birmingham, so we have to go through Memphis." Video at 23:13 (video transcript
at 6).
(3) When the officer obtained the rental agreement, he learned that Defendant
had paid $1200 for the one-way rental from Oakland to Chicago. R34:8-9. This
drew his attention because "it was a very expensive rental." Id. But when he asked
Defendant "what made you want to drive from Oakland to . . . Chicago," Defendant
asserted that it wTas "less expensive." Video at 23:12 (video transcript at 5).
(4) When the officer asked Defendant about the presence of other luggage in
the car, Defendant gave contradictory responses.

While awaiting Defendant's

driver's license, the officer asked, "All you[] guy[s'] luggage is just sitting in the
back seat here?" Video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4). Defendant answered, "No."
Id. About four minutes later, the officer asked again, "So, ummm, all of your
luggage is in the back seat here?" Video at 23:14 (video transcript at 7). This time
Defendant answered, "Pretty much." Id. The officer then asked specifically,
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"You . . . don't have anything in the trunk or anything?77 Id. Defendant said, "No."
Video at 23:14 (video transcript at 8). The officer thought it was suspicious that
Defendant "said that they had other luggage but there was nothing in the trunk."
R34:14.9
(5) Defendant was unusually nervous during the questioning. The officer
testified that Defendant "was very, very nervous in answering questions about his
trip, his origination and his destination. He was very unsure of his answers."
R34:10. "[H]e would look up and stall as if he was seeking and making up the
answer as he was going along. He avoided eye contact when answering those
simple questions." Id. "It seemed like he had a frog in his throat

" R34:ll.

Inconsistent and evasive responses. All of these circumstances sufficed to
further the officer's suspicions that had first been aroused by Defendant's wife's
feigned sleeping, four cell phones, luggage on the back seat, and other matters
observed upon approaching the car.

Defendant's inconsistent and evasive

9

A.s explained, at the evidentiary hearing, the officer attributed these two
contradictory statements to Defendant's wife, the passenger. See R34:14. The video,
however, indicates that the two statements were both made by Defendant. See
video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4), 23:14 (video transcript at 7-8). In any case, who
made the statements is of little significance. What is significant is that the
occupants' statements about the luggage were contradictory.
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responses suggested that Defendant was not being candid and may have been
trying to conceal illegal activity. See United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140,1150
(10th Cir. 2010) (noting that "vague, inconsistent or evasive answers with respect to
travel plans support]]... reasonable suspicion"); State v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120,1129
(10th Cir. 2005) ("Implausible travel plans can contribute to reasonable suspicion");
United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 944 (10th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S.Ct. 1721
(2010) ("[This court] ha[s] noted numerous times that implausible travel plans can
form a basis for reasonable suspicion") (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Nervousness and failure to make eye contact Moreover, Defendant's
extreme nervousness and failure to make eye contact suggested fear that such illegal
activity might be detected. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 270, 276 (driver's not looking at
Border Patrol agent supported reasonable suspicion); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119,124 (2000) ("[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion") (citation omitted); Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1148,1152 (extreme
nervousness, criminal record, and inconsistent and evasive answers to queries about
travel plans, provided reasonable suspicion to detain for further questioning and
canine sniff); United States v. Morneau,

Fed. Appx.

, 2010 WL 3330505, *1 (9th

Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (reproduced in Addendum D) (car occupants7 nervousness
and avoidance of eye contact supported reasonable suspicion); Sutton v. State, 2009
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WY 148, % 24,220 P.3d 784 (extreme and continued nervousness, acting evasive, or
breaking eye contact can form basis for reasonable suspicion).
Thus, the totality of the circumstances increased reasonable suspicion of drug
activity and justified the continued detention to conduct a dog sniff.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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Addenda

Addendum A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

Case No. 91500017
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
GARY WILLIAM DUHAIME,
Defendant.
DATE: July 31, 2009
The above matter came before the court for decision an
Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

BACKGROUND
An information was filed on January 21, 2009, charging
defendant with felony possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute (76 pounds of mari3uana), misdemeanor
possession of a controlled substance (diazepam), and an equipment
violation (rear license plate lignt).

After being bound over

after a preliminary hearing on April 28, 2008, defendant filed a
motion to suppress on May 5, 2009.

An evidentiary hearing was

held Jane 2, 20C9.
The court heard evidence and received a DVD of the traffic
stop and took the matter under advisement, and allowed the
parties to file further memoranda.
Defenaant filed his memo on July 8, 2009.
responded July 21, 2009.

The State

Oral argument was held July 28, 2009.

The court took the issues further under advisement after oral

argument.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Niel Ekberg (Ekberg) was on
patrol in Summit County on Interstate 80 in the night time hours
of January 14, 2009.

His patrol car was equipped with a camera

and microphone that captured most of the events.

He also

testified at the hearing. No other testimony was received. From
those sources the court finds as follows.
2. Some time just before 11:06 pm Ekberg saw this vehicle, a
Lincoln Town car with Texas plates, traveling east-bound on 1-80
in Summit County.

He called it in at some point to check on the

license for reasons unknown.

Shortly thereafter, for reasons

unknown, that vehicle again passed Ekberg.
3. Ekberg observed that the rear license plate illuminating
light was not working and Ekberg could not see the license plate
clearly.

The video does not clearly show either way, as the

license is visible but it may be from the reflection of the
headlights from Ekberg's vehicle.

Defendant challenges the

testimony but the court credits the testimony of Ekberg about the
equipment violation. Ekberg pulled up behind the vehicle, which
proved to be driven by defendant, in an effort to see if in fact
the light was functioning.

The camera was activated.

4. Defendant was in lane number 2, or right hand or slow

-2-

lane, and he signaled properly and moved into the fast, or number
one lane. 1-80 has two lanes for both the west and east-bound
traffic at this point.

Ekberg remained in the outside, or slow

or number 2 lane, for a few moments then pulled into the fast
lane behind defendant.
at that time.

There was no other traffic on the freeway

Upon Ekberg pulling behind defendant, defendant

again signaled and moved back into the right or slow lane.
Ekberg evidently turned on his emergency equipment then and
defendant pulled over to the side of the road.
5. Ekberg approached from the passenger side and observed
defendant as the driver and a woman asleep as the front
passenger.

She remained asleep a few moments, though it was cold

and he had a flash light turned on. Ekberg made several
observations quickly, which of course are not shown on the video.
There was luggage in the rear seat.
and a map was visible.

The vehicle had a GPS unit

Ekberg could see four (4) cell phones

evidently connected together according to his testimony, though
he later admitted they were not all connected to a charger.
Ekberg saw a coffee cup $nd fast food papers, indicating to him
the occupants were driving in a hurry and not desiring to stop.
6. Ekberg asked, at 11:07, how it was going and then asked
where defendant was going.

Defendant said to Chicago.

Ekberg

asked where he had come from, and defendant said Oakland,
California.

Ekberg stated the fast lane is for passing only and

-3-

the rear license plate was not illuminated.

Ekberg then asked

how long defendant was going to be in Chicago and if he had
family there. Ekberg asked, at 11:09, for the rental agreement.
Ekberg testified he saw a Hertz tag on the GPS system, but Ekberg
made clear later on the video that he had seen and called in this
vehicle shortly before stopping it and knew it was a rental
vehicle before he stopped it. Defendant handed a paper to Ekberg
who examined it and it was not a rental agreement but an
inspection paper concerning the vehicle.

While this was going on

Ekberg observed that defendant was uncontrollably nervous,
shaking as he handed the papers to Ekberg.
avoided eye contact.

Defendant also

Ekberg then asked when the vehicle was

rented and how long defendant planned to keep the car.

The

rental showed it was rented in Oakland, at the airport, and was
to be returned to the Chicago airport on January 16, 2009, and
cost over $1200 to rent,

Ekberg asked what they were going to do

in Chicago and was told they were visiting family, amd when asked
who, defendant paused a bit (a few seconds) and stated his uncle,
and Ekberg asked what his uncle's name was.
immediately stated Bob.

Defendant

At that point Ekberg pointed out to

defendant the paper defendant had given Ekberg was not the rental
agreement.

Ekberg asked who the female was and defendant stated

it was his wife.
license.

Ekberg then asked, at 11:10, for defendant's

Ekberg asked if this was all their luggage and the

-4-

female stated no, but also stated there was nothing m

the trunk.

Upon receipt of the license, Ekberg noted it was a Hawaii license
and asked defendant if he lived in Oakland or Hawaii.
said he had a restaurant m

Oakland.

Defendant

Ekberg asked, at 11:14,

other questions about travel, such as where the vehicle was
rented, whether they going to drive back to California, and why
they did not fly.

Defendant stated they wanted to enjoy the

drive and it was cheaper than flying.
plans to stop and stay somewhere.

Ekberg asked if they had

Defendant stated they may go

on to Memphis, and they had grandkids in Birmingham, but had no
set plans.

Defendant said he was semi-retired and was 60 years

old.
7. At 11:14 EKberg went back to his patrol car, and stated
to someone he was going to need a dog, and called evidently his
supervisor or sergeant, Loveland, and asked if Cunningham would
mind coming out. (The court is aware that Summit County Deputy
Sheriff Bryan Cunningham is the handler for a trained drug
detection dog.)

Ekberg then called for a carine unit.

Ekberg

then called into dispatch and asked for checks on defendant's
license and criminal history.
8. Ekbeig was engaged j_n other iadio traffic wxth others d.nd
was talking about the "crazy" story of defendant, and what
evidence Ekberg had as to his suspicions.

Ekberg characterized

the story of defendant as "very, very bizarre." Ekberg stated

-5-

defendant's wife was much, much younger, perhaps in her 20s or
30s and they claimed were going to see grandkids.

In fact the

evidence later showed according to some comments on the video
that defendant's wife was age 65.
9. At 11:22 Ekberg stated he was coming up on 15 minutes and
would go see if he could get consent.

No result was evident from

the dispatch concerning the license of defendant.
10. Ekberg went to defendant and asked him to step out and
they examined the rear license plate light.
everything was alright.

Defendant asked if

Ekberg returned the documents, license

and rental, and issued a verbal warning as to the lane change and
license plate light. Ekberg then asked if he could ask some more
questions.

Defendant stated he wanted to get going.

Ekberg at

11:23 asked if defendant had anything illegal, and named various
drugs and defendant stated no to each inquiry.

Ekberg asked if

he could search the vehicle and defendant stated no.

Ekberg then

stated he would detain defendant, who could wait in defendant's
car, while a canine unit came.
safety.

Ekberg asked for the car keys for

Defendant returned to his vehicle and Ekberg to his

patrol car at 11:25.

Ekberg called in to his supervisors

evidently, and just as the dog arrived the Sargent indicated
defendant had a very old criminal marijuana conviction (from the
1960s) and some other old arrests, and a valid license.
11. The certified dog and its handler arrived at 11:28, and
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was deployed on the vehicle at 11:31.

It indicated aggressively

and strongly on the trunk area, and based on that Ekberg opened
the trunk at 11:33.

Inside the trunk the troopers found what has

proven the be over 76 pounds of marijuana, the subject of this
information and motion. Defendant and his wife were arrested,
though his wife was not charged. They found $2105 cash on
defendant.

DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

THE STOP
1. Ekberg was justified in stopping the vehicle as he
observed an equipment violation.

Ekberg testified the license

plate light was not functioning and there was no other testimony
to the contrary other than the arguments about what is and is not
observable on the video.

Again, the court cannot conclude as

defendant suggests that the light was in fact functioning from an
observation of the video.

The court credits the testimony of

Ekberg. This is true even if the traffic violation stop is a
pretext for what otherwise may be a stop due to an improper
motivation.

State

v.

Chevre,

994 P.2d 1278 (UT App. 2000). From

comments on the video there is little doubt Ekberg was intending
to look for drugs even before the stop.
2. Defendant argues Ekberg's testimony is not credible in
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several respects. The court has examined the video carefully and
compared it to the testimony and defendant's interpretations and
arguments about those sources of information.

The court does not

believe the statements attributed are any thing more than either
exaggeration to superiors or a failure to communicate precisely
or a failure to recall specifics.

The explanation for the

inconsistencies is not, in this court's view, fabrication by
Ekberg.

For example, saying to a superior that defendant took 15

seconds to name his uncle, when in fact a very few seconds passed
after Ekberg asked who was being visited, followed quickly by a
question about his name and defendant giving that name.

That

does not demonstrate Ekberg is lying, only that there are other
factors at play concerning either Ekberg's recollection or his
relationship with his superior.

The court does not find any

"lies" by Ekberg, but as will be discussed, does find errors in
conduct under what this court believes is the law of this state.
3. The other reason given by Ekberg for the stop is not
supported by the law.

Again, the court does not find or conclude

Ekberg is lying about the lane change situation, only that he
misunderstood the law and misapplied it. The court certainly does
not read UCA 41-6a-704 as allowing only passing in the fast lane,
or lane number 1, where there are two lanes of travel.

The

v,

fast" lane is described in the statute as a general purpose lane

and it may be used for travel unless it impedes someone behind in
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that lane.

Thus, Ekberg's belief that defendant impeded his,

Ekberg's travel, is rejected by the court as a valid reason for a
traffic stop.

Driving in the left or fast lane simply, in this

court's view, is not prohibited unless it impedes traffic.

Here,

defendant was in the slow lane, lane number 2, Ekberg came up
behind defendant and defendant moved to the fast lane, Ekberg did
the same, and then concluded defendant was traveling in a lane to
be used only for passing.

An officer must, as defendant argued,

know the law and what it prohibits.

If the officer validly

believes the conduct is a violation of a traffic law and in fact
the conduct is NOT a violation of the law, his good-faith
personal misunderstanding and belief does not justify the stop.
4. Still, here, the stop is valid because of the observed
equipment violation, even though the other reason is not a valid
basis on which to stop a motorist.
5. Vehicle stops used to be considered in the context of
what was often called the "pretext" doctrine.

That standard is

no longer the law and a vehicle stop is fully justified and
lawful EVEN IF the real reason the officer stopped the vehicle
was other than expressed by the officer.
6. When speaking of "pretext" we normally ascribe that
criticism to an action that has a motive which is at odds with
the action.

The "motive" is incompatible with the ordinary

reason for the action.

In a law enforcement action, the issue
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really is: what is to be done (by the courts who review what
officers do) when the police do the right thing for the wrong
reasons, that is, they do a lawful act with an improper motive?
That question has now, with "nails in the coffin," been answered.
The answer is that the courts do nothing.
7. The United States Supreme Court basically has taken the
focus away from why the police act to ask what actions do the
police engage in. If a driver is driving in violation of law, the
police have the right to stop him, regardless of their "true
motive."
8. While many, many commentators have bemoaned this trend
and the status of the law, it clearly is the law of this land.
The "objective" approach has been many years in coming, but it is
here and evidently here to stay at least for the foreseeable
future.

It perhaps started in the early 1970s, perhaps altered

course before 1996, but since then has been solidified and ended
with a recent case originating in Utah.
9. In Whren v.

United

States,

517 U.S.

806

(1996)

the Court

made clear that an officer's subjective motive does not
invalidate "objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
Amendment."

Further, "subjective intentions play no role

ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."

m

The Fourth

Amendment's concern with reasonableness allows actions taken,
whatever the subjective intent.
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10. In another context, the Court in United
Knights,

534 U.S.

112 (2001),

States

v.

dealt with a probation search,

where in the past the intent of the officers and agents had been
relevant.

In this case the Court again held that it had no need

to examine the "official purpose" or actual motivation of the
officers who made the search, to determine whether it was
investigatory or "probationary."
11. Ending any doubt about whether the objective standard
applies not only in "pretext" situations but in general search
and seizure law, the Court in 2006 decided a case from Utah,
Brigkam

City,

Utah

v.

Stuart,

126 S.Ct.

1943

(2006).

In what

would normally be called an "exigent circumstances" case, the
Court quickly rejected a request for a subjective analysis, as to
why the officers "really" entered the residence.

The Court said

"It therefore does not matter . . . whether the officers entered
the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence against
them or to assist the injured and prevent further violence."

The

Court also said clearly that "An action is 'reasonable-' under the
Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of
mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
I 4. v. ,, i

[ tix^ j

_. _ +_ _• ~ ~

dULlUfj.

rr

12. While determining reasonableness of an officer's action,
the court is to consider whether the totality of the
circumstances justify the action under an objective standard,
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regardless of the officer's state of mind.
2007

UT 47.

State

v.

Worwood,

It must be determined (A) whether the "officer's

action [was] justified at its inception;" and (B) whether the
"resulting detention [was] reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified" the stop.
1127,

1131-32

(Utah

State

v.

Lopez,

873 P. 2d

1994).

13. A traffic stop is justified where an officer observes a
traffic violation or equipment violation within his presence.
State v.

Hansen,

2002

UT 125,

1 30.

Examples of observed

violations include improper lane changes, driving without
insurance, indications the driver is driving under the influence,
driving with a false registration, and other infractions.
Worwood,

2007

UT 47,

1 26;

and Hansen,

2002

UT 125,

See

1 30.

14. From this line of cases, the court concludes that1
whether Ekberg secretly desired to search this vehicle for drugs,
upon observing an objectively stated equipment violation, the
stop was legitimate under the constitution. Ekberg's belief that
the law was violated as to the lane change does not legitimize
the stop for the alternate reason of a traffic violation,
however.

THE DETENTION.
15. Once the stop is made, the detention must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of

the stop, to give a warning, citation, or receive some
explanation by the driver. Florida

v. Royer,

460 U.S. 491 (1983).

In a routine traffic stop, the officer may request a license and
registration, conduct a compute check and issue a citation.

Once

those items have been produced, the motorist is entitled to
proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by
police for additional questioning.

Any further temporary

detention for investigative questioning after the fulfillment of
the purpose for the initial traffic stop is justified only if the
officer has reasonable suspicion of other serious criminal
activity.

State

v.

Robinson,

797 P.2d

431

16. Under Utah law, as stated in State
115,

(UT App

v. Baker,

1990).

2008 UT App

a seizure occurs if in view of all the circumstances a

reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.
The State bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
officer's actions during an investigative detention. The officer
may detain the driver to conduct a limited investigation of the
circumstances that caused the detention.

The detention, if it

exceeds the reason for the original traffic stop detention, must
be temporary and necessary and must be based on reasoranle
Suspicion the officer can articulate.

The couit looks to the

totality of the circumstances to determine if there is an
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity and for a
continued detention. "Investigative acts that are not reasonably
-13-

related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for
the stop are permissible only if they do not add to the delay
already lav/fully experienced and do not represent any further
intrusion on the [the detainee's] rights."
17. The duration of a stop is not to be any "longer than
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."
Weaver,

2007 UT App 292,

f 13.

State

v.

"Once the purpose of the initial

stop is concluded... the person must be allowed to depart."
Hansen,

2002 UT 125,

1 31.

Any further detention constitutes an

illegal seizure, "unless an officer has probable cause or a
reasonable suspicion of further illegality."

Id.

However, the

officer must have reasonable suspicion BEFORE the detention
becomes illegal.

See Weaver,

2001

UT App

292.

18. This case highlights that concept and the difficulties
in reviewing the conduct of officers in the field.

Under Utah

cases, the purpose for the stop may be explored but unless there
is reasonable suspicion to conduct other investigation which
lengthens the detention, if the officer delays the motorist, that
investigation is not permissible.

The court examines the length

of the delay as well as the overall reasonableness.

Contrary to

wnat appears to be popular knowledge, as evidenced by Ekberg's
comments that he was "coming up n 15 minutes," courts in general
and the Utah courts have NOT set a "time limit" of any sort.
Reasonableness is the touchstone. Obviously a long delay is
-14-

scrutinized more fully than a delay of 2 seconds while the
officer bends over to pick up his dropped pen.
19. Thus, in a traffic stop this court believes the law is
that an officer may and must pursue that investigation which
caused the stop initially.

That involves, in a case such as

this, an investigation into the equipment violation and even
though mistaken in his belief as to the legitimacy of the stop
for improper lane travel, making sure that the driver is alert,
safe, and not impaired in some way.
20. This case, as well as many others, highlights the
difficulty faced by the officers in the field and by this court
in "reviewing" or "second guessing" what officers do in the
field.

In fact and practice, that is what is involved.

An

officer's conduct is reviewed many miles and months from the
conduct in the field.

As has been said in other contexts, this

review of what occurs in the heat of the day in "mid-battle"
takes place in the cool shade of the evening.

Nevertheless, our

law compels such review.
21.

The unlimited and endless possibilities make it

impossible for the court to adequately explain all possible
scenarios as each case is so fact dependent that generalities are
almost useless. However, the court believes that the Utah cases
require an officer, when a traffic stop is made, to explore first
that traffic stop.

As the cases hold, the officer may ask for
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license and registration, run a check, and then, absent other
suspicion, send the motorist on his way.

Of course the

difficulty is determining, in the field and now on review,
whether that officer has other reasonably objective suspicions
that justify further and other investigation and thus further and
delayed detention.
22. Here, obviously, Ekberg approached the vehicle and began
a discussion not about missing or broken lights, not about lane
travel, but about "where have you been and where are you going."
That discussion clearly detained defendant, three minutes in this
instance, before Ekberg even asked for a rental agreement or
driver's license. (Obviously Ekberg knew when he spoke that this
vehicle was rented, as he had "run" the plate before stopping it
and no doubt could make observations about the vehicle's interior
that showed it was rented, a Hertz sticker on the GPS unit).
23. Thus, contrary to the State's argument, the court
concludes that such an investigatory questioning is, in this
context, not permitted absent other facts yielding reasonable
suspicion.

Again, neither this court nor any court can or should

write a "script" nor envision all possibilities.

Generally,

however, if suspicious circumstances appear to the officer upon
an approach to a vehicle, those may be explored.
24. The court rejects the argument of the State that the
cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
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Circuit allow such routine questioning about travel plans upon
approach to a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

An

examination of those cases, and the court has read the cases
cited by the State, reveals that the law in the federal circuit
appears to be that AFTER asking for license and registration a
limited conversation about travel plans is justified as part of
the traffic stop.

The cases examined do show that the officer in

those, upon approach to the vehicle, acted in the way the Utah
courts require officers to conduct themselves under a
constitutional analysis.
license and registration.

The officer in those cases asked for
DURING that process questions can be

asked about travel plans, but that questioning MAY NOT
substantially delay the temporary detention, especially where the
delay occurs BEFORE the officer even asks for license and
registration.

That is, unless there are other factors that

justify the questioning. The Tenth Circuit often notes in its
cases that the questioning about travel plans did not lengthen
the detention.
F.3d

1262

(10th

See, for example, United
Cirr

States

v.

Williams,

211

2001).

25. The issue, here, is whether Ekberg had such other
information that justified his questioning at the beginning of
the stop, before he asked for registration (rental agreement) and
license.

The court rules and concludes that absent such other

reasonable suspicion, the delay of three minutes BEFORE even
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seeking license and registration is an unlawful detention.
26. To state preposterous extreme examples, if an officer
stops a vehicle for speeding and approaches the vehicle and sees
a bloody corpse in the rear seat, obviously the officer need not
simply ask for license and registration.

The difficulty comes,

of course, NOT when there is a bloody corpse, or smoking gun, or
observable open packages of cocaine for example on the rear seat,
but the difficulty comes when the officer sees what he has been
trained to believe are "indicators" of unlawful (usually drug)
activity that are much more benign than a bloody corpse.
27. Here, that very case presents itself.

Ekberg did not

ask for license and registration until almost 3 minutes had
passed.

Those three minutes were consumed by Ekberg asking about

travel plans, destination, stays, names of uncles, and so forth.
Those questions to this court do not go directly to an
investigation concerning the reasons for the stop, at least on
the surface.

This court does not believe, however, as defendant

argues, that an officer MUST only inquire about what it is that
appears suspicious, though that is certainly possible and often
logical. The officer must purse an investigation that is designed
to quickly confirm or dispel the suspicions.

The precise nature

of that investigation is often common and frequent, but it cannot
be "mapped" by the courts as the facts are so divergent often.
For example, upon approaching a vehicle and observing what
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appears to be a blood spot on the carpeted floor, or possibly the
handle of a gun under the seat, an officer is NOT required to ask
"why is that blood there" or "whose gun is that."

An officer may

use misdirection, or even subterfuge, and may not want to
escalate a situation or alert the occupants as to his
observations until, for example, back up arrives or he has
further confirmed or dispelled his observations and determined it
is not a gun handle but a plastic container.

Thus, the officer

may be justified in such a situation as a typical traffic stop in
asking about travel plans as a "stall" until some other officer
arrives or until the officer can confirm or dispel his suspicions
about the observations he has made.

As an example in this case,

having seen 4 cell phones, a conversation about where defendant
was going may reveal he was a cell phone salesman, thus
dispelling that suspicion.

The conversation about travel may

confirm or dispel the suspicion about the luggage, as it may be
revealed defendant was a salesman with his wares in the trunk.
Thus, there can be no hard and fast rule that an officer must
only ask directly about what he has seen.

There are valid

reasons for asking about travel plans when the results cf that
investigative tactic may reveal whether the driver is fully
alert, or whether he is impaired by fatigue or some substance, or
simply to in other ways confirm or dispel the suspicion evident
from the indicators observed.

The ability or inability to carry
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on a sensible conversation may, of course, give an officer
substantial information about the condition of the driver or his
right to possess

the vehicle as well.

The questioning in this

case does not, on the surface, go to the suspicion observed yet
it would still be a legitimate detention and investigation based
on what the officer saw under certain circumstances. Again,
absent some other indications, however, an officer, in this
court's view based on Utah case law, may not simply engage in a
three minute dialogue about travel plans if that is not designed
to investigate the reasons for the traffic stop or if it is not
based on reasonable suspicion based on other factors.
28. Here, however, Ekberg observed factors he said were
"indicators'" and the court will discuss those further.

However,

the court rejects most of them as being the basis for any
suspicion, even combined with other factors.

The court

understands that clearly both Utah law and United States Supreme
Court law (for example, State v.
2005); United

States

v.

Arvizu,

Markland,
534 U.S.

112 P.3d
266

(2002)

501 (UT
and previous

case law) require the courts to examine the totality of factors
and circumstances and to not examine in isolation the factors, to
nuL
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some factor.
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Nevertheless, there are often advanced

"indicators" that in this court's view are simply not indicators
of anything suspicious, no matter what they are combined with.
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29. Here, the factors the court finds could concern a
reasonable officer, and give rise to some suspicion, are that
there were 4 cell phones immediately visible, luggage m

the rear

seat of a large car, and defendant was extremely nervous.
30. Again, the State asks the court to include the travel
plans as being suspicious.

The court rejects those travel plan

indicators at this point, and their claimed inconsistency, in
this analysis because they beg the question.

The question is,

could Ekoerg ASK about those plans based on what he had seen and
what he knew upon approach to the vehicle.

Again, if, for

example, Ekberg saw what he believed was a marijuana seed, or
smelled marijuana, he may be able to detain and ask questions,
even though they were unrelated to that observation.

There can

be no bright line questions that the courts will "approve" but
the investigation must be logically related to the suspicion the
officer has and must seek to confirm or dispel the suspicion.
31.

That questioning about travel plans would be

permissible IF it occurred during the gatnenng of rne Documents
and during the actual investigation of the traffic violation. The
State did not demonstrate tnat such questions were asked while
tl e docur-nts were being aatnered sacn that tre cuesticnmcr o_^d
not lengtnen the stop beyond the traffic stop.

Clearly, from the

DVD, m e "investigation" of the equipment violation and perceivea
(but wrong) lane violation did not get under way for almost three
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minutes.

The court does not suggest there is only one rote

memorized script law enforcement must apply.

Certainly an

officer can and should be polite, can perhaps ask "where are you
headed" or something to "pass the time," but an officer is NOT
free to begin a dialogue, detaining a motorist, on something
totally unrelated to the reason for the stop unless there are
circumstances that justify such an investigation.
32. In this case much of the suspicion stated by Ekberg were
BECAUSE of the answers given by defendant and Ekberg's
misinformed and perhaps unreasonable belief in the "craziness" of
the story.

Again, for now the court is discounting those,

however, discussing first whether those questions could be asked
based on the objective evidence observed by Ekberg. If the
questions could be asked, the court may consider those questions
and answers about travel plans and any suspicion they reveal, in
the overall equation of whether there was sufficient suspicion to
justify further detention.

If the questioning was impermissible,

the detention was unlawful and the statements given ought not to
be considered as a basis for Ekberg's suspicion.
33. The "indicators" claimed by the State, and stated by
Ekberg, Include the travel plans.

Discounting those, rhe claimed

factors giving suspicion the fact that the car was on 1-80, ihere
was luggage in the rear seat, there were 4 celL phones, a map, a
GPS, a coffee cup, food papers about the vehicle, lack of eye
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contact, the nervousness of defendant, and the female seemed to
remain asleep for awhile even with an open window on a cold
night.

After the license and rental agreement were obtained, it

could be seen by Ekberg this was a one way trip from Oakland to
Chicago in a big, expensive vehicle

($1200 plus) compared to the

quicker, possibly cheaper, air travel and the woman stated they
had more luggage but it was not in the trunk.
34.

Facts that could be construed as indicators of legal

behavior as well as illegal behavior do not carry much weight.

See State

v.

Robinson,

797 P.2d

431

(Utah

Ct.

App.

1990).

Facts

when considered in their totality that give rise to a reasonable
suspicion of further illegality are exemplified by several cases.
Large amounts of money and drugs visible inside rhe passenger
compartment of a vehicle justifies reasonable suspicion.

State

v.

Baker,

2008

UT App 115

(Utah

Ct.

App.

2008) .

See

If during

the traffic stop, an officer smells marijuana, it creates a
reasonable suspicion to prolong investigatory detention.

State v.

Parkin,

2007

UT App 193

(Utah

Ct.

App.

See

2007).

Additionally, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes and the smell of
alcohol gives rise to reasonable suspicion.
47.

See Worv/ood,

2007

UT

Facts thai: may not give rise to reasonable suspicion because

they can be indicators of legal behavior are nervousness, are
lack of eye contact, and a lack of cold weather gear when the
driver is headed to cold location, especially when the driver is
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from an area with a warm climate.
P.2d

431.

See State

v.

Robinson,

797

As to nervousness, the court believes the law is that

"normal" nervousness is of limited significance, but extreme or
uncommon or unusual nervousness is given more weight as a factor.
Of course, this list is not complete, since there may be many,
many other facts that are indicators of both legal and illegal
behavior and they must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
35. The claim of the State is that the questioning was
justified at its inception as simply part of the traffic stop.
That is rejected. That position being rejected, the State's claim
must be that the observations about the vehicle and its contents
and the occupants by themselves amounted to reasonable suspicion
to believe there was criminal activity.

Again, to the court,

given the above law, those factors have to boil down only to the
observation of nervousness, the luggage in the back seat of a big
car, and the 4 cell phones.

The other claimed "indicators" are

so common to all travelers that they cannot possibly, even when
combined with other "legitimate" factors, be considered
suspicious.

Every major city west of Utah could be considered a

drug source city, every major city east of Utah could be
considered a delivery point, every freeway could be considered a
drug corridor, every coffee drinker who needs a map is
suspicious, and on and on.

Rental cars have GPS units in today's

world and that cannot add suspicion, even when combined with
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other factors.

Of course it is well known that drug couriers

often do fly from the east to the west, obtain marijuana, rent a
vehicle and return east in a rental car with the contraband.
Still, rental cars are so common, and they have maps and GPS
devices, such that those factors cannot amount to any suspicion.
The possible suspicious factors are more unusual, more truly
indicative of something out of the ordinary. The list is endless,
but certainly includes of course the actual observation of drugs,
odor masking agents, visible drug paraphernalia, a driver
impaired by drug usage, large amounts of cash and other such
factors.

Of course the court must not dismiss the concept that

officers are also trained to observe things and their experience
must not and is not discounted and it is not discounted.
Traveling on Interstate 80 CANNOT be suspicious in any way.

What

would be suspicious is if a person going a long distance, perhaps
from California or Nevada to a point east, was traveling on small
roads or through the fields and meadows and country side of a
rural area.

Attaching any significance to travel on a freeway

is, in this court's view, simply not what the lav/ allows.
presence of coffee or energy drinks is not a factor.

The

Driving,

even a short distance, is often perceived as boring and something
may be needed for energy.
36. Again, while nervousness alone is insufficient to
justify further detention, the nervousness Ekberg saw was not the

standard factor often mentioned.

This was described as hand

shaking nervousness, stalling in conversation, and after three
minutes of discussion defendant was still shaking, meaning the
initial nervousness of a driver being stopped had not subsided.
The court considers all factors observed by Ekberg and found by
tne court to determine if, in combination, they were objectively
reasonable indications of criminal activity other than the
purpose of the stop.

Here, that nervousness is one factor that

weighs moderately. ''Normal" nervousness is of limited
significance, but nervousness is not a nullity, and extreme
nervousness combined with other suspicious activity may amount to
reasonable suspicion. State

v.

Chevre,

994 P.2d 1278, 1281

(UT

App. 2000)
37. The other factors here that the court believes justify
the questions by Ekberg, combined with the nervousness, are the
cell phones
car.

(4) and luggage being in the rear seat of a large

Again, avoiding and not considering the travel plans, those

items were necessarily readily and quickly observed by Ekberg.
Of course there are innocent explanations for having the luggage
in the rear seat.

A passenger, or driver, may desire to retrieve

items quickly, including snacks or reading material
passenger).

(for the

The paities may have several family members who have

different cell phone numbers.

The fact that there ARE innocent

explanations does not mean to a trained officer, however, that
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such officer cannot reasonably articulate those as being
suspicious.

The four cell phones are certainly unusual,

especially for two people. Whether Ekberg was right or wrong
about being hooked up to chargers, four cell phones is not normal
and standard for two people in a rental car.

A trained officer

could readily conclude, objectively, that the reason the luggage
is in the back seat and not the trunk of a large vehicle with
presumably a large trunk is because something else is in the
trunk.
38.

This trained officer no doubt believed the items he saw

and their configuration were indicative of someone possibly
possessing and moving drugs, and from an objective standpoint the
court must agree.
39. The State urges that during the wait for the canine,
Ekberg learned defendant had a drug conviction in the 1960s.

The

court rejects that as any basis for reasonable suspicion given
the age of that conviction and the age of this defendant, age 60.
A criminal history may or may not be a legitimate factor, at
another point in time depending on circumstances, but not in this
instance.

Further, it is in this case irrelevant as there was

reasonable suspicion without such information that justified the
detention and this information added nothing and came only during
the wait for the drug detection dog.
40. Once the questioning began at the initial encounter,
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the answers' to questions may or may not provide a basis to
conclude legally that reasonable suspicion exists. The travel
plans and conversation may or may not "add" to the level of
suspicion, depending on what is asked and what is answered. In
this case it is not necessary to fully decide that, because the
detention was already lawful based on the factors observed and
discussed (four cell phones, luggage in the rear seat, and
extreme nervousness).

To the extent the court needs to determine

that issue, this is a close case.

Many cases involve travel

plans that clearly are very suspicious. (I am going to visit a
friend in Wyoming but I don't know what city he lives, for
example.) Some are not suspicious from an objective basis.
case is not on either end of the spectrum.

This

The court agrees that

these travel explanations were somewhat suspicious, but
objectively not as suspicious as Ekberg believed them to be, even
given his training.

Fairly considered, a semi-retired man rented

a $1200 vehicle to drive to Chicago rather than fly;

Ekberg's

characterization of the "craziness" involving Memphis and
Birmingham arose, the court believes, simply because Ekberg did
not fully understand what defendant was saying.

The plans are

not in any sense, to this court, "crazy" but even with the
presumable wealth that may or may not come with age, there is
some "unusualness" in renting an expensive car for a short (in
time) trip. Again, using as a basis that the trip began in
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California cannot be suspicious, even a city such as Oakland
whatever connotations that elicits.

and

Ekberg did not in fact know

the cost to fly to Chicago, but assumed renting a car for $1200
was more than flying.

Even if it is, people drive rather than

fly for many valid reasons, despite costs.

It is not certain,

and the court has no idea as to airfares at any given time.
However, certainly taking 3-4 days to drive to Chicago when 3-4
hours by air could achieve the same result causes one to wonder
why a person would do that if the stay in Chicago was only for a
few days.

However, many people perhaps do want to take a "road

trip" and "see the country" on the way.

Still, an officer is not

unreasonable in believing, even without knowledge, that such a
plan is a bit unusual.

However, that does not make it

necessarily suspicious but it certainly is a factor to examine in
determining whether there is overall reasonable suspicion,
combined with the other three "major" factors.

The court does

not find that the remainder of the facts revealed by the travel
discussion unusual.

As noted, the one way rental may give some

suspicion, but defendant indicated he was not sure of his plans
after Chicago, whether he would go to Memphis, Birmingham, or
drive or fly back to California.

Again, some suspicion may arise

from a knowledge of that fact, but it is not of great
significance.

After obtaining the rental agreement, the woman

stated they had more luggage but it was not in the trunk.
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That,

of course, is certainly an odd statement, leading an officer to
wonder just where that other luggage is if not in the car or in
the trunk.

That comment certainly gives some suspicion adding to

the equation.
41. Thus, because the court has concluded that Ekberg had
sufficient reasonable suspicion based on his observations
(extreme nervousness, 4 cell phones, luggage in rear seat) to ask
about travel plans and delay the stop, the information learned
about those travel plans may also be considered in the totality
of circumstances in determining whether the detention was
justified by the suspicion the officer had.
it was so justified.

The court concludes

Ekberg thus was acting lawfully when he

asked for consent to search.

DETENTION WHILE AWAITING CANINE UNIT.
42. Here, no consent was given but the further detention was
justified by the factors above described.
43. Again, in this court's view, there is seemingly some
belief that there is a time frame during which a motorist may be
required to await the arrival of a canine.
The rest is again one of reasonableness.

That is not the law.
In a rural area, it

will naturally take longer for a drug detention dog to arrive
than it will in an urban setting where a vehicle is stopped 3
blocks from the police station. Recently our court has observed
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that in this particular realm, of waiting for a drug dog, and
this court believes the comments apply to all such judicial
reviews of police conduct, the courts are not to micro-manage the
second by second conduct of a police officer.
to judicial second guessing.

That amounts only

In determining if an officer acted

reasonably in obtaining a canine to the scene, the overall
reasonableness is examined, not the second by second conduct of
State

the officer.

v.

Wilkinson,

2008

Ut App 395.

This court, as

noted, believes those comments apply also to the traffic stop
itself in that the courts cannot and do not require use of a stop
watch by an officer nor require a particular script.
44. Here, Ekberg acted expeditiously.

When Ekberg returned

ro his patrol car, at 11:14 he asked if Cunningham could come to
the scene.
at 11:27.

Ekberg asked for consent at 11:24.

The dog arrived

This stop was some 12 miles from the Summit County

Sheriff' s Office, where presumably Cunningham was.
deployed at 11:31.

After the alert, which amounted to probable

cause to search the vehicle {United

1523 (10tn Cir.

The dog was

1993),)

States

v.

Ludwig,

defendant was arrested.

10

F.3d

The court

concludes that the conduct of Ekberg in detaining defendant for
purposes of having the canine present was reasonable and
expeditious, was based on reasonable suspicion, and the detention
while awaiting the dog was reasonable and based on reasonable
suspicion.
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CONCLUSION
The court believes here the traffic stop, based entirely on
the objective standard, was justified as the officer saw an
equipment violation, whatever his true "motive" was.
Upon approach to the vehicle, the officer is required to and
may obtain license, registration, and run a computer check.
Absent some other reasonable suspicion, the officer may not delay
the stop or detention beyond what is required to complete the
traffic stop, and the officer may not simply engage in a
discussion for 3 minutes about travel plans, again absent some
suspicion to do so.
Here, the officer had such suspicion based on his
observations upon approaching the vehicle.

Those observations

consisted of the extreme nervousness of defendant, the presence
of luggage in the rear seat given the size of the car, and the
presence of 4 cell phones with two people in the car.

The

officer, upon seeing those, thus had reasonable suspicion to
justify further and delayed detention and further investigation.
The courts cannot and do not write a script for officers, and the
questioning undertaken to explore and confirm or dispel those
suspicions arising from observations about a vehicle's contents
is to be related in scope to the suspicion, but the questioning
need not be directed solely at those suspicions as the motorist
need not be "tipped" that the officer has such suspicions. Based
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on the observations, and the information gathered by the
discussion, the officer here had sufficient suspicion to justify
detaining the motorist and the passenger.

Upon asking for and

being denied consent to search, a drug detection dog was
reasonably summoned and alerted, yielding probable cause to
search the vehicle.

The motion to suppress is DENIED.

This matter is set for a status conference for August 17,
2009, at 8:30 a.m. to determine whether a trial will be scheduled
or there will be some other disposition.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.

i
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Addendum B

Unofficial partial transcript — viaeo 01 name siop
Approximate times in brackets

Trooper:

Summit 526, 10-60 [23:07]

Dispatch:

526

Trooper:

159 East bound. Texas Delta Mike X-ray 116

Dispatch:

526, 10-60, 159 East bound 1-80, 2307

Trooper:

Good evening. Here, I'll come talk to you, so that I don't wake up these
guys.

(inaudible)
Trooper:

How's it going? I'm Niel. [23:08]

Driver:

Fm doing fine.

Trooper:

Okay. I'm Niel Ekberg from the Highway Patrol. Where are you headed
tonight?

Driver:

We're heading to Chicago.

Trooper:

To Chicago? Where are you guys coming from?

Driver:

California.

Trooper:

Okay, are you from Chicago or?

Driver:

Uh, no, I'm just visiting family there.

Trooper:

You're just visiting family? Are you, so, you are from California?

Driver:

Yes, Sir.

Trooper:

What part of California?

Driver:

Um, uh, Oakland.

Trooper:

Oakland? Ok, um, the reason why I'm stopping you, you, here in the State
of Utah, the number 1 lane is actually designated for passing only. I was
just wondering why you were moving back into that number 1 lane

Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop
Approximate times in brackets

Driver:

Oh, I, I didn't know that.

Trooper:

You didn't know that? Okay. And then also, I know you are out of state
and this is a rental, but the back, uh, rear plates need to be illuminated here
in the State of Utah as well.

Driver:

So, my lights aren't working?

Trooper:

No they're, in fact, let's see. Yeah, the lights that are supposed to
illuminate the, the plate aren't working on this.

Driver:

Okay.

Trooper:

So, you'll probably have to let Hertz,

Driver:

I guess that I'll have to go to a gas station.

Trooper:

Hertz, you'll have to let Hertz know about that.[23:09]

Driver:

Okay.

Trooper:

So, how long do you plan on staying in Chicago?

Driver:

Umm, probably for a few days.

Trooper:

Just for a few days.

Driver:

Yeah.

Trooper:

You said that your, you were visiting family.

Driver:

Yes, I am.

Trooper:

Ok, and just for a few days, huh? Making that big long trip for just a few
days.

Driver:

Well, my, we've got a, we've got a, yeah, we are.

Trooper:

Okay. Do you have the rental agreement for the car?

Driver:

I do.

Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop
Approximate times in brackets

Trooper:

When did you rent the car?

Driver:

Uhh, yesterday.

Trooper:

Just yesterday? Okay, how long have you had the trip planned for?

Driver:

Oh, just ummm, a little while.

Trooper:

Just a little while.

Driver:

Yeah.

Trooper:

Okay. What part of your, who, what family members you visiting in
Chicago?

Driver:

I'm actually visiting my. my, uh, my uncle over there.

Trooper:

Your uncle, okay. What's your uncle's name?

Driver:

Bob

Trooper:

Bob? Okay.

Driver:

Bob's his name.

Trooper:

All right This is all of the rental agreement you have? [23:10]

Driver:

I think so.

Trooper:

Does it have, this is just, this is a pre-rental inspection form.

Driver:

(inaudible)

Trooper:

Who, who, who, uh, who's with ya? Who, who is this with ya?

Driver:

This is my wife.

Trooper:

Oh, it's your wife? Okay and I woke her up, I apologize.

Driver:

It's okay.

Trooper:

You're missing all the scenery here in Utah.

Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop
Approximate times in brackets

Driver:

Yeah, well, we're trying to get, trying to do a mad drive out there.

Trooper:

Yeah? I bet, umm, you're Gary?

Driver:

Yes, I am.

Trooper:

Okay, do you have a valid driver's license, Gary?

Driver:

I do.

Trooper:

All your guy's luggage is just sitting in the back seat here?

Driver:

No.

Trooper:

What was that?

Driver:

Uh, no.

Trooper:

You got more luggage in the

Driver:

Here you go.

Trooper:

So, you're from Hawaii?

Driver:

Well, I do, I have a residence over there as well.

Trooper:

Oh, wow! So, okay, so how long have you lived in, in Oakland? [23:11]

Driver:

Oh, we just got a home, we actually it is (inaudible) island, it's close
enough.

Trooper:

What was that?

Driver:

It's close enough, (inaudible)

Trooper:

Oh, the, in Oakland?

Driver:

Yeah.

Trooper:

Okay.

Driver:

We've got a restaurant there, so. That's what Uncle Bob is doing back.

Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop
Approximate times in brackets

Trooper:

Mmhmm, all right. Where, where, did you rent the, the car exactly?

Driver:

In Oakland.

Trooper:

Okay. Just at a local Hertz place?

Driver:

Yes, Sir.

Trooper:

All right, so when you're done going to Chicago are you going to drive
back?

Driver:

No, we're probably not.

Trooper:

What makes you want to drive out to Chicago, instead of fly out?

Driver:

Well, you now it's actually something that we are going to be enjoying on
the ride as well.

Trooper:

Okay, do you, do you have any place in mind to stop?

Driver:

Well, when we get tired, we'll stop. [23:12]

Trooper:

But you, you said you wanted to enjoy the ride out there?

Driver:

Yeah, we'll probably, I think we just past Ut, umm, Salt Lake City, so I
think probably, umm, another hour or so and we'll pull over.

Trooper:

Okay. Uh, so, you're going to fly back home to Oakland from Chicago?

Driver:
Trooper:
Driver:

(inaudible) back down to Memphis, we have a friend who lives there.
Okay.
So.

Trooper:

Umm, okay. So, what made you want to drive from Oakland to, to
Chicago?

Driver:

Well, just, umm, just less expensive for it.

Trooper:

Right.

Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop
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Driver:

(inaudible)

Trooper:

Right. Do you, do you want to fly back?

Driver:

Well, we're either going to fly back or go down to Memphis and fly back.

Trooper:

Don't you mean fly down to Memphis?

Driver:

We might drive, I don't know.

Passenger:

We have no really good plan.

Trooper:

Okay.

Passenger:

We just kind of took, uh,

Driver:

We've got our grandkids down in, uh, in Birmingham, so we have to go
through Memphis. [23:13]

Trooper:

Okay. So did you, were you going to fly from Chicago doAvn to Memphis
maybe?

Driver:

No.

Trooper:

or drive or rent another car or what?

Driver:

You know we really don't have, uh

Trooper:

. No plans?

Driver:

No plans.

Trooper:

Are you guys retired, working or

Driver:

We're retired pretty much I'm 60 years old.

Trooper:

Okay, it's nice, it would be nice to be able to do that I'd say. Okay, so,
what, were you guys going plan on staying anywhere in between here and
Chicago, just 'til you get tired or.

Driver:

No, we'll probably (inaudible)

Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop
Approximate times in brackets

Trooper:

In Utah, you're going to stay?

Driver:

Probably

Trooper:

Okay, you don't have that much more left of Utah

Driver:

Oh really?

Trooper:

You only have about (inaudible) five miles of Utah, then you get into
Wyoming.

Driver:

Well, I know, Cheyenne is probably the next stop, so.

Trooper:

Well, Cheyenne is pretty far, so.

Driver:

Is it? How far is it? So,

Trooper:

You're looking

Driver:

So, where would be the next city to stop in?

Trooper:

You've got little towns ma, most, the biggest major city you'll, is Evanston,
it's still not really big, but Cheyenne is obviously, you're looking at 10
hours away still so. [23:14]

Driver:

To Cheyenne?

Trooper:

Yeah.

Driver:

Oh, man.

Trooper:

Cause Cheyenne, still clear, you got to drive clear across Wyoming to get
to Cheyenne.

Driver:

Ok.

Trooper:

So, umm, all of your luggage is in the back seat here?

Driver:

Pretty much.

Trooper:

You, you don't have anything in the trunk or anything? Do you, do you
have your luggage in the trunk?

Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop
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Driver:

No.

Trooper:

Nothing? Okay. Hang tight, let me go back and make sure everything's
current and valid, okay.

Driver:

Okay.

Trooper:

Oh, I need a dog. Think Cunningham will mind coming out here?

Cunningham:No, we'd love to.
Trooper:

Okay, 51, 526.

51:

Go ahead. [23:15]

Trooper:

Arevou 10-6?

51:

Negative.

Trooper:

Can you be in route to my location for a sniff?

51:

Not a problem.

Trooper:

Summit, 526, can I get a 27-29 check out of Hawaii?

Dispatch:

10-4, 526, go ahead.

Trooper:

by number Hotel 01031771 and if you can do a triple I on that as well.

Dispatch:

10-4 [23:16]

598:

Summit, 598, IT1 be out with 526. [23:17]

Dispatch:

598,23-17

598:

Hey, now, we are going to just hang tigh back here until you need our
assistance.

Trooper:

10-4

Cunningham: Have you got to the consent part yet?

Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop
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Trooper:

No, Fm running his license and seeing if he has any triple I, Fm going to
go talk to him. Eh, crazy story, crazy travel plans, big 'ol rental, Lincoln
Town car and luggage is in the back seat and he says nothing is in the
trunk. But, yeah, his story, he's got very, very bizarre travel plans. [23:18]

Cunningham: I like it.
Trooper:

From Oakland, California by the way.

Cunningham: Hate the Raiders.
Trooper:

Couldn't tell me his, uh, his uncle's name for about 15 seconds.

Cunningham: Sounds like another one is getting ready to bite the dust to me.
[23:19 to 23:20]
Trooper:

This rental cost twelve hundred and twenty-three dollars and, uh, they
wanted to drive from Oakland to Chicago because it is too expensive to fly
and they're going to fly back from Chicago to Oakland in two days.
[23:21]

Cunningham: (inaudible) He's prob, he's probably unemployed too.
Trooper:
(inaudible)
Trooper:

No, he's retired. He's an older guy. 1948.

We have two, actually. There's, his, uh, wife who's much, much younger
in the passenger seat, she was completely asleep laid out. Fm going to go
see, uh, if he'll grant me consent, right now before Cunningham. Fm
pushing my 15 minutes on the stop right now. Fm going to go give him his
warning. [23:22]

181:

Summit, 181 with 526.

Dispatch:

181,23-22

Trooper:

Hey, Gary, can I have you step out of the car back here, let me talk to you
out here.

Trooper:

(inaudible) for a couple of days, right? And then you don't know where
you're going from there?
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Driver:

No, we are going to be going down to, as I said, to visit our kids in
Birmingham, our grandkids. [23:23]

Trooper:

Okay.

Driver:

So. Is everything ok?

Trooper:

Yeah, ummm. Let me, uh, going to give you a warning for the light, like I
said, these lights are suppose to be illuminating this plate.

Driver:

Those are the back up lights, sir.

Trooper:

Well, uh, either way, there's that light right there, there is supposed to be a
light there.

Unknown:

Yeah, that's broken.

Trooper:

That's what that is.

Driver:

We'll get that taken care of.

Trooper:

And in the State of Utah, well,

(Inaudible)
Trooper:

The State of Utah that number one lane is passing only.

Driver:

Okay.

Trooper:

I'm going to give you a warning for that.

Driver:

Thank you.

Trooper:

Umm, you said that you were retired, you don't have a job right, you don't
mind if I ask you some more questions do you?

Driver:

Well, I'd like to get going, there's no reason, you know, I own a restaurant
I'm in commercial property.

Trooper:

I thought you were retired.

Driver:

Well, I'm 60.
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Trooper:

Dri\ en

So owning the property. \_:• ._-*]

Trooper:

uLiy, so, he: J. here's : ' •

"

-.jl

in this vehicle do you\
Driver:
•. ,

No, Sir.
) " : i i.""i ;:!: II i 1 1 laulii lg any kind of drugs1:

Driver:

NO, blT,

Trooper;

No marijuana?

1 H i \ ',1*1

No. Sir.

Trooper:

[\jn | n ' | ' l i l f *

Driver:

No, Sir.

Trooper:

No cocaine? No

Trooper:

No methamphetamines

Driver:

No. Thank you. •

Trooper:

Can I search ujui car""/

Driver: '

No

Trooper:

Okay.

Driver:

1" J :>.

Trooper:

Let's have you sit tight, you're, you're going to be detained right now. We
are going to call for a K-9 and have them sniff around the car. Okay.

Driver:

Oh, Okay.
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Trooper:

Okay.

Driver:

You don't have to do that.

Trooper:

So, well, I am going to do that. Let me just have you, we can have you just
detained in the car. The K-9 will be here any moment.

Driver:

Oh, Okay

Trooper:

Okay.

Driver:

Fine

Trooper:

Okay.

Unknown:

Have them take the keys out.

Trooper:

Sir, let me have your keys, if you don't mind. Just for our safety. And you
can sit back in the car until we get the dog here, okay. [23:25]

Trooper:

What's the

Unknown:

I'm going to sniff that damn trunk, can you (inaudible) before the dog gets
here.

Trooper:

No, its, no, I got, everything's cool.

Unknown:

huh?

Trooper:

Yeah, dude, he's, he's busted.

Unknown:

Non

Trooper:

It's going to be good.

Unknown:

Non-consent?

Trooper:

Completely, no way and then he told me how

Unknown:

He hasn't had, a really, really old triple I, marijuana years ago, hitchhiking
years and years ago all back in the 60s and he's got a valid DL.

unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop
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Trooper:

Dude, he told me the reason he's driving from Oakland to Chicago is cause
it is so expensive to fly. That rental is twelve hundred dollars alone. Then
he said.

Unknown:

That's more than flying one way.

Trooper:

Then I asked him if he, are you going to fly back to Oakland and he's like
well, maybe, well we might drive down to see our grandkids in Memphis.
I'm like okay, so you're going to fly or drive down there, oh, maybe drive,
and I'm like so, you're going to rent another car, well, no, maybe fly down
there. So, you're going to just fly, it was great. [23:26]

Unknown:

That's awesome.

Trooper:

I talked to him for like, uh, ten minutes about the his trip it was just
everything was weird, all the indicators are in there, this map, uh, GPS, all
of his luggage is in the back seat.

Unknown:

And she way is younger than him.

Trooper:

Oh, she is way younger than him.

Unknown:

But they have grandkids?

Trooper:

Yeah.

Unknown:

He's scratching his head.

Trooper:

He's sweating bullets.

Unknown:

Look at him, dude.

Unknown 2: (inaudible) no, I didn't want him to take off.
Trooper:

No, it's cool. I'm just glad that I, uh

Unknown 2: Sit back here until the dog gets here.
Unknown:
(inaudible)

Want to sniff the trunk?
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Trooper:

Well, there's markings just like the hundred pounds, but yeah, we can.
[23:27]

Unknown:

Nippy

Trooper:

What was that?

Unknown:

Nippy, outside tonight.

Trooper:

I'm getting my hat on.

Unknown:

I here ya, I'm

Trooper:

I'm all sorts of excitement.

Unknown:

I haven't worn my hat tonight yet or that new coat I haven't worn it yet.

Trooper:

So, the 10-84 was, uh, for the triple I?

Unknown:

Really, really old triple I.

Trooper:

On, on

Unknown:

For misdemeanor stuff, nothing for a long time.

Trooper.

We got our dog here, so its less, less than one half hour.

Unknown:

I'm just going to sit back here and watch it. [23:28]

Trooper:

Except for, I, I don't know if I was mic'd when I was talking to him when I
asked for consent.

Trooper:

You're going to be (inaudible)

K-9 Trooper: Yeah.
Trooper:

Okay, uh, older dude twelve hundred dollar rental Lincoln Town car , from
Oakland, California to Chicago, they're driving to Chicago, cause it is so
expensive to fly. Twelve hundred bucks, they're going to be in Chicago a
couple of days. He says he didn't have a job, he's, oh he's retired, he's got
a really young wife, probably in her 20s, 30s, passenger seat, but yet they
have grandkids in Memphis, Tennessee. And then when asked they're just
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going to be in Chicago for a couple of days, story goes on an on and on. He
said that he was going to fly back to Oakland from Chicago, then they
weren't sure. Umm, tons of indicators, all the luggage is in the back seat,
asked them if there is anything in the trunk and then, uh, so, I gave him
back all of his stuff, gave him a warning for all the stuff I stopped him for,
then I did, the, the questions and he totally denied me, then straight up no.
He does have 10-84 or for the you heard the triple I [23:29]
K-9 Trooper: Adult?
Trooper:

Yep.

K-9 Trooper: Okay, get them both out 15 feet in front of the car.
Trooper:

Cool. He would like both occupants to be 15 feet in front of the car.

Trooper:

All right, Gary, the dog has arrived, he's asking, you guys need to come out
of the car and be about 15 feet up here, we'll watch you, if you guys have
coats or what not you can get those out. [23:30]

Trooper:

Are you just getting a coat, jacket, what are you getting?

Driver:

Woo.

Trooper:

A little nippy, it is. A little colder than California.

(inaudible)
Trooper:

You guys don't have any knives or weapons on you, nothing? [23:31]

Passenger:

No.

Trooper:

Okay. Yeah, just, you'll be safer over here in the grass over here.

K-9 Trooper: Have them keep going a little bit further.
Trooper:

Little bit farther. Is that good?

K-9 Trooper: Yeah. [23:32]
Trooper:

That's good.

Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop
Approximate times in brackets
Trooper:

We need to get them separated. Hey, Josh, can you go get them separated?
Let's keep them separated. [23:33]

Trooper 1:

What do you need?

Trooper:

I'm just having them separate them.

K-9 Trooper: Oh, yeah, there's pot in there.
Trooper:

All right. Actually, I got the keys. See if we got the automatic trunk, ah,
here we go.

Trooper 2:

There it is.

Trooper:

You take her I'll take him. Gary, do not move. Do not move from your
position. Keep your hands out of your pockets. Put your arms behind your
back, for your safety do not move, do you understand? I'm going to put
two cuffs to make it more comfortable, okay, (inaudible) [23:34]

Driver:

Yeah, I had my shoulder operated on.

Trooper:

All right, (inaudible) big wide shoulders. Okay, you're under arrest.

Trooper:

Summit, 526, 10-82, a male and a female, 10-35 (inaudible)

Dispatch:

10-4 (inaudible)
[23:35 to 23:38]

Trooper:

It's awesome guys, it's like looking for drugs tonight and then, you know
I'm going, cause he had something at the view area, um, so we're going
over there and he let them go, see, and I pass this guy in toll gate and
(inaudible) as soon as I pull up on him, I saw a town carfiromTexas and he
started tapping his breaks and I kind of passed him, I had already ran his
plate when it came back as a Hertz rental, I slowed up, cause Loveland 22'd
me and then he, uh, what's weird is I got behind him and I noticed that he
didn't have, the light's burned out there, so, that was one of the reasons
why I stopped him. Then he just pulled in the number one lane and not
passing anybody, so left lane violation. [23:39]

K-9 Trooper: How much is in there?

unomciai partial transcript — video ot trattic stop
Approximate times in brackets
Trooper:

I'm guessing a little over a hundred.
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PARK CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JUNE 2, 2009, 9:42 A.M.
-oooOoooTHE COURT:

So we'll call State versus Duhaime.

Mr. Duhaime is here with Mr. Metos.
And, Ms. Natale, you said you had two witnesses or
just one on this?
MR. METOS:

I expect the second witness will be

fairly short.
MS. NATALE:

It will.

THE COURT:
I recall.

Okay.

And that was Trooper Ekberg, as

And who else?
MS. NATALE:

I'm sorry, Your Honor?

THE COURT:
come up.

He will.

Your other witness?

Let's have them

Let's get —
MS. NATALE:

Okay.

THE COURT:

- let's go along.

Step up, take an

oath, gentlemen, and...
(Whereupon, the potential witnesses
for this case were duly sworn by
the clerk.)
THE COURT:

All right, gentlemen, whoever's not

testifying first step outside, and don't talk about your
testimony until you're in the courtroom.

And your first

witness is Trooper Ekberg again.
Again, tell us your name and spell it, please.

THE WITNESS :

1
2

My name is Niel Ekberg, N-i-e-1 E--k-

i b - e-r--g.

3

THE COURT:

Thank you.

4

Ms. Natale?
NIEL EKBERG,

5
6

called as a witness by the State of Utah,

7

being first duly sworn, was examined

8

and testified on his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

9
10

BY MS. NATALE

Q.

11
12

And y o u ' r e p r e s e n t l y employed as a trooper with

the Utah Highway P a t r o l ; i s t h a t c o r r e c t ?

13

A.

Yes, I am.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

And how long have you been a trooper,

again?

16

A.

Approximately three years.

17

Q.

Okay.

Drawing your attention to January the 14th

18

of 2009, do you recall participating in a traffic stop

19

involving a black 2008 Lincoln Town Car on that particular

20

day?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And do you recall the location where you first

23
24
25

observed that car?
A.

Approximately milepost 158 on Interstate 80 in

Summit County.

1

Q.

Thank you.

And do you recall what time y o u

first

2 I observed that car?
3

A.

It was approximately 2306 at night.

4

Q.

And what drew your attention to it?

5

A.

The vehicle's back rear license plate was very

6

hard to read and I noticed that it had — it did not have a

7

working rear plate light.

8
9

Q.

Okay.

As you observed the vehicle, were y o u -

were you stationary or moving when you first saw it?

10 I

A.

I was moving.

11

Q.

You were moving.

Okay.

So upon first noticing

12

that it was hard to read the plate, did you then try and get

13

closer to the vehicle to determine whether or not the light

14

was working?

15

A.

Yes, I did.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

And so you were able to get close enough to

determine that it wasn't illuminated.

18 |

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

Okay.

20 J

A.

When I got closer in back of the vehicle to see if

Did you observe anything else?

21 I the light wasn't working, the vehicle changed lanes into the
22 i No. 1 lane.

There was no traffic at all on the interstate;

23 | I thought it was odd that he was going into the passing to
24

pass no vehicles.

So I followed and turned on my lights to

25 I stop the vehicle.

5

Q.

So what were the reasons, then, for the traffic

A.

Failure to illuminate the rear license plate and

1
2
3

Stop?

4

the left lane - he was actually traveling below the speed

5

limit when he moved into the No. 1 lane.

6

reason for him to be in the No. 1 lane.

7

about the impeding the traffic in that No. 1 lane.

8
9

Q.

Okay.

So I advised him

And there was no reason for him to be in

the No. 1 lane because there was no one else around to pass?

10 I

A.

No other traffic around.

11

Q.

All right.

12
13

There was no

I understand.

And you also mentioned that the car appeared to be
traveling below the posted speed limit?

14

A. Yes.

15

Q.

What is the posted speed limit there?

16

A.

The posted speed limit is 70 miles per hour.

17

Q.

And approximately what speed was this black

18
19

Lincoln Town Car traveling?
A.

Approximately 60 to 70 miles per hour, 10 miles

20 I per hour under.
21 I

Q.

I'm sorry, what was it?

22

A.

From 60 to 65 miles per hour.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

Correct.

25 I

Q.

And how did you determine that?

So five to ten miles an hour under.

Was that j u s t a

visual estimation or did you confirm that with radar?
A.

I confirmed it with front moving and I paced him

with my own speed.
Q.

Okay.

Front moving meaning?

A.

The radar.

Q.

Okay.

Did you initiate a traffic stop based on

what you had observed?
A.

Yes.

Q. * And what time was the stop made?
A.

At approximately 2306.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Within minutes of when I saw the — the violation.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And upon the car pulling over and you pulling up

Did the car pull over immediately?

behind it, is there anything you do before you exit your —
your vehicle and go up to the car to make contact with the
driver?
A.

I exit and walk around my vehicle and approach on

the passenger side.
Q.

Okay.

So what time did you make — does — if your

report indicates, contact with the driver of that car?
A.

2308.

Q.

So approximately two minutes or so after you first

observed the car.
7

A.

Correct.

Q.

And the driver of that particular vehicle that you

had stopped, do you see him in the courtroom today?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

And is it the defendant, Mr. Duhaime?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Who's seated at counsel table?
MR. METOS:

We'll stipulate to his identification,

Judge.
MS. NATALE:

Okay.

Q.

How did you identify Mr. Duhaime?

A.

Mr. Duhaime provided me with a Hawaii driver's

license.
Q.

Photo.
Okay.

Did you determine whether or not the

vehicle belonged to Mr. Duhaime?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And what did you determine with respect to that?

A.

Again, I — I observed that it was a — a rental

vehicle and asked for the rental agreement.
Q.

Did you look at that rental agreement?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And what did it indicate?

A.

It was a one-way rental from Oakland, California

to Chicago, Illinois.

And the thing that drew my attention

to the rental was that it was a very expensive rental.
8

1

Q.

How expensive?

2

A.

It was approximately $1,200.

3

Q.

Was Mr. Duhaime the only person in the car?

4

A.

No.

5

front seat.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

There was a female passenger sleeping in the

So just the two of them?

Did the rental agreement indicate who the

renter of the vehicle was?

10 I

A.

Yes.

11 I

Q.

Okay.

It was rented by Mr. Duhaime.
Was there anything in particular — just

12

talking about the rental agreement — that aroused your

13

suspicions?

14

A.

That it was due back in Chicago and that it was

15 I very expensive, that it was due at the Chicago Midway
16
17 I

airport, and it was also rented at the Oakland airport.
Q.

Was there anything significant to you about either

18 I it being rented in Oakland or being returned to Chicago?
19
20
21 I

A.

Correct.

It was — it was due back in Chicago in a

couple of days.
Q.

I guess my question, though, was there anything

22 I that made you suspicious just based on the locations where
23

it was rented from or being returned to?

24

A.

Yes.

25 I

Q.

What?

A.

Just - it was rented at Oakland airport and it was

due back at the Chicago airport.
Q.

But why are Oakland or Chicago significant to you?

A.

Major cities.

From prior experience, drug

traffickers fly from the east to the west coast, pick up the
drugs and drive them back east.
Q.

Based on your training and experience, is Oakland

a major distribution center from which A.

Yes.

Q.

— drugs leave?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

Now, as you were speaking with the

defendant, did you notice anything else, any other
indicators or things that made you suspicious that there
might be drug activity or criminal activity afoot?
A.

Yes. Mr. Duhaime was very, very nervous in

answering questions about his trip, his origination and his
destination.

He was very unsure of his answers.

Every

answer that he would answer, he would look up and stall as
if he was seeking and making up the answer as he was going
along.

He avoided eye contact when answering those simple

questions.

His travel circumstances were very, very

suspicious.
Q.

Can you elaborate on that?

A.

Yes. He — he provided me different versions of
10

1

why he was making this one-way trip from Oakland to Chicago.

2 ! He first stated that he was going to visit his — a family
3

member.

I asked what family member; he had a hard time

4

telling me what family member.

5

visiting his uncle.

6

he blurted out "Bob" and said, "Yes, Bob's his name."

7
8
9

He told me that he w a s

I asked him what his uncle's name was;

He just acted very nervous and unsure of these
simple questions.
Q.

Anything else?

10 I be nervous.

You mentioned that he appeared to

Other than being unsure or somewhat

11

inconsistent in his answers, did you notice any other

12

physical behavior that made you think that he was nervous?

13

A.

Just the way he was talking and answering

14

questions.

15

he had a hard time answering those questions.

16

Q.

It seemed like he had a frog in his throat and

Did you observe any shaking, sweating, anything

17 I like that?
18

A.

No.

19 I

Q.

Okay.

Okay.

So the suspicious travel

20 I circumstances, I think you —
21 i
22

A.

When I asked for the rental agreement, he also had

a hard time finding that rental agreement.

And when he

23 I located what he thought was the rental - he gave me a
24

vehicle inspection form that wasn't the rental agreement.

25

And so I actually had to tell him that that wasn't the
11

rental agreement.
Q.

Did he have any difficulty producing his license

or just the rental agreement?
A.

Just the rental agreement.

Q.

Okay.

So you mentioned - I think the third

indicator or so that you mentioned was the suspicious travel
circumstances?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What, if any, other indicators did you observe?

A.

He told me that he was going to Chicago to visit

his uncle and then he stated that he was going to Memphis to
see his grandkids.

And then that later changed to

Birmingham, Alabama to see grandkids.
Q.

So he mentioned three different possible locations

or destinations where he was going?
A.

Yes. And I knew that the rental vehicle was due

back in Chicago, so I asked him how he was going to go to
Memphis or Birmingham, and he did not know.
Q.

Did the rental agreement indicate when the car was

due back in Chicago?
A.

Yes.

I don't have a copy of it wTith me, though.

Q.

Okay.

I guess what I'm just wondering was — is

whether —
A.

The rental agreement was — the vehicle was due

back in Chicago in two - two days from the time I stopped
12

1

him.

So -

2

Q.

Two days from the time of stop.

Okay.

3

A.

- it would be the 16th of January.

4

Q.

So is it fair to say it would have been difficult

5

for him to drive from Park City to either Memphis or

6

Birmingham and then make it back to Chicago in time to

7

return that car in two days?

8

A.

9

Yes.

And Mr. Duhaime also told me that he was -

when I asked why he was driving from Oakland to Chicago,

10 I that it was something that they wanted to enjoy.

And so

11

that came across as that they wanted to spend time seeing

12

sights on the way, and they weren't going to be able to do

13

that if the vehicle was due in Chicago and those were all

14

part of the circumstances.

15

Q.

16

Okay.

Anything else that — any other indicators

that you've observed, just going down your list here?

17

A.

Just the one-way, it was a large luxury rental.

18 i It's $1,200, like I said before.

And, again, I asked —

19 j because I was perplexed about his plans and these suspicious
20 | circumstances, and I asked him why he drove instead of
21 I flying, and he seated that it was less expensive for them to
i

22 | drive instead of flying.
23

Q.

Is that consistent with your experience?

24 I

A.

No.

25 |

Q.

Okay.

Was there anything significant to y o u about

13

1
2
3
4
5

him being on 1-80?
A.

Just that Interstate 80 is a known drug

trafficking corridor.
Q.

And you're making that conclusion based on your

training and experience or both?

6

A.

Yes.

7 I

Q.

Okay.

Did you observe anything inside the vehicle

8

that made you suspicious of — that there might be drug

9

trafficking or drug activity going on?

10 I

A.

Yes.

I noticed, when Mr. Duhaime was getting his

11 J driver's license for me, I noticed the luggagre, all of their
12

luggage was in the back seat.

And while he was getting his

13

driver's license for me, I asked if this was all of their

14

luggage that they had.

15

And then Mr. Duhaime quickly gave me his driver's license

16

and said, "Here you go."

17

returned back to my vehicle, because I had the rental

The passenger said, "No, it's not."

And then I asked — before I

18 | agreement and the license, I just asked if they had any
19 i luggage in the trunk, and — or if they had anything in the
20 | trunk, and the passenger said, "No."

So I thought that was

21 I weird that she said that they had other luggage but there
22 i was nothing in the trunk.
23
24
25 |

Q.

When you asked about the luggage or whether or not

there was anything in the trunk, did Mr. Duhaime respond?
A.

No.

He actually did not; it was the passenger.
14

1

Q.

Okay.

Anything else you observed again inside the

A.

There was fast food wrappers, appeared that they

2 I car?
3
4

were eating on the run.

There was four cell phones and

5

chargers in the center console.

6

it was odd to have a large quantity of cell phones.

With two people, I thought

7

Q.

And you could see those in plain view?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Okay.

A.

It appeared that they were all plugged into the

10 I
11

Were they plugged in?

cigarette lighter.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

There was a map in the center console but, yet,
Coffee cup on

14

the GPS was on.

the center console, caffeine

15

late at night, making a — a long trip.

16

was odd that the passenger stayed asleep on first contact.

17

As I talked to Mr. Duhaime about his trip, she — she stayed

The — I thought it

18 I asleep for a couple of minutes and then she woke up.

I

i

19 j thought that was odd.
20 |

Q.

Why did you find that odd or unusual?

21 I

A.

I approached on the passenger side.

It was very

i
i

22 | cold that night, so with the window down and my flashlight
!

23 ! in the vehicle, I would think that passengers would not stay
24 j asleep if — in my experience, passengers have always been
25 j wide awake even if they were sleeping.

They don't stay
15

1

asleep while I'm talking to them and shining my light with

2

the weather coming in and so on.

3

Q.

And this was in January?

4

A.

This was in January.

5

Q.

So it was quite cold.

6

A.

It was very cold.

7

Q.

And when you made the stop, had you activated both

8

your lights and siren?

9

A.

No siren, just my —

10

Q.

No sirens.

11

A.

— red and blue lights.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

And spotlights and wig-wags.

14

Q.

Okay.

Anything that — that we haven't mentioned

15

that was an indicator to you that there might be some type

16

of drug activity going on?
A.

17
18

Just the — again, the totality of the

circumstances and how it was said and what wais said, what

19 I I - what I had observed, and my prior experience and
20

training.
Q.

21

Okay.

So based on all of these things that you

22

observed and had noticed while you were speaking with

23

Mr. Duhaime and the passenger, what did you decide to do

24

next?

25

A.

I returned to my vehicle.

I knew Z was going to
16

ask for consent to search the vehicle and/or call for a K-9
drug-sniffing dog.

I actually returned to my vehicle and I

knew that Deputy Cunningham was out on patrol that evening,
and I called for a K-9 immediately.
Q.

Does your report indicate what time you called for

the dog?
A.

Yes.

I called for the dog - let's see.

It was

shortly after I'd returned to my vehicle, so — let's see. I
would say approximately five minutes after the 2308.

So

between 2313 and 2315, I'd say.
Q.

Okay.

So you — you called for the dog,' then, as

soon as you got back to your vehicle?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that prior to you calling in to dispatch to

ask for a records check or after you had called in?
A.

That was before.

Q.

Okay.

A,

Yes.

Q.

- and then - and then is the next thing you do -

A.

I run — I ran a — I checked his driver's license

So you called for the dog -

and ran a criminal history check.
Q.

Okay.

And then what happened?

A.

At about twenty - I waited for Brian.

At about

2322, I returned back to the vehicle to speak with
Mr. Duhaime about the traffic violations.

I had Mr. Duhaime
17

step out of the car.

He came back to check that rear

registration light, and he thought I was talking about his
backup lights and I actually had to show him the light above
the license plate that I was talking about.

I had to

advise —
Q.

And this was at 2322?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So you'd already called for the dog at that point.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

So I - I actually handed Mr. Duhaime's driver's

Go ahead.

license back and his rental agreement and advised that he
was going to need to get that light fixed.

I also briefly

educated him on using that passing lane. And then I — so I
issued him the verbal warning.
I was still waiting for the criminal history,
dispatch was taking an extra long time that evening for the
records check, the criminal history at Least.
Sgt. Loveland had arrived on scene and, when I was
talking to Mr. Duhaime, someone at dispatch came back with
his criminal history and they asked if I was - if I had
visitors present, if I was alone or not, to hear the
information they had for me.

But I was talking to

Mr. Duhaime at the time, so Sgt. Loveland obtained the
information that Mr. Duhaime did have prior criminal history
18

for - for marijuana.
Okay.

And then I asked - after giving him — after

giving Mr. Duhaime his driver's license and rental
agreement, I asked if he had anything illegal in the
vehicle, and he stated no, "No, sir."

And I asked if he was

hauling any kind of drugs, such as marijuana, heroin,
cocaine or methamphetamine, and he stated, "No, sir."
asked for consent to search the vehicle.

And I

He immediately

stated no, and I advised Mr. Duhaime at that time that he
was going to be detained a little bit further until the dog
arrived.
Q.

So you told him at that point that there was a dog

en route?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you know approximately what time that

conversation occurred?

And by "that conversation" I mean

him denying you consent and you telling him he was going to
be detained for a little bit longer while you waited for the
dog.
A.

I logged his further detention — or I told him

that he was being further detained at approximately 2324,
just approximately two minutes after I'd returned back to
the vehicle to issue the warning.
Q.

Okay.

And what time did the dog arrive?

A.

Three minutes later, at 2327.
19

1

Q.

Okay.

Did you believe, based on everything you

2 I had observed, that at that point you were justified or you
3

had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to keep

4

Mr. Duhaime there for that extra three minutes while you

5

waited for the dog?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And what was that based on?

8

A.

All of the indicators that we spoke about, the

9

totality of the circumstances, what Mr. Duhaime had said to

10 I me, what I - what I had observed in the vehicle.
11

Q.

12

Did you believe that the dog would either confirm

or deny those suspicions?

13 I

A.

Yes.

14 I

Q.

Okay.

15 |

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And that was Deputy Cunningham's police service

18 I

A.

Yes.

19 |

Q.

Okay.

17

So the dog arrived at 2327?

dog?

Were you present while he did the exterior

20 I sniff of the car?
!

21 I

A.

Yes.

22 |

Q.

Did you notice the dog alert or indicate in any

23 ! manner?

24

A.

Yes.

He was very excited and the canine, Caster,

25 | indicated strongly on the rear - the rear trunk with double
20

1

scratch of the paws.

2

also tried to jump inside the vehicle from the passenger

3

side.

4

Q.

Okay.

He tried to get up onto the trunk.

And after Caster had sniffed the vehicle,

5

did you have a discussion with Deputy Cunningham about

6

exactly what he had observed the dog doing?

7
8
9 f

A.

He

He just smiled and said, yeah, he indicated very

strongly on the trunk.
Q.

Okay.

And did that lead you to believe or, you

10 I know, confirm or dispel your suspicions one way or another?

11 I

A.

12

Q.

And which way?

13

A.

That there was something in the trunk.

14 I

Q.

Okay.

15

Yes.

Did you decide to search the trunk at that

point?

16

A.

Yes.

17 I

Q.

And is that something that you participated in by

18 I yourself or did you have assistance?
I
19 I

A.

There were other troopers on scene.

I had the — I

20 I had asked Mr. Duhaime for the keys to the vehicle for safety
21 I reasons after I detained him further.

So I had the keys.

22 I And I popped the trunk myself and in plain view, a large
23

quantity of marijuana in the trunk.

24

Q.

Was it just sitting there?

25 I

A.

It was sitting there.
21

1

Q.

And how was it packaged?

2

A.

The majority of it was packaged in black garbage

3

bags, opened, and there were several — several vacuum sealed

4

one-pound packages laying on top of those bags.

5

was just packed* full.

6

Q.

Okay.

The trunk

So there were - were they clear plastic

7

bags, then, that were laying on top of the black garbage

8

bags?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And then inside the black garbage bags, was there

n I also marijuana?
12

A.

Were more, yes.

13 I

Q.

Okay.

14

Was it a

green leafy substance?

15
16

And I'm using the term marijuana.

A.

A green leafy substance.

One of the packages was

cut open at the sally port and I nick tested it, and it

17 I tested positive for marijuana.
18 i

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

There was approximately 7 6 one-pound vacuum sealed

21 I

Q.

So there was a total of 7 6 pounds.

22 I

A.

Approximately.

23

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

20

bags.

And did you also find some - some pills as

24 I w e l l ?
25

W h i l e d o i n g an i n v e n t o r y of t h e v e h i c l e ,

in
22

Mr. Duhaime's bag, I believe it was — it had an airport
sticker on the bag identifying it as Mr. Duhaime's bag, as
well as having male clothing and — clothing for a male.
There was an unmarked bottle that contained seventeen and a
half Valium pills.

I identified these pills using a pill

identification book.
Q.

Okay.

Based on what you had seized during the

search, did you place Mr. Duhaime under arrest?
A.

Yes. Mr. Duhaime and his passenger was placed

under physical custody arrest shortly after the trunk was
opened.
Q.

What time — what was the time of arrest?

A.

2335.

Q.

Okay.

So less than ten minutes, then, after the

dog arrived; is that correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

My math is bad.

The dog arrived at 2327; is that

right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And Mr. Duhaime was placed under arrest at 2 335.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Incident to arrest, did you search Mr. Duhaime?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you find anything of significance?

A.

There was a large quantity of cash on Mr. Duhaime,
23

1 i approximately $2 100

$2,105.

2

denominat ions of bill_s

3

fifties.

4
5

Q.

The majority were hundreds and

And do you recall, was that in a pocket or a

wallet or where?

6

A.

It was in a pocket.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

I don't recall.

9
10
11
12

Q.

17

It was in one of his coat

Okay.

Was the — the stop in this tape — in this

case videotaped?
A.

Yes.
MS. NATALE:

Your Honor, may I approach the

witness?
THE COURT:

15
16

Do you recall which pocket?

pockets.

13
14

And these i^ere diffe rent

Q.

Sure.

(By Mr. Ms. Natale)

I want to hand you what I've

marked as State's Exhibit No. 1.

Do you recognize that?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Can you tell us what it is, please?

20

A.

That is the traffic stop on video.

21 i

Q.

And you personally burned this copy?

22

A.

Lots of them.

23

Q.

And you've watched it to make sure that it

24
25

Yes. And it works for sure.

coincides with your report as well as your recollection?
A.

Yes.
24

1.1

MS. NATALE:

Your Honor, I would move for the

2 J admission of State's Exhibit No. 1.
3

MR. METOS:

No objection.

4

THE COURT:

Received.

5

MS. NATALE:

And, Your Honor, I don't know if you

6

want to take the time at this point to watch it, but I was

7

just going to admit it and then let you peruse it at your

8

leisure, if that's okay —

9

MR. METOS:

Judge, what I was going to suggest is

10 J that — I know you're going to request briefs afterwards.

As

11 I part of the briefing, there may be portions of the video
12

that I would like to direct your attention and - and I think

13 I I could include those portions in my brief so that, w h e n you
14

watch it, you can look for the particular times on the video

15

that — that I would like to have you observe.

16
17

THE COURT:

Well, I'll watch the whole thing, not

in court today, but I will watch the whole thing and take

18 | notes and incorporate that into my findings of fact,
19 I combined with the testimony here today.
20

So in your briefs,

you can certainly request me to pay particular attention to.

21 J. this or that conversation at this or that time.
22 I

MR. METOS:

23 I

MS. NATALE:

24

THE COURT:

25 |

MS. NATALE:

Okay.
So this is admitted for Yes.

l's received.

Thank you.

And my only request would

25

1

be that, after the Court has ruled on the motion that I be

2

allowed to withdraw this because this is my only copy.

3
4

THE COURT:

All right.

problem, Mr. Metos, I assume.

5

MR. METOS:

No.

6

THE COURT:

We'll

7

MS. NATALE:

8

That shouldn't be a

-

And t h o s e a r e a l l t h e q u e s t i o n s

I

have —

9

THE COURT:

10

MS. NATALE:

11

THE COURT:

12

Mr. Metos?

13

MR. METOS:

- give it back.
- for this witness, Your Honor.
All right.

Thank you.

The only thing with the video is I

14

don't — we've had troubles running it before, and the Court

15

may require some instructions on getting the proper —
MS. NATALE:

16

And I can provide the Court with

17

minimal — with just a — a couple instructions on how to play

18

it.
MR. METOS:

19
20

Yeah.

I don't have problems with her

giving you the memo on how to —

21 |

THE COURT:

No.

I - I think that I got a program

22

installed on the computer now that I can - at least the last

23

one I was able to watch, the last one from the Highway

24

Patrol.

25

folks downtown, IT, put on a program that allowed me to

I was able to watch it with no problem.

I had the

26

watch it, so. . .
MR. METOS:

Fine.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. METOS:

Q.

Okay.

Trooper Ekberg, you said that you first saw

Mr. Duhaime at 2306; is that right?
A.

Approximately, yes.

Q.

And that was right — approximateily when you start

the videc> running; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you recall telling the office>rs who came to the

scene later that you had followed Mr. Duhaime and determined
that the car was a rental car out of Texas ?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you made that determination before you stopped

A.

When I — I ran the plates and it came back as a

it.

Texas rental
Q.

And you told those officers that, when you

found

it was a Texas rental, you decided to follow the car.
A.

No.

Q.

You didn't tell them that.

A.-

I don't recall that.

Q.

You don't recall telling them that?

A.

I don't recall.

27

Q.

Do you recall telling them that, just prior to

that, that that particular night, you were out looking for
drugs?
A.

I don't recall that.

Q.

That would be - you don't recall then?

But you

may have said that.
A.

I may have said that.

Q.

And that would be on the video.

' A.
Q.

It would be on the video if I said that, yes.
And during the course of the video, there's a

number of statements you made about "hundred pounds" and
"looking for a hundred pounds" or "getting your hundred
pounds."

What did you mean by that?

A. . I don't recall what I said.

If you can elaborate

on what I said, or no?
Q.

You made statements about a "hundred pounds" and

looking for a hundred pounds, or getting your hundred
pounds.

You don't recall making — making any of those

statements?
A.

Well, I don't recall when I said that.

Q.

Okay.

But, again, the video reflects what was

said.
A.

Correct.

Q.

Now, if you had made those statements, what would

you have been talking about?
28

A.

If the vehicle that I stopped had a large quantity

of drugs.
Q.

Is there some quota that you're looking for, a

hundred pounds is some sort of benchmark that you get where
you get some sort of chit or some sort of reward?
A.

No.

Q.

Nothing like that?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

Now, you said you've been on the Highway

Patrol now for three years.
A.

Approximately.

Q.

And a lot of your time with the Highway Patrol is

spent driving the roads, the freeways; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you have a lot of training on driving the

freeways.
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you've probably been driving yourself for —

since you were about 16 years old.
A.

Yes.

Q.

So you have a good idea of how people react in

certain traffic situations; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, when- somebody holds up — when you observe one

car pulling up behind another car, if it's on the freeway
29

1

and the left lane - the No. 1 lane, the car who is moving

2

slower has a legal obligation to pull over; is that right?

3

Into the right lane.

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And that would be the legal obligation in Utah is

6

41-6a-704.

7

A.

Correct.

8

Q.

That is the statute you cited Mr. Duhaime for -

9

you gave him the warning for violating.

10 )

A.

Yes.

11 J

Q.

And that section applies only when the driver's in

12

the left lane; is that right?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

Now, sometimes people are driving in the right

15

lane and a car will come up behind them; is that right?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And if a car gets too close, it can be a little

18

nerve-wracking.

If — well, let me rephrase chat.

19 I

A.

Not if you're not there.

20 I

Q.

If a car is too close on the freeway, it can

21 I create a dangerous situation.
22 |

A.

If a vehicle is too close, yes.

23

Q.

And, generally, the rule of thumb is about, what,

24
25 I

one car length per ten miles an hour?
A.

Sure.
30

1

Q.

And in the previous hearing, you talked about two

2 I seconds between the distance that cars are traveling; is
3

that right?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And on the video, you can see you had pulled

6
7
8

fairly close to Mr. Duhaime; is that right?
A.

Close enough that I could see that the plate was

not illuminated with a light.

9

Q.

But you were still fairly close on his tail.

10

A.

I was not following too closely.

11

Q.

No.

My question is you were — you pulled up close

12 I behind him.
13

A.

I was behind, not close.

14

Q.

And you approached from behind.

15 I

A.

Of course.

16

Q.

And you can see in the video the front of your car

17

and the rear of Mr. Duhaime1s car; is that right?

18 I

A.

Yes.

19 j

Q.

And you can also pick out spots on the road and

20 | count the distance in seconds, as you did in the — the
21 I previous case that you testified about today.

22 I

A.

23

Q.

24
25 I

Yes.
And you said, in that case, a two-second distance

at 60 or 65 miles an hour was too close.
A.

Yes.
31

1

Q.

Have you gone back to that tape and looked and

2

measured and see - to see if you were too close in this

3

case?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Now, when somebody's approaching from behind, out

6

of courtesy, quite often a driver will pull over and let

7

that car pass; is that correct?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

That doesn't happen.

10 I

A.

No.

11 I

Q.

That's your testimony, that doesn't happen.

12

A.

I'm not saying it doesn't happen.

13

happen regularly, often.

But, sure.

It doesn't

Yes.

u

Q.

It can happen.

15

A.

It can happen.

16

Q.

You follow a car for a certain distance, they're

17

worried — well, let me back up.

18 |

The danger in following too close Ls that: somebody

19 I has to make a sudden stop.
20 I

A.

Correct.

21 I

Q.

And this — on this particular day, just about

22

11:00 at night - is that correct?

23 I

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

It's dark out?

25

A.

Yes.
32

1

Q.

It's in sort of a rural area?

2 |

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Sometimes there's animals that cross the road.

4

A.

Sometimes.

5

Q.

This is in January?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And sometimes there may be ice or snow on the

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And a sudden stop could result in a rear-end

8

11

road.

accident.

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And so it's probably a good idea, if a car is

14

fairly close to you, to move over and let him pass, isn't

15

it?

16

A.

Not if you're in the No. 2 lane.

17 |

Q.

Not if you're in the No. 2 lane and the guy's

18 i right up on your tail?
19 I

A.

Are you saying that I was on the —

20 |

Q.

No.

21 !

A.

Yes.

22 !

Q.

- that would be a good thing to do.

23 J

A.

If I was - yes.

24
25

I'm saying, as a practical matter -

If the vehicle was up on

someone's tail, then it would be an unsafe situation.
Q.

And you said Mr. Duhaime was traveling about 65

miles an hour at this time?
A.

Approximately.

Q.

And then he pulled over to the left-hand lane; is

that right?
A.

Into the No. 1 passing lane, yes.

Q.

And at that time, there were no other cars in that

lane?
A.

No other cars.

Q.

But you cited him for impeding traffic.

A.

I didn't cite him, I gave him -

Q.

Or you warned him about impeding traffic.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And at the time that he moved over there, you were

in the No. 2 lane, the right lane.
A.

Yes.

Q.

So there was no traffic he was impeding at that

time that he moved, was there?
A.

As soon as I moved into the No. 1 lane, I was

traveling —
Q.

You're smiling as you say that because you caused

that violation by moving there, didn't you?
A.

No.

Q.

You didn't?

A.

I'd already made the decision to stop the vehicle

for the rear registration light.

I thought it was odd that
34

he was moving into the No. 1 lane with no traffic Q.

So you'd made the decision, but you hadn't

signaled him to pull over, though.
A.

I was waiting for a safe — safe spot for me to

make a safe traffic stop on the car.

At that time, we were

nearing guardrails and other safe - unsafe bends in the
road.

I was waiting for a safe spot that I could conduct a

safe traffic stop.
Q.

So how much farther did you think you had to

travel before you reached that safe spot?
A.

To 158.

Q.

So he pulls over, you pull behind him; is that

right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

He impedes you because you're behind him.

Is your

testimony.
A.

That he was impeding the traffic flow in the No. 1

lane, yes.
Q.

Which would be you.

A.

Yes.

Q.

The only car that was in that traffic lane; is

that right?
A.

As I recall, yes.

Q.

It wasn't there when he moved there.

A.

Correct.
35

Q.

And he was in that traffic lane less than five

seconds before you turn on your overheads.
A.

Correct.

Because we had gotten to the safe spot

for me to stop the car.
Q.

Now, you talked about the license plate lighting;

is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And on the video, you can see the rear of

Mr. Duhaime's car.
A.

Yes.

Q.

You pulled within maybe two to four car lengths

behind him.
A.

Okay.

Q.

And at that point, you can see the light — or you'

can see the license plate; is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you can look at the video and — and see that —

you can see what's on the plate, you can see the writing; is
that right?
A.

That's because my camera was zoomed up on the

vehicle.
Q. . And you can also - it was zoomed up, but if the A.

The camera was —

Q.

- i f the plate was dark, you wouldn't be able to

see the plate.
36

A.

From driving — driving behind the vehicle, the

plate was not — you could not read the plate from a hundred
feet.
Q.

Okay.

But, still, the video, you can look at the

video and see some illumination on the plate; is that right?
A.

That's because my headlights were reflecting off

the license plate.
Q.

And this car had a metallic bumper; is that

correct?
A.

I don't recall.

Q.

And you could look at the video and see if there's

any reflection on the bumper from any lights that were on
the - the license plate, could you not?
A.

I have spotlight and my headlights on, so any

reflection, of course, it's going to reflect.
Q.

Okay.

And so when the car changes position, that

reflection would also change, would it not?
A.

Sure.

Q.

Okay.

A.

It's reflecting my headlights.

Q.

Getting back to - to the move into the No. 2 lane,

when he moved, he signaled properly; is that right?
A.

As I recall.

Q.

So there's no violation in the way he changed

lanes.
37

1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Now, on a drug stop, you look for — you previously

3 I testified you look for some indicators; is that right?
4

A.

On a drug stop?

5

Q.

Okay.

6 I

A.

I don't classify my stops.

7

Q.

Pardon me?

8

A.

I don't classify my stops as a drug stop as a —

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

I mean, if I have indicators, of course, it's

11

I don't -

Any —

criminal activity, but, yes.

12

Q.

13

All right.

So if you're — one of the things

you're doing is looking for drugs as part of your job.

14

A.

One, yes.

15

Q.

And one of the indicators that you seem to rely on

16

is unusual travel plans.

17 I

A.

Yes.

18 i

Q.

And when you make a traffic step, you're

19 | entitled — you're aware that you're entitled to get the

I
20 I registration or rental agreement, the driver's license and
21 j check that stuff out; is that correct?
22 !

A.

Yes.

23 !

Q.

And as you do that, if other information develops,

24 | that becomes your reasonable suspicion.
25 I

A.

Yes.
38

1

Q.

In this case, when you walked up to the window,

2 I you approached the passenger side; is that right?
3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

I assume you did that for your own safety.

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And your initial question was:

7

Where are you

going?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

You didn't ask for his license.

10

A.

Not at that time.

11

Q.

You didn't ask for the — you didn't ask for the

12

rental agreement.

13

A.

Not at that time.

14

Q.

You didn't ask for the registration.

15 I

A.

Not at that time.

16

Q.

You didn't tell him why you were pulling over at

17

that time.

Initially.

18 i

A.

Not — not initially.

19

Q.

And that initial questioning had nothing to do

20 | with the reason for the stop, did it?
21 |

A.

Not at — the very first question, I just asked

i

22 I where he was going.
23 I

Q.

Yeah.

That had nothing to do with the reason you

24 | stopped him.
25 i

A.

No.
39

1

Q.

Had nothing to do with his driver's license.

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Whether he properly had the vehicle.

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

I'll ask the questions.

Can I explain?
But that's the kind of

6

question that can help you develop some reasonable suspicion

7

or some indicators for drug activity, can it not?

8

A.

Or other activity, yes.

9 I

Q.

Other illegal activity.

10

A.

Yes.

n

Q.

Okay.

12

When you talked to him about the reason for

this stop, you asked him why he changed lanes; is that

13 I right?
14

A.

Yes.

15 I

Q.

You told him that it was illegal to change lanes

16
17

like that, didn't you?
A.

I'd advised of — him of the — the No. 1 lane,

18 I passing —
19

Q.

You told him it was illegal to change lanes like

A.

If I can refer to my report, I'll know exactly

20 | that.
21 |

22 | what I said, so I can be sure.
23 I

I just explained that the left lane is really

24 J designated for passing only and that he changed lanes into
25 I the No. 1 lane with no traffic.
40

Q.

But that's not correct.

The left lane isn't for

passing only, is it?
A.

In a two — two-lane highway, it usually is

designated for passing only.
Q.

In seventy - under 41-6a-704, that's not what the

statute says, is it?
A.

Not that statute.

Q.

Is there some other statute that says that?

A.

There's — there's another statute that states that

the — on a two-lane highway, all vehicles shall drive on the
right side of the road unless passing or overtaking another
vehicle.
Q.

But this is a four-lane highway.

A.

No.

This is a two-lane highway.

One way, two-

lane.
Q.

But you didn't cite him for that or warn him for

that.
A.
. Q.
A.

No.
Okay.
There were other violations that he — he had

violated.
Q.

Then you talked about the plate illumination; is

that right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Then you went back to talking about his travel
41

1

itinerary, where he was going; is that right?

2 I

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Why he was going there?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And asked him how long he would be staying.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

None of those had anything to do with the license

8
9
10 |
11

plate light; is that right?
A.

No.

Q.

None of those had anything to do with him impeding

traffic.

12 I

A.

13

Q.

No.
None of those had anything to do with his right to

14 I operate that vehicle.
15

A.

No.

16

Q.

And at that point, you'd not even requested his

17

driver's license; is that right?

18 |

A.

Not at that time.

19

Q.

And at that point, you'd not requested any other

20 I form of identification.
21 I

A.

No.

22 I

Q.

You did finally receive the rental agreement.

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

You requested it shortly after there was m o r e

25 I questions about his travel itinerary.
42

1

A.

That's because he'd provided me with a vehicle

2 J inspection form not the rental agreement.
3
4

Q.

No.

questions.

I said you requested it after those

Then he provided —

5

A.

The -

6

Q.

- the rental inspection form; is that right?

7

A.

I asked a few questions and asked for the rental

8

agreement, which he didn't provide, then asked a few more

9

questions and then he finally found the rental agreement,

10

provided me with that; asked a few more questions, got the

11 i driver's license.
12

Q.

All right.

And that would all be reflected on the

13 ] video.
14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

And the — and you're relying on your

memory; is that right?

17 I

A.

18 i

Q.

Yes.
And that may be inconsistent with - with what's on

19 i the video.
20 j

A.

Sure.

21 |

Q.

Okay.

You did receive the rental agreement; is

22 j that right?
23 j

A.

I obtained a rental agreement, yes.

24

Q.

Then, after you received that, you began

25 | requesting details about his trip; is that correct?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

He said he was going to Chicago; is that right?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

You asked who he was visiting; is that correct?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And he said he was going to visit his uncle.

7

A.

No.

8

He stated - he actually said, "I'm actually

visiting my — my — my uncle over there."
Q.

9
10

As I looked over the rental agreement.

And then on the - you asked what's his uncle's

name.

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And you testified today that he immediately said

13

"Bob."

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

But when you called in dispatch on the radio, you

16

stated that he waited about 15 seconds before he came up

17

with a name, didn't you?

IS

A.

I didn't tell dispatch the name of the uncle.

19

Q.

No.

When you said you talked about some of the

20

indicators you had, you indicated to the guy on the other

21

end, dispatch, that this guy had waited about 15 seconds

22

after you requested the uncle's name.

23

that?

24
25

A.
was —

Do you recall saying

I did not tell dispatch the name of the uncle.

I

Q.

That's not my question.

A.

- I think -- okay.

to dispatch.

You're referring to that I said

I didn ' t tell dispatch anything about the

uncle's name.
Q.

Okay.

And you didn't say anything to dispatch

about him having to wait and come up with an uncle's name.
A.

Not to dispatch, no.

Q.

Okay.

To any of the other people on - that you

were talking to on the radio?
A.

To my sergeant, who was right next to me, yes.

Q.

Okay.

So you told him that you - that Mr. Duhaime

had to wait about 15 seconds to come up with the uncle's
name?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that wasn't true, was it?

A.

It wasn't 15 seconds.

But I was - it was the

totality of what Mr. Duhaime was telling me.
Q.

No.

My question is: You told the sergeant,

whoever, Duhaime waited about 15 seconds before coming up
with a name.
A.

If that's in the video, then, yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

And that was not true.

Now, getting back to the discussion you

were having with Mr. Duhaime about where he was going, about
45

1

1

five minutes into this, you request his license; is that

2

correct?

3
4
5
6

A.

I don't recall it being that long, but within

minutes <Df my approach.

Q.

But, again, the timer on the video would show when

that happened.

7

A.

Sure.

8

Q-

And you discussed the Hawaii license; is that

9

correct?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And you asked more questions about why he's

12

driving; is that correct?

13

A.

Why he's driving?

14

Q.

He was driving rather than some other form of

15

transportation.

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

He said that he — he wanted to enjoy the ride.

18

A.

One of the reasons uhat he provided, yes.

19

Q.

And then you asked him again, several times, why

20

|
1
1

1

he was driving, and he said something about it being less
1

21 |

expensive.

22 I

A.

Yes.

23 |

Q.

And he also discussed he was going to Chicago; is

24 | that right?
25 I

A.

Yes.
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Q.

Then he talked about - you asked where he was

going from there; is that right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And that's when he started talking about going to

Memphis, then they're going to Birmingham to see their kids,
their grandkids.
A.

Correct.

Q.

And they also indicated that they really didn't

have any set plans.
A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay.

Now, you go back to the parole — patrol

car, and the first thing you do is request a dog.
A.

Yes.

Q.

Then one of the reasons that you request a dog is

the nature of the rental agreement; is that right?
A.

No.

One — the rental agreement was one of the

reasons why I requested a dog.
Q.

Okay.

They're renting the car to go from Oakland

to Chicago; is that right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And you said it had Texas plates.

A.

It was a Texas rental.

Q.

But that's not uncommon for rental cars to have a

plate from a third state from where you're at.
A.

No.
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Q.

1

Everything in the rental agreement was proper; is

2

that right?

3

A.

As in valid?

4

Q.

As in valid.

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And it listed Mr. Duhaime as the driver?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

He was the driver.

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

His name was on the agreement.

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

You also indicated as an indicator that you

13

observed some working GPS?

14

A.

That was one of the indicators, yes.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

People use GPS devices to keep from getting

lost; is that right?

17

A.

Correct.

18

Q.

Now, was this a GPS device that was installed in

19

the car or was it a separate one?
A.

20
21

Q.

Okay.

And some higher end vehicles have them

actually installed in the vehicle.
A.

24
25

It

was just in the - in the vehicle.

22
23

I believe it was — it was in — I don't recall.

Some higher end vehicles do have them installed,

yes.
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Q.

Okay.

You said there was a road atlas?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Road atlases are handy in case the GPS is out of

range or goes down for whatever reason; is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Especially if you're driving cross-country.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Whether you're transporting drugs or just going

for pleasure, it's a good idea to keep a map, isn't it?
A.

Sure.

Q.

You probably have a map in your car, don't you?

A.

I do.

Q.

You said there was also a cup of coffee.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And it's about 11:00 p.m.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that right?

And so — and there was some other

wrappers or food wrappers in the car; is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All of those would be consistent with people

traveling interstate; is that right?
A.

Innocent motoring public, yes.

Q.

And 1-15 — or, excuse me, 1-80 is where you were

on; is that right?
A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

You said it's — that's a major drug thoroughfare;

2 I is that right?
3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

There's also a lot of long-haul trucking; is that

5

right?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

There's also a lot of people just traveling for

8

their own recreation?

9

A.

Yes.

10 I

Q.

Traveling for business?

11

A.

Yes.

12 I .

Q.

In fact, probably the vast majority of travel on

13

.

that road is not drug related.

14

A.

I don't know the percentages.

15 I

Q.

Would you say that the majority of cars that you

16

stop on 1-80 contain drugs?

17

A.

It's hard to say.

18 |

Q.

Maybe not?

Maybe, maybe not.

You indicated that there are four cell

19 I phones in the car; is that right?
20 I

A.

I observed four.

21

Q.

And you said there were four chargers.

22

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you told Ms. Natale that every one of them was

23

.

24

plugged into the charger.

25

A.

I saw one into the cigarette lighter.
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Q.

So that was an overstatement on your part.

A.

Sure.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Can I explain the cell phone?

They were all

connected to a charger, so I had no idea if they were all
plugged in or not.
Q.

So each one was connected to a charger.

A.

Yes.

Q-

So when activity — so if you're traveling

interstate, it's a good - it's a good idea to keep a cell
1 phone; is that right?
A.

One, yes.

Q.

Some people have more than one cell phone.

A.

Some people.

•Q,

Some people have a business phone and a personal

phone.
A.

Two, yes.

Q.

And in this case, there were two people in the

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, you said that the trip didn't make sense

car.

because of the cost of the rental car; is that right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Did you call and get any information on cost of

airline travel during that particular time frame?

1

A.

Not at that time.

2

Q.

Did you check - so you didn't check what the cost

3

would be to go from the California Bay Area to Chicago for

4

two people by plane?

5
6

A.

ticket from California to Chicago was approximately $2 50.

7
8

I recall, from an earlier stop, that a one-way

Q.

But that depends on when you buy it in relation to

when the trip is; is that right?

9 I

A.

Sure.

10 J

Q.

If you buy an airline ticket close to the time

11

you're leaving, the price tends to go up.

12

A.

Okay.

13 I

Q.

If you buy a first class ticket, it's higher in

14

cost; is that right?

15

A.

I don't know.

I'm not familiar with airline

16 I tickets.
17

Q.

You're not familiar with airline tickets.

18 I

A.

Their prices.

Just from - I know from California

19 I to Chicago that day, it was two hundred and fifty bucks one
20 | way.
21 I
22
23

Q.

But did you - you didn't go back and check it for

this particular date, did you?
A.

I actually did.

I - it's not in my report, but I

24

was curious as to what a one-way trip from Oakland to

25

Chicago would be, and it was approximately $250.
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Q.

1

Now, did you check it for a next-day travel or

2

same-week travel or did you just get the lowest price

3

available?

4

A.

I just got on to Priceline.com and —

5

Q.

So you got the lowest price available.

6

A.

I don't know if it was the lowest price.

7

Q.

Then did you check the — the cost for airline

tickets to go to Memphis then on to Birmingham?

8
9

A.

I didn't check that.

10

Q.

And you didn't include any of that in your report,

11

did you?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

And you just testified a few minutes ago that: you

14

weren't familiar with airline ticket costs, didn't y o u ?

15

A.

16

I know that $1,200 for a rental car is a lot more

expensive than flying two people from California to Chicago.

17

Q.

18

And did you factor in flying, then, to Memphis

then on co Birmingham?

19

A.

To fly or drive?

20 |

Q.

Fly.

!

21 I
A.
I would assume uhat if you're going to fly from
I
22 i Chicago - from California to Chicago that you'd fly

'

!

23 I everywhere and not just fly out somewhere, drive somewhere
24 i and then fly.
25 |

Q.

That's going to run up the cost of travel, isn't

53

1

it?

2 J

A.

Yes.

3 I

Q.

Okay.

4

And this car was due in Chicago about two

or three days later, after —

5

A.

Two days.

6

Q.

Two days.

7

A.

Two days.

8

Q.

Now, have you ever rented a car before?

9

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you're aware that, when you rent a car, rental

10 I

11 I companies are generally more than happy to let you just call
12

in and keep the rental as long as you're paying more.

13 j

A.

I'm not aware, but, yes.

14 J

Q.

That happens, though.

15

A.

Okay.

16

Q.

And what this indicated is that he'd prepaid about

17 I $1,200.
18 I

A.

Okay.

19 I

Q.

So when he gets to Chicago, it would have been a

20 | big deal to keep the car longer as long as he notified the
21 | rental company.

Is that right?

22

A.

Sure.

23 I

Q.

Now, you talked about, on direct, a drug

24 j conviction; is that right?
25 I

A.

Yes.
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1
2

You failed to mention that that was - that that

Q.

occurred in the '60s.

3

A.

I said he had a prior history with marijuana.

4

Q.

But that was in the '60s.

5

A.

Prior —

6

Q.

1960s.

7

A.

Prior history.

8

Q.

Okay.

9
10
11

But you neglected to mention t h a t i t was 40

y e a r s ago.
A.

I have — i t j u s t — i t wasn't a c t u a l l y an i s s u e

because I knew I —

12

Q.

Right.

13

A.

— was going to ask for consent, I new the dog was

14
15
16

already on its way.
Q.

Okay.

Now, you also said that he appeared to be

somewhat nervous?

17

A.

Yes. Very nervous.

18

Q.

And you'd never met Mr. Duhaime before?

19

A.

You don't know how he acted — how he would act

20

normally?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

You don't know how he would react to questioning

23

or — or how he spoke normally?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

So you generally don't know what his demeanor is.
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

And when you were talking to him at the side of

3

the car, you had your flashlight with you; is that right?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And you're shining it in the car in his face?

6

A.

Not in h i s face.

7

Q.

Towards him?

8

A.

In the vehicle.

9

Q.

Now, when you - after you call for the dog and you

Mainly hands.

10

go back to Mr. Duhaime, you get him out of the car; is that

11

right?

12

A.

After when?

13

Q.

After you call in on the license plate, you go

14

back to get Mr. Duhaime out of the car.

15

After you're at your patrol car —

16

A.

Okay.

17

Q.

Right.

18

A.

Yes.

19

I run a records check —

I brought Mr. Duhaime out to issue him a

warning.

20

Q.

21

lights.

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Is that right?

24
25

To talk to him.

And you had a discussion about the license plate

And you were the one that pointed

at the two lights that weren't shining, were you not?
A.

I pointed towards the plate.
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1

Q.

And he was - he said those are the backup lights.

2

A.

He thought I was talking about the backup lights.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

And I wasn't going to get on the ground and show

5
6
7

him that the light was broken.
Q.

And again the — again, the video would show what

you were pointing at —

8

A.

Yeah.

9

Q.

— as you made that statement.

10
11

Now, you - at that point, you give him back his
documents; is that right?

12

A.

Rental agreement and driver's license, yes.

13

Q.

And you didn't tell him he was free to go at that

14

point.

15

A.

No.

16 I

Q.

And he wasn't in fact free to go at that point.

17

A.

He was free to go in his — because he had his

18 | documents, his driver's license, rental agreement.

I was

19 I making sure that he understood his rights, that he — that he
20 j had the right to know that he was free to go.

But, no, I

21 j did not want him to go.
22 |

Q.

You didn't want him to go, but you're saying now

23 I he was free to go?
24

A.

No.

I'm not saying he was free to go.

I handed

25 I him his driver's license and rental agreement to let him
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1

know that I was done with the - the traffic violations that

2

I stopped him for.

3
4

Q.

Okay.

And at that point, after you hand him the

documents, you started asking him questions about drugs.

5

A.

Not immediately about drugs, no.

6

Q.

You didn't ask him about whether he was carrying

7
8
9

drugs at that point?
A.

Let's see.

I asked him if he had anything illegal

in the vehicle.

10 J

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

And then — then —

12 J

Q.

— into drugs.

13

A.

— specifically into drugs, yes.

14

Q.

You then - he then - you then asked to search; is

15

that right?

16

A.

Yes.

17 I

Q.

And he says-, "1 — I'd like to get on my way"?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

But what he said specifically, again, is on the

20
21 I

And then you went specifically —

He said no to asking —

video.
A.

Yes.

I think what you're recalling is I asked

22 I him — after giving him his driver's license and the rental
23

agreement, I asked if I could ask a few more questions, and

24

he thought that it wasn't really necessary for me to.

Is

25 J that what you're referring to?
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Q.

Yeah.

So he was has:Lcally tired of you asking him

questions •
A.

He fe It that it wasn 't necessary for me to ask

questions and I thought it was necesjsary for me to ask more
questions.
Q.

And then you detained him and waited for the drug

A.

Yes.

Q.

Oh, one of the factors I didn't ask you about, I'm

dog.

sorry, is:

For three minutes.

On the tape, when you're calling either your

sergeant or the dispatcher, you made some — you — you seem
to indicate there is an inconsistency because he said he had
grandchildren and his wife looked like she was in her
twenties or thirties; is that right?
A.

I hadn't — I never identified the passenger until

after the arrest was made.

From the dark, from what I had

observed, she — she had a hat on she pulled over.

She was

sleeping at first, so I didn't actually get a really good
look at her.

But she did appear to be very young.

Q.

But she turned out to be 65.

A.

I don't recall her age, actually.

Q.

So — but - so when you tell your sergeant that she

appears to be really young, in her twenties or thirties,
you're just speculating.
A.

During — yeah.
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1

Q.

Okay,

2

A.

If I was going to - I didn't ever identify her,

3

but from what I saw, yes, I would think that she was in her

4

twenties or thirties.

5

Q.

All right.

6

A.

But as a whole, that didn't make my decision on

7

searching the vehicle or calling for a dog.

8

something I said to my sergeant.

9
10

Q.

But it was part of what you keep describing as the

totality of the circumstances.

11

A.

One of them.

12

Q.

All right.

13

A.

It's not even in my report, so...

But not one of the major ones, so...

14

MR. METOS:

That's all I have.

15

THE COURT:

Thank you.

16

Ms. Natale, any redirect?

17 |

MS. NATALE:

18 I

THE COURT:

19

It was

No, Your Honor.
All right.

Thank you.

You may step

down.

20 I

Ms. Natale, you said you had another witness?

21 I

MS. NATALE:

Yes, Your Honor.

23

THE COURT:

Is he or she here?

24

MS. NATALE:

Yes.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'll try and be

22 j brief.

60

1

MS. NATALE:

2

THE COURT:

3

He's outside.
Step up, take an oath and take the

witness stand, please.

4

Tell us your name.

5

THE WITNESS:

6

THE COURT:

7

Ms. Natale.

Brian Cunningham.

Thank you.

BRIAN CUNNINGHAM,

8

called as a witness by the State of Utah,

9
10

being first duly sworn, was examined

11

and testified on his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

12
13

BY MS. NATALE:

14

Q.

And where are you presently employed?

15

A

Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office.

16

Q

And how long have you been with the sheriff's

17

office?

18

A

Five years.

19

Q

Do you have any particular specialized training

20

with the sheriff's office —

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

— dealing with — go ahead.

23

A.

I'm currently assigned to the K-9 unit.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

And as a K-9 handler, then, do you — have

you received particular training in how to handle a police

service dog?
A*

Yes, lots of it.

Q.

And what has that training mainly consisted of?

A.

I'm — I'm required yearly or annually to

recertify.

I had to go through over 200 hours to certify

with the dog in the first place.

Then I'm required by our

policy to train monthly.
Q.

Okay.

And is that training — do you have to do

that training with the dog or is it individual training that
you do?
A.

It's with the dog.

Some can be without the dog,

with just — in handlers training, but most of the time it's
with the dog.
Q.

Okay.

And is there a particular agency that

certifies you and/or the dog in order to conduct these types
of operations?
A.

Yes.

The State of Utah Police Officers Standard

and Training certifies my dog.
Q.

Okay.

And are you certified as well, or just the

A.

Both the dog and myself.

Q.

Okay.

A.

As a handler and as a narcotics detecting dog.

Q.

Were those certifications for both you as well as

dog?

your dog current on January 14th of this year, 2009?
62

1

A.

Yes.

2 J

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

Caster.

4

Q.

Can you describe basically what it is that Caster

5
6

And what is your dog's name?

does when you deploy him on an exterior sniff of a vehicle?
A.

.Yes.

There's two types of alerts for a dog.

7

One's passive alerting and the other one is aggressive.

My

8

dog's an aggressive alert indicator, which means that, when

9

he alerts, he goes into a behavioral change.

And once that

10 I behavioral change and he — he finds the source where the
11

odor's coming from, he can — he indicates in different ways.

12 I One, scratching, biting, barking.

Sometimes due to the fact

13

of where the narcotics are hidden, if you — if it's the

14

temperature or the wind, it all — it all depends on — on

15 | what's present as an element.
16
17 j

But just an alert can be his

final response.
Q.

Okay.

So as I understand you, then, an alert is

18 I more of a behavioral change?
19 I

A.

Yes.

20 |

Q.

And an indicator would be what then?

21 I

A.

Actually, going to source, the strongest point of

22 j the odor.
23

Q.

Okay.

And then when he finds that particular

24 I odor, is there something that he does in response?
25 I

A.

Yes.

He'll either scratch, he'll - he'll bite,
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1
2
3
4

he 11 bark or :iust stick on odor and not leave.
Okay.

Q.

Does an alert usually precede an indication

or can they be independent of each other?
They can be independent.

A.

An alert can happen

5

without an indication due to the fact it's a large odor of

6

marijuana or methamphetamines or just narcotic in general.

7
8
9

Q.

Does it take a stronger odor, usually, to trigger

an indication than an alert?
A.

No.

It's usually an alert is the first: and then

10

it's an indication on a point source.

11

response.

12
13
14
15
16
17

Q.

Okay.

It's a final — final

And are there particular drugs that Caster

is trained to detect?
A.

Yes.

He's certified on four odors:

methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin and marijuana.
Q.

Okay.

And has he been deployed by you to conduct

exterior sniffs of many vehicles?

18

A.

Many.

19

Q.

Approximately how many; do you know?

20

A.

I don't know.

21

It could be 50, 60.

I don'z - I've

done so many.

22

Q.

How long has he been doing it?

23

A.

He had a previous handler before me, but, with me,

24
25

two years.
Q.

Okay.

Were you called to assist Trooper Ekberg on
64

1

a traffic stop on 1-80 on January the 14th of this year,

2

2009?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And what were you informed about that particular

A.

I was informed over the radio that he was

5
6

stop?

7

requesting a K-9 for a exterior vehicle sniff.

As I arrived

8

on scene, I was met by Trooper Ekberg, and he advised that

9 | he had reasonable suspicion to believe that the individuals
10
11
12

in the vehicle were trafficking illegal narcotics.
Q.

Okay.

And do you recall approximately what time

you arrived at the scene?

13 I

A.

I don't recall.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

Yes, I do.

16 j

Q.

Okay.

I can look to my report and see.

Do you have that with you?

And would it help you to refer to it to

17 J refresh your memory on that?
18 I

A.

19 j
20

Yes, iu would.
I actually went at about 2321, which was 11:21.

Q.

Okay.

So you arrived at uhe scene.

What's the

21 j first thing you do?
22 I

A.

First thing I do is I want to make sure that the

23 [ scene is secure before I get my dog out.

I want to get the

24 ! information from the trooper, I want to make sure that, you
25 I know, it's going to be a - something that's - that's legit
65

1

for my dog to be run on.

A lot of times, people will find

2 I the drugs in the car on a consent search and then they'll
3

want me to run my dog after the fact, which is not necessary

4

unless it's - they believe a hidden compartment's on the

5

vehicle.

6

So I wanted to make sure that - that I knew the

7

circumstances of why I'm getting my dog out of the vehicle

8

and that everybody was secure and safe, so...

9

Q.

Okay.

So do you have the occupants in the car,

10

then, exit —

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

— before you start the search?

13

A.

We can either leave them in the vehicle or we can

14 I have them step out of the vehicle.

My preference is to get

15

out of the vehicle.

I don't want a 2,000-pound weapon in

16

their — in their hands while I'm in front of the vehicle

17 i with my dog.
18 |
19

Q.

Okay.

And then when you start to run your dog, is

there a particular protocol or steps that you follow when

20 I you — when you start conducting a sniff of a vehicle?
21
22

A.

Yes.

I have the occupants stand at least 15 feet,

if not more, in front of the vehicle; one, so I can keep an

23 I eye on — if I'm by myself, if I don't have any other
24

officers on the scene.

Two is that's a good distance away

25

from — from me and my dog so my dog doesn't perceive them as
66

1 I a threat and try to - to bite them.

He's on lead, which

2 I means he's on a leash, but, still, it's three to four feet
3

on a lead that he can - he can do a good snap at you.

4

feet -

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

— at least in front of the vehicle.

7

Q.

Okay.

So you have them get out.

So 15

And then is

8

there a particular spot at the vehicle you always start at

9

or —

10 J

A.

I always start at the rear of the vehicle.

11

Sometimes, depending on the wind current, just the elements,

12

if they're too close to the roadway or the fog line, you

13

know, it depends on which side of the vehicle I'll actually

14 I go to.
15

If I go clockwise or counter-clockwise on a vehicle.

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

No.

18 I

Q.

Okay.

16

So you don't always go the same direction

or -

Do you take into account things like — you

19 I mentioned the wind — the elements, the weather conditions,
20 | things like that?
21 I

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I did.

i

22 I
23
24

And did you do that in this particular

case?

25 | traffic.

It was — it was at night, not a lot of

It was pretty - I recall pretty secure on the side
67

1

of the — the right shoulder.

And so, no, I just - I just

2

deployed my dog and I let him go -

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

— where he wanted to go.

5

Q.

So describe what you observed Caster do during

6

this particular sniff.

7

A.

I observed multiple alerts.

Like I said, it was

8

behavioral change, head checks.

9

indications after those alerts on the areas where the alert

10

I did receive some

was — was perceived.

11

Q.

And what did the indications consist of?

12

A.

Scratching.

13

Q-.

Okay.

14

A.

Two paws.

15 I

Q.

And was it just a light scratch or was it a very

With one paw, two paws?

16 J aggressive scratch?
17

A.

It's — it's aggressive.

Depends on — on, like I

18 j said, just the elements and how high the height is.
19 I Sometimes he can't get to a scratch, so it's just going to
20 j be an alert if it's too high.
21 |

Q.

Okay.

So tell me the areas where he alerted and

22 I then the areas where he indicated.
23
24

A.

I believe in a wheel well and — the rear wheel

well on the right side, I believe, and the trunk, trunk

25 | lid 68

Q.

Okay.

A.

— and the rear bumper.

Q.

So on the trunk, was there an alert and an

indication or just one or the other?
A.

Both.

Q.

Both.

Okay.

Did you convey those observations to

Trooper Ekberg?
A.

Yes, I did.

And I actually advised Trooper

Ekberg, before my dog was out of the vehicle, not to
interview or speak about the traffic stop while my dog was
out of the vehicle.
Q.

And is there a reason for that?

A.

Yes.

There's some — there's case law on coercion

with the dog out of the vehicle.

So I wanted to make sure

that no interviews or any questions of any sort were advised
to them while my dog was out of the vehicle.
Q.

Okay.

Anything else that you recall about this

particular incident that you can talk about?
A.

Just that, after I secured my patrol dog in my -

in the car, the trunk was popped and a large quantity of
marijuana was located in the trunk.
Q.

Okay.

So were you present when the trunk was

opened?
A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

And did you also observe the - the substances you
69

1

believe to be marijuana in the trunk?

2

A.

Yes.

3 J

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

Or a green leafy substance, but, with my training

5
6

There was multiple packages of marijuana.

and experience, I knew it was marijuana.
Q.

Okay.

And, again, just to reiterate, those

7

indications and alerts that you observed your dog doing

8

during this particular occasion suggested to you that there

9

was — there were controlled substances present.

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Okay.

Thank you.

12

THE COURT:

13

Mr. Metos?

14 I
15
16
17
18 I

Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. METOS:
Q.

Have you got copies that you can provide to

counsel?
A.

Yes.

I believe she — she's in possession of those

19 | copies.
20 I

MS. NATALE:

21 I

MR. METOS:

Uh-huh.
Judge, just I would request that we

22 I could make those part of the record.

I have no problem with

23 j Ms. Natale's needing those exhibits later, as long as copies
24
25

are provided to me, since I haven't seen those yet.
THE COURT:

Do you want to offer them?

I mean 70

1

MS. NATALE:

I don't know that they're necessary

2

for purposes of this hearing, but I'd certainly be h a p p y to

3

get them to Mr. Metos.

4

MR. METOS:

5

I think it goes to the dog's

qualifications.

6

THE COURT:

Well, I - I mean, I don't think

7

they're necessary.

8

you were asking that they be admitted, I certainly don't

9

have a problem with admitting them either.

10

He's testified they're certified.

If

But I don't

think it' s -

11

MR. METOS:

12

Q.

All right.

When you got the — when you got there, did y o u

13 I talk to Ekberg about what he'd seen in the car and w h a t his
14 I observations were?
15

A.

16

No.

He just advised he had reasonable

suspicion

to believe there was some drug trafficking.

17 i

Q.

And so you basically just walked your dog around

18 | the car and looked for alerts.
19 |

A.

Looked for, yes, behavioral changes and then the

20 I final response.
21

!

Q.

And the areas that this dog alerted were the rear

I
22 i end of the car and the —
23 j

A.

The trunk and the bumper, yes.

24 |

MR. METOS:

25 J

MS. NATALE:

All right.

That's all I have.

Nothing further, Your Honor.
71

THE COURT:

Thank you, deputy.

You may step down.

May he be excused?
MS. NATALE: No.
THE COURT:

No?

He's got the next case or

something?
MS. NATALE: Yes.
THE COURT:

Oh, okay.

Any further testimony,

Ms. Natale?
MS. NATALE:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Mr. Metos?

MR. METOS: No.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Metos, when - when can

you reasonably get a brief in, you think?

I mean, what you

think you want and let's talk about whether I think that's
reasonable.
MR. METOS:

I've got a Tenth Circuit brief coming

up in the next couple weeks. My preference would be to get
a — a transcript of this, and I don't know how long — I know
it only takes a matter of days to get the video.
THE COURT:

Well, you can get - you can gee the

MR. METOS:

I mean the CD, yeah.

THE COURT:

- in a day - in a day.

CD

MR. METOS: Yeah.
THE COURT:

But you have to physically come get
72

1

it, but — and I don't know your schedule, but as far as you

2

just have a form and we can get it back to you in a day.

3

But I don't know how long it's going to take you to get a

4

transcript.

5

half for a brief to get that.

6

here and, sometime in the next two days, watch this video.

7

So I don't need a transcript.

8

but I won't need one.

9 I
10

I don't — I don't want to wait a month and a

MR. METOS:
the July 4th holiday.

I mean, I'm going to leave

You may for your purposes,

Could we - what about July - we've got
What about submitting my brief July

11 I 6th?
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 i

THE COURT:

Ms. Natale, if he did that, when could

you have yours?
MS. NATALE:

July 6th.

Two weeks after that

should be fine, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

So then we could put argument the next

day or do you want argument on the 2 8th?
MR. METOS:

I would prefer a little time to review

19 j it for a response so that I could —
20 i

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's set, Mr. Metos, then, you

21 | file your brief by July 6th; Ms. Natale, respond by July 21.
22 I I'll give you an extra day.

And we'll hear argument on this

23 I at 9:00 on July 28th, Mr. Metos and - and I will have viewed
24
25 j

the DVD in the next two days, so...
All right.

We'll follow that schedule.

Bail may
73

1

remain.

Mr. Duhaime, stay in touch with your attorney,

2

Thank you.

3

MR. METOS:

4

(Whereupon, the hearing was

5 I
6

Thank you.

concluded at 11:03 a.m.)
-oooOooo-

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3330505 (C.A.9 (Mont.))
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter)
(Cite as: 2010 WL 3330505 (C.A.9 (Mont.)))
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.This
case was not selected for publication in the Federal
Reporter.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter See
Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or after
Jan. 1, 2007. See also Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. (Find
CTA9 Rule 36-3)
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Timothy M. MORNEAU, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 09-30192.

48AVU Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349fl8) k. Inquiry; License,
Registration, or Warrant Checks. Most Cited Cases
Officer's questioning of vehicle's occupants, following traffic stop, during 16-minute time period required to complete records check was permissible,
and did not have to be justified by reasonable suspicion, since questioning did not extend duration of
stop. U.SC.A Const.Amend. 4.

€=^>

[21 Automobiles 48A " w "
Argued and submitted July 29, 2010.
Filed Aug. 25,2010.
Background: After his motion to suppress was denied, defendant was convicted in the United States
District Court for the District of Montana. Richard F.
CebuU, Chief Judge, of possession with intent to distribute ecstasy and conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute ecstasy. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that:
(1) questioning that occurred during records check,
following traffic stop of vehicle, was permissible, and
(2) officer had reasonable suspicion justifying continued questioning of vehicle's occupants after completion of records check.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes

HI Automobiles 48A N - ^ ^ ^ ^ 349(18)
48A Automobiles

349(18)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(18) k. Inquiry; License,
Registration, or Warrant Checks. Most Cited Cases
Officer conducting traffic stop of vehicle had reasonable suspicion that justified continued questioning of
vehicle's occupants after completion of records
check, given occupants' nervousness and avoidance
of eye contact, defendant's continued, or feigned,
deep sleep despite cold air from open window, contradictory stories by other occupants as to whether
defendant was hitchhiker or knew one of them, contradictory stories about identity of person occupants
planned to visit, contradictions about when and
where defendant was picked up, defendant's knowledge of name of person to be visited, which was unknown to other occupants even though they said they
were visiting other's friend, and defendant's implausible claim that he legally crossed into United States
from Canada on snowmobile and thereafter had his

©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3330505 (C.A.9 (Mont.))
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter)
(Cite as: 2010 WL 3330505 (C.A.9 (Mont.)))
identification stolen. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

131 Automobiles 48A ^ - ^

review for clear error the underlying findings of fact.
United States v. Tunin. 517 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th
Cir.2008).

349(17)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
Length and Character Thereof. Most Cited Cases
Continued delay of traffic stop after officer obtained
consent to search car was reasonable in light of circumstances of case, including need to move vehicle
to highway patrol office to ensure safety and comfort
Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S., James Edmund
Seykora, Esquire, Assistant U.S., USBI-Office of The
U.S. Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David Allen Duke, Esquire, Law Office of David A.
Duke, Billings, MT, for Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Montana, Richard F. Cebull Chief District
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. l:08-cr-00043-RFC-l.
Before O'CONNOR, Associate Justice.—
THOMAS and W FLETCHER. Circuit Judges.

and

MEMORANDUM —
*1 Defendant Timothy M. Morneau was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute ecstasy and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute ecstacy in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He now
appeals the pretrial denial of his suppression motion.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 12Q1 and
nttm

INI

atrirm.—
[11 The district court denied Morneau's motion to
suppress, holding the initial traffic stop justified
based on a broken headlight and the continuation of
the stop supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Morneau here alleges only that the stop
was unreasonably prolonged. We review de novo the
district court's ruling on a motion to suppress and

After de novo consideration, we agree with the district court that the stop was not unreasonably prolonged. A motorist's general expectations in a traffic
stop include a records check, United States v.
Mendez, 416 F.3d 1077. 1080 (9th Clr.2007) (citing
Berkemer v. McCartv, 468 U.S. 420. 437. 104 S.Ct
3138. 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)). which Officer Quinnell conducted in this case. Relying on Supreme
Court precedent, this Court has explained, " '[M]ere
police questioning does not constitute a seizure'
unless it prolongs the detention of the individual, and,
thus, no reasonable suspicion is required to justify the
questioning that does not prolong the stop." Mendez,
476F.3dat 1080 (quoting Muehlerv. Mena, 544 U.S.
93. 101. 125 S.Ct. 1465. 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005)).
Questioning may include inquiries unrelated to the
purpose of the stop. See Tunin, 517 F.3d at 1100.
Therefore, questioning that does not extend beyond
the completion of a records check does not prolong a
stop and need not be supported by reasonable suspicion. Here, the records check for Morneau and the
other occupants of the car ended around minute 16 of
the stop, which means that all questioning until that
time was permissible because it did not extend the
duration of the stop.
[2] The issue that remains, therefore, is whether the
extension of the stop was justified from minute 16 to
minute 34, when the car's owner (a passenger in the
car) gave consent for Officer Quinnell to search the
car.
Evaluating the totality of the circumstances at minute
16, id. at 1101 (determining reasonableness of prolongation of a stop based on a totality of the circumstances analysis), we conclude that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to continue questioning the car's
occupants. By minute 16, factors that, taken together,
amounted to reasonable suspicion included: 1) occupants' nervousness and avoidance of eye contact; 2)
Morneau's continued deep sleep (or feigning of sleep)
despite cold February Montana air due to an open car
window; 3) contradictory stories by the car's other
occupants about whether Morneau was a hitchhiker
or knew one of them; 4) contradictory stories about
the identity of the person they planned to visit in Billings; 5) contradictions about when and where they

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. VS Gov. Works.
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picked up Morneau; 6) the fact that Morneau-the alleged hitchhiker-knew the name of the person they
were to visit in Billings, though neither of the other
occupants did, despite the fact that the other occupants each said they were visiting the other's friend;
and 7) Morneau's implausible claim that he legally
crossed into the United States from Canada on a
snowmobile and subsequently had his ID stolen.
*2 [3] In light of these factors, it was reasonable for
the officer to prolong the stop from minute 16 to
around minute 34 when he obtained consent to search
the car. Continued delay after minute 34 and before
Morneau's arrest was reasonable in light of the circumstances of this case, including the need to move
to the Highway Patrol Office to ensure safety and
comfort during the search of the car.
Viewing the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the stop, the officer's conduct was reasonable, and
we therefore affirm the district court's denial of Morneau's motion to suppress.
The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.
FN* The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor,
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court (Ret.), sitting by designation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(a).
FN** This disposition is not appropriate for
publication and is not precedent except as
provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
FN1. Because the parties are familiar with
the factual and procedural background, we
recite it here only insofar as it is necessary
to understand the disposition.
C.A.9 (Mont.),2010.
U.S. v. Morneau
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3330505 (C.A.9 (Mont))
END OF DOCUMENT
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334 Fed.Appx. 880, 2009 WL 1579798 (C.A.IO (Utah))
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter)
(Cite as: 334 Fed.Appx. 880, 2009 WL 1579798 (C.A.IO (Utah)))
HThis case was not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter. See
Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or after
Jan. 1, 2007. See also Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. (Find
CTA10 Rule 32.1)
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jose Alfredo LOPEZ-GUTIERPvEZ, DefendantAppellant.
No. 08-4143.
June 8, 2009.
Background: Defendant was convicted of possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine after the
United States District Court for the District of Utah,
2006 WL 3373909, denied his motion to suppress
evidence, and he appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Michael R. Murphy,
Circuit Judge, held that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes

Automobiles 48A

€^=>

349(17)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(]4) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry

48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases
Police officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong
traffic stop of car defendant was driving in order to
have a drug-sniffing dog sweep the car; officer saw
multiple signs of hidden compartments in the interior
of the car, and there was an air freshener and a rose in
the car, which the officer suspected were devices to
mask the scent of drugs, there were more cell phones
in the car than passengers, and when defendant exited
the car at the officer's request, he assumed a position
to be frisked fui weapons without being asked to do
so. U.S C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
*881 Stephen Sorenson, Assistant U.S. Attorney,
Veda M. Travis, Office of the United States Attorney,
Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Julie George, Salt Lake City, UT, for DefendantAppellant.
Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and McCONNELL,
Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 1 ^
FN* This order and judgment is not binding
precedent except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R App P.
32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
MICHAEL R MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
**1 After examining the briefs and appellate record,
this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed R.App P 34(a)(2); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
I. Introduction

©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter
(Cite as: 334 FedAppx. 880, 2009 WL 1579798 (C.A.
Defendant-Appellant Jose Alfredo Lopez Gutierrez
appeals his conviction for Possession of Methamphetamme With Intent to Distribute in violation of 21
U S C ^ 841(a)(1) On appeal he argues the district
court failed to suppress evidence seized during a
search of the car he was driving Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U S C fr 3742(a) and 28 U S C &
1291, we affirm the distnet court's denial of the suppression motion because the police had reasonable
suspicion to temporanly detain Lopez while a dog
sniff was conducted, and had probable cause to
search the vehicle when the dog alerted to drugs
II. Background
Lopez was pulled over in Cedar City, Utah, for tailgating, making an improper lane change, and possessing tinted windows darker than allowable under
state law A female passenger was riding in the vehicle When the officer approached and looked inside
the vehicle, he immediate!) noticed scarring on the
seat belt bolts and a reattached airbag compartment m
the dashboard Based on his training, the officer considered both of these alterations to the vehicle's interior to be indicative of hiding places for contraband
The officer also observed one picture of Tesus Malverde affixed to the dashboaid and another*882
hanging from Lopez's necklace The officer recognized the images of Jesus Malverde, who is considered a patron saint by some drug traffickers The officer observed an air freshener, which he thought
might be used to mask the smell of drugs, as well as a
rose on the dashboard which he characterized as a
4
distraction " Finally, the officer observed three cell
phones in the vehicle's center console He believed,
based on his training and experience, that individuals
engaged in criminal activity often carried extra cell
phones to have multiple lines of communication
available Lopez told the officer he and the passenger
were returning to Kansas after spending "about a
week" m Las Vegas on vacation The officer observed only one small suitcase m the vehicle, however, which m his view was less luggage than would
be expected for a trip of that duration
The officer asked Lopez to return with him to the
patrol vehicle to leceive a written warning When
Lopez got out of his car, instead of following the
officer to the patrol vehicle, he assumed a position to
be frisked for weapons The officer told him a frisk
w as not necessary and motioned him to sit in the pa-

(Utah)))
trol car Once in the patrol car, while the officer was
writing out the warning, he asked additional questions about Lopez s travels Lopez changed nis account about the duration of the tnp, new saying it had
been three or four days Lopez also, without prompting, told the officer a friend had taken the vehicle
overnight while Lopez was m Las Vegas The officer
testified this spontaneous statement was suspicious
and interpreted it as an attempt by Lopez to distance
himself from any contraband that might be found m
the vehicle
**2 Pnor to giving Lopez the written warning he had
been preparing, the officer asked Lopez if there was
anything illegal m the vehicle Lopez said no The
officer then asked if he could search the vehicle, and
Lopez said yes The officer then returned to Lopez's
vehicle and briefly questioned the female passenger
She said the two had been staying m a motel, which
contradicted Lopez's account of them staying with a
friend The officer then deployed his certified drug
sniffing dog, Gino, for a sweep around the exterior of
the vehicle Gmo alerted to the rear of the vehicle, so
the officer opened the rear cargo door and deployed
Gmo inside the vehicle The dog then indicated at the
area between the second and third rows of seats The
officer searched that area by hand and discovered
6 73 pounds of methamphetamine hidden inside one
of the rear seats
At trial, Lopez attempted to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing the search was conducted without
probable cause or valid consent The district court
rejected the suppression request, ruling Lopez did not
have a legitimate possessory interest in the vehicle to
assert a Fourth Amendment violation,f— and even if
he did, the officer had both probable cause to search
the \ehicle and valid consent Lopez pleaded guilty,
and now appeals
FN1 The vehicle's expned registration was
in the name of a third party, and Lopez was
unable to provide the officer vuth the
ownei's full name or telephone number
There was, however, an expired insurance
card indicating the vehicle had been insured
by Lopez
III. Discussion
A district court's decision on a motion to suppress
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(Cite as: 334 Fed.App\. 880, 2009 WL 1579798 (C.A.10 (Utah)))
evidence is reviewed de novo United States v
Contreras. 506 F 3d 1031 1035 (10th Cir 2007) The
factual findings underlying its decision, however, are
reviewed for clear en or A/_
**883 Lopez does not contend his initial traffic stop
was invalid Rather, he argues the government unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and searched the interior of his vehicle without valid consent The polite
may search the mteiior c i a ^ chide if theie is probable cause that there is contraband inside the vehicle
See United States v Vazquez 555 T 3d 923 929
(10th Cir 2009) An alert by a certified drug-sniffing
dog during a sweep of the exterior of the vehicle can
give probable cause to search the interior Id at 92930, United States v Claikson, 551 F 3d 1196 1203
(10th Cir 2009)
Here, Gino's alert along with the other information
known to the officer at the time, created probable
cause to search the interior of the vehicle The only
issue is wheiher Lopez was being lawfully detained
when the sweep with Gmo commenced A traffic stop
may be extended if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activin Vazquez, ^ 5
F 3d at Q29 Reasonable suspicion is a 4 particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped
of cnmmal activity' United States \ AlcaiazAiellano 441 F 3d 1252 12>9 (10th Cir 2006) (quotation omitted) "It represents a minimum level of
objective justification which is considerably less than
proof of wrongdoing by a pi eponderance of the evidence " Id at 1260 (quotations omitted) This court
"accords appropriate deference to the ability of a
trained law enforcement officer to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions " Cknkson,
551 F 3d at 1201 (quotation omitted) Reasonable
suspicion is determined based on the totality of the
circumstances present Id_
**3 The iecord indicates the traffic stop became piolonged, at the earliest when the officer began asking
additional questions while sitting in the patrol car
with Lopez — At that point, the officer had ample
reason to be suspicious of possible drug trafficking
There were multiple signs of hidden compartments in
the interior of the \ehicle There was an air freshener
and a rose in the car, which the officer suspected
w ere de\ ices to mask the scent of drugs There w ere
more cell phones m the car than passengers There
w ere multiple images of Jesus Malverde, considered

by some to be a patron saint of drug traffickers Lopez and his companion had less luggage than would
be expected for a v\eel -long \ acanon Finally, Lopez
automatically assumed a position to be frisked for
weapons w ithout being asked to do so These factors
taken together particular!} the evidence of the hidden compartments, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Lopez may have been engaged in drug tiaffickmg The police officer was therefore justified m
prolonging the lenith of the traffic stop
FN2 The recoid is uncleai as to whtn the
officer CDmpleted filling out the warning
while he was questioning Lopez in the patrol
vehicle Once the written warning was completed, the officer's refusal to give Lopez the
warning meant Lopez was not free to terminate the encounter and thus was still being
detained beyond the original purpose of the
traffic stop, which required reasonable suspicion of some criminal activ lty It is unnecessary to determine the precipe point during
the questioning when the stop became prolonged, however, because the officer had
reasonable suspicion to piolong the step before the questioning began
The police officers questioning pnor to the deployment of the drug-sniffing dog onlv served to heighten
his suspicions and further justify the detention Lopez
gave an inconsistent statement about the length of his
stay in Las Vegas and spontaneously *884 told the
officer that the vehicle had been m his friend's possession overnight The passenger in the car told the
officer they had stayed m a motel, not m a friend's
house as Lopez had indicated These inconsistencies
gave the officer justification to prolong the traffic
stop further and deploy Gmo Therefore the detention was lawful at the time Gmo alerted tc drugs inside the vehicle —i
F~NR The government amends ana tne uis
tnct court ruled that Lopez did not demonstrate a possessory interest m the vehicle
sufficient to permit him to assert a Fourth
Amendment violation It is unnecessary to
reach this issue on account of the officer
havmg probable cause to search the vehicle
Likewise it is unnecessary to address the
government's other contention that Lopez
gave valid consent to search the vehicle, be-
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cause the search was lawful even in the absence of consent.
IV. Conclusion
The district court correctly denied Lopez's motion to
suppress because the police had probable cause to
conduct the search following a lawful detention.
Therefore, the district court's decision is affirmed.
C.A.IO (Utah).2009.
U.S. v. Lopez-Gutierrez
334 Fed.Appx. 880, 2009 WL 1579798 (C.A.IO
(Utah))
END OF DOCUMENT
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Dotted States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jesus Manuel DIAZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 09-2090.
Dec. 11,2009.
As Amended on Rehearing in Part Jan. 28, 2010.
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan 28,
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Background: Defendant was convicted, in the
United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico, of possession with intent to distribute 1000
kilograms or muie of marijuana. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals. Marv Beck
Briscoe, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) motor carrier inspection officer had piobuble
cause to conduct further search of defendant's tractortrailer after his regulatory inspection of the vehicle;
(2) evidence was sufficient to support conviction;
(3) permissive inference jury instruction was warranted;
(4) admission of officers' testimony regarding the
trucking industry and common drug trafficking practices was not plain error; and
(5) denial of motion to allow handwriting expert to
examine original consent to seaich form did not
prejudice defendant.
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48Ak349.5(4) k. Probable or reasonable
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48AVI1 Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak3^9,5 Search or Seizure Consequent
to Arrest, Stop or Inquiry
48Ak349,5(5) Object. Pn-ihil s o[»
and Conduct of Search or Inspection
48Ak349.5D k. Drugs and naaotics. Mo^t Cited Cases
Motor carrier inspection officer had probable cause to
conduct further search of tractor-trailer defendant
wras driving after conducting regulatory inspection;
inconsistent weights suggested defendant was carrying more load than was listed on bill of lading, log
book showed considerable down time away from
home, defendant offered inconsistent stories, appeared increasingly nervous, and possessed four cellular phones, but not a CB radio, lock and seal on
trailer was unusual given weight and nature of load,
and large amount of dust on boxes m trailer and
strong odor of air freshener was consistent with drug
shipment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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[21 Controlled Substances 96H " V - / " " " 81
96H Controlled Substances
96HIII Prosecutions
96Hk70 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
96Hk81 k. Possession for sale or distribution. Most Cited Cases
Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's constructive possession of marijuana found in tractortrailer, as required to support conviction for possession with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more
of marijuana; defendant was the sole occupant and
driver of the vehicle, he had a receipt for shrinkwrap
used to package the marijuana, and the large quantity
and value of the drugs made it unlikely that they
would be shipped without the driver's knowledge.
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Art

of

1Q70

S 4f)irhVlVA , l

91

IKfA

8

Most Cited Cases
Admission of law enforcement officers' testimony
regarding the trucking industry and common drug
trafficking practices was not plain error, in prosecution for possession with intent to distribute 1000
kilograms or more of marijuana; to the extent that the
testimony was expert in nature, the testimony's reliability could be inferred from the breadth of the officers' training and experience. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule
702, 28 U.S.C.A.

[51 Criminal Law 110
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627.6(3)

110 Criminal Law
110XX Trial
11 OXX(A) Preliminary Proceedings
110k627.5 Discovery Prior to and Incident
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110k627.6 Information or Things, Disclosure of

131 Controlled Substances 96H x - r —

97

96H Controlled Substances
96HIII Prosecutions
96Hk95 Instructions
96Hk97 k. Possessory offenses. Most Cited
Cases
Permissive inference instruction telling jury it could,
but was not required to, draw an inference about
driver's knowledge of the marijuana based on his
operation of the tractor-trailer in which the marijuana
was found was warranted, in prosecution for possession with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more
of marijuana, where defendant was sole operator of
the vehicle, a drugs had a high value, and defendant
had receipt for shrinkwrap used to package the marijuana.

HI Criminal Law 110
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036.6

110 Criminal Law
11QXXIV Review
11OXXTVYE) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl036 Evidence
110kl036.6 k. Opinion evidence.

110k627.6(3) k. Particular documents or tangible objects. Most Cited Cases
Denial of motion to allow handwriting expert to examine original consent to search form did not prejudice defendant, in prosecution for possession with
intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, where prosecution had allowed defendant to
inspect and copy the original form. Fed.Rules
Cr.Proc.Rule 16fa)(T¥E). 18 U.S.C.A.

[61 Witnesses 410

€=?

228

410 Witnesses
41 PHI Examination
410111(A) Taking Testimony in General
41Qk228 k. Mode of testifying in general.
Most Cited Cases
Trial court lacked discretion to permit telephonic
testimony, and thus properly excluded telephonic
testimony of defendant's former employer's regarding
the common practices of the trucking industry in
prosecution for possession with intent to distribute
1000 or more kilograms of marijuana. Fed.Rules
Cr.Proc.Rule 26. 18 U.S.C.A.

J71 Criminal Law 110
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110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
11 OXVII(D) Facts in Issue and Relevance
11 Qk3 3 8 Relevancy in General
110k338(7) k. Evidence calculated to
create prejudice against or sympathy for accused.
Most Cited Cases
Probative value of testimony of defendant's worker's
compensation attorney as to defendant's possible
worker's compensation recovery was outweighed by
danger of jury confusion, in prosecution for possession with intent to distribute marijuana; even if the
testimony was relevant to show absence of defendant's motive to engage in drug trafficking, it could
confuse the jury into thinking that the criminal prosecution involved a civil case. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule
403.28U.S.CA.
*119 Laura Fashing, Office of the United States Attorney, Albuquerque. NM, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Brian Anthony Pori, Esq., Inocente, PC, Albuquerque. NM. for Defendant-Appellant.
Before BRISCOE. BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit
Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT—
FN* This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. RApp. P.
32.1 andlOthCir. R. 32.1.
MARY BECK BRISCOE. Circuit Judge.
*•! Defendant-Appellant Jesus Manuel Diaz was
convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). On appeal Diaz
challenges his conviction on five grounds alleging
that: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress evidence of the marijuana; (2) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction; (3) the district court improperly instructed the jury; (4) the district court improperly
admitted the testimony of two law enforcement officers; and (5) the district court committed three other
evidentiary errors which cumulatively denied him the
ability' to present a defense. We have jurisdiction pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM Diaz's conviction.
I.
Jesus Manuel Diaz is the owner-operator of a one ng
trucking company known as JD Easyline On Marih
IP. 2007, Diaz drove his tractor-trailer eastbound
through the Gallup, New Mexico, Port of Entry located on Interstate 40 near the Arizona border. The
drive-up credentials booth was closed that morning
so Diaz got out of his truck and entered the lobb) at
9:40 a.m. in pursuit of the permits necessary to dn\ e
his tractor-trailer across Neu Mexico.
Once inside. Diaz encountered James Snnd. a Motor
Transportation Division officer with the New Mexico
Department of Public Safety. Diaz provided Officer
Smid with his commercial drher's license and the
various other items necessary to complete the permit
paperwork. According to the bill of lading and weight
scale ticket Diaz presented to Officer Smid, Diaz's
load consisted of 9,762 pounds of Dollar Store merchandise and the gross weight of his tractor-trailer
was 56,760 pounds.
*120 These weights concerned Officer Smid. Based
on his experience, both as a commercial truck driver
and as public safety officer, Smid knew that an empty
tractor-trailer with fuel weighs between 32,000 and
33,000 pounds. Thus, he believed that if Diaz's load
were in fact 9,762 pounds, the gross weight of Diaz's
tractor-trailer would be approximately 42.000
pounds. This left approximately 14,000 pounds unaccounted for by Diaz's paperwork. Smid was also confused by the fact that Diaz had chosen to "scale out"
when he was well below the applicable weight limit.
At 9:45 a.m., with his interest piqued, Officer Smid
informed Diaz that he was going to perform a Le\ el
Two Regulatory Inspection of his tractor-trailer. A
Level Two Inspection is a process authorized by
N.M. Stat. Ann. S 65-5-1 which allows a safety officer to ensure that a tractor-trailer is in compliance
with all applicable laws and regulations by examining
the vehicle and performing a more in-depth review of
the driver's relexant paperwork.
Officer Smid began his Level Two Inspection of
Diaz's tractor-trailer by reviewing Diaz's logbook. It
showed that Diaz had not driven for the first several
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weeks of March and that Diaz had in fact been in
California since January 19, 2007. Officer Smid felt
that such a long stretch of downtime was strange for
a sole proprietor trucker, particularly because although Diaz listed Baxley, Georgia as his home, he
had spent the downtime in California. Smid asked
Diaz about this and Diaz claimed that he had been
sick with the flu in California for the entire two
months.
**2 Officer Smid then began to question Diaz about
the weight discrepancies indicated by his paperwork.
Diaz attempted to explain the unaccounted weight by
telling Officer Smid that sometimes shippers put
more on to a trailer than is indicated in the bill of
lading. Officer Smid found this explanation odd
given that in his experience legitimate shippers only
ship what is listed in the bill of lading.
During his review of Diaz's paperwork, Officer Smid
also noticed a marked change in Dial's demeanor.
Diaz began lowering his head, rubbing his lips with
his hand, and scratching his neck. This was of note to
Smid because Diaz had not exhibited any of this behavior during the initial permitting process. At this
time Diaz also offered a second story regarding his
downtime in California, this time informing Smid
that he had spent some of the time in Mexico visiting
family and friends.
With the document review portion of the Level Two
Inspection complete, Officer Smid instructed Diaz to
pull his tractor-trailer into an inspection bay so that
he could inspect the vehicle itself. As Officer Smid
inspected the outside of the vehicle he first noted a
lock and seal on the trailer's doors. Officer Smid felt
that this was unusual because based on his experience, a relatively small load of Dollar Store merchandise would not be locked and sealed.
Officer Smid then began to inspect the cab of the
tractor-a routine part of a Level Two Inspection.
While inside Smid noticed that Diaz did not have a
citizen's band or CB radio, which he felt was unusual
for a commercial trucker. Smid asked Diaz why he
did not have a CB radio and Diaz told Smid he had
sold it because he needed money. Officer Smid also
discovered four cell phones in Diaz's cab. Smid
thought this was significant because in the over 2,500
inspections he had conducted, he had discovered
multiple cell phones in only about thirty instances,

nearly all of which eventually resulted in the discovery of contraband as well. Officer Smid also felt that
Diaz's paying for four cell phones was not consistent
with his statement that he sold his CB radio because
he needed the money.
*121 Officer Smid then moved on to check the load
in Diaz's trailer. Diaz had informed Smid that the
shipper had sealed and locked the load. Again, Smid
felt that it was unusual that a load of this nature
would have been sealed and locked. Upon further
examination Smid was also concerned by the fact that
the seal on the trailer's door was a commercially
available seal, not unique to the shipper. In Smid's
experience this was not a typical practice.
When the doors of the trailer swung open, Officer
Smid detected a strong odor of air freshener. Smid
thought this was strange because the bill of lading did
not indicate that Diaz was transporting any air fresheners. Further, in Officer Smid's experience, drug
traffickers had used air fresheners in an attempt to
conceal the contraband they were transporting.
Officer Smid then viewed the contents of the trailer.
It was packed very tightly with pallets of boxes lining
its entire length. In the middle were large bundles of
clear plastic shrinkwrap. Officer Smid noticed that
the boxes toward the nose of the trailer had a large
amount of dust on them while the boxes toward the
rear of the trailer, or near its doors, did not. In Officer
Smid's experience this was consistent with the use of
a "cover load," or a group of boxes that remain in a
trailer over the course of multiple drug runs, each
time aiding in the driver's attempt to appear legitimate. During this time Officer Smid also looked back
at Diaz on at least one occasion, but Diaz would not
look at Officer Smid.
**3 Confident now in his belief that Diaz's trailer
contained contraband, Officer Smid terminated his
Level Two Inspection at 10:17 a.m. and asked another officer to call Officer Hermillo Lucero, a K-9
officer. Although it is unclear wrhether Smid returned
Diaz's paperwork to him at this time, Smid did ask
Diaz if he could ask him a few more questions, and
Diaz agreed. Officer Smid asked Diaz if there was
any cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine in his truck
and Diaz promptly answered "no" to each of these
questions. When Smid asked Diaz if there was any
marijuana in his trailer, however, Diaz hesitated,
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turned away from Smid, and laughed nervously before saying "no" again.
Officer Smid then asked Diaz if he could perform a
more thorough search of the tractor-trailer and Diaz
verbally agreed. Smid then produced a consent formin Spanish because Diaz indicated he was more fluent
in that language-which was read to Diaz. Diaz signed
this consent form at 10:30 a.m. and Officer Smid
began his subsequent search at 10:35 a.m.
At this point Officer Dave Halona arrived and stayed
with Diaz while Smid began searching the cab of the
tractor. As he entered the cab, Diaz informed Smid
that there was $1,500 in cash in a bag in the cab. Diaz
said that he had received the cash as an advance for
costs from the broker who got him the job. Based on
his experience, Officer Smid felt that this was an unusual practice. Further, he felt that it was odd that the
cash was is small denominations. Officer Smid's
search of the cab ended at approximately 10:55 a.m.
Officer Smid then moved back to the trailer. The
smell of air freshener became stronger as he moved
toward the middle of the trailer. He proceeded to
open one of the boxes and discovered a seat cushion
in a state of disrepair that indicated to Smid that it
was not legitimate merchandise. He continued to
diligently move and search the boxes by himself for
approximately an hour. Then, at 11:55 a.m., Smid
called Officer Lucero to see how long it would be
before he arrived with the canine unit. Officer Lucero
said he would be there shortly.

pounds.
At Diaz's trial, the following additional facts were
adduced. First, a laptop computer and printer were
discovered in the cab of Diaz's tractor and a computer
forensics expert testified that a program used to create bills of lading had been deleted from the computer the day before Diaz was arrested. Also, it was
discovered that Diaz already had a bill of lading for a
return trip from Georgia which was identical in every
way to the one he presented to Officer Smid in
Gallup except that the cargo was listed in a different
order. And a Dollar Store manager from California,
Homer Gonong, testified that the Dollar Store does
not ship in bulk, a single company services the company's southern California trucking needs, the contact
listed on Diaz's bill of lading does not work for the
Dollar Store, and the type of bill of lading that Diaz
presented was not one that the Dollar Store used.
**4 Further, a receipt for shrinkwrap was discovered
in Diaz's cab, the seal on the trailer's door was found
to be within the sequence of seals found in Diaz's
cab, and it was determined that all four of the cell
phones found in Diaz's cab were "throw away"
phones, only one of which had any connection to
Diaz or his company. Finally, Drug Enforcement
Agency Agent Kevin Garver testified that many of
Diaz's practices were consistent with drug trafficking
operations that he had previously investigated.
On March 20, 2007, a criminal complaint was filed in
the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico charging Diaz with the possession of
over 1,000 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(A). After
a jury trial, Diaz was convicted and this timely appeal
followed.

*122 Smid continued to search the trailer without
taking a break until Officer Lucero arrived at 12:15
p.m. Shortly after he arrived, Officer Lucero ran his
dog around the outside of Diaz's trailer and it alerted
on the front left corner. The dog did not, however,
alert inside the trailer. Nonetheless, Officers Smid
and Lucero decided to conduct a further hand search
of the trailer.

A Motion to Suppress

As they moved several more of the boxes in the
trailer the officers discovered a plywood tunnel that
had been built into the trailer. Officer Smid crawled
into the tunnel and discovered a large plastic bag. He
cut the package open and discovered marijuana. The
officers then arrested Diaz at 12:45 p.m. before finishing their search which eventually produced 230
bundles of marijuana weighing more than 3,300

Prior to trial, Diaz filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence in which he requested that the district court
suppress the evidence of the marijuana seized from
his tractor-trailer. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Diaz's motion. The district court concluded that Officer Smid's initial Level
Two Inspection of Diaz's tractor-trailer was constitutional under the regulatory search exception to the

II.
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Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, see United
Siates v. Gwathnev, 465 F.3d 1133. 1138-40 (10th
Cir.2006) (holding that New Mexico's inspection
system is constitutional under the regulatory search
exception insofar as it allows an officer to enter a
trailer to inspect its cargo). The district court also
concluded that the subsequent search performed by
Officers Smid and Lucero was constitutional, offering three independent bases for this holding: (1) that
during the course of his Level Two Inspection Officer Smid developed *123 probable cause to believe
that Diaz's tractor-trailer contained contraband; (2)
that during the course of his Level Two Inspection
Officer Smid developed reasonable suspicion to believe that Diaz's tractor-trailer contained contraband;
and (3) that Diaz voluntarily consented to the subsequent search.
On appeal, Diaz does not challenge the district court's
conclusion regarding the constitutionality of Officer
Smid's Level Two Inspection, but does argue that the
district court erred in upholding the subsequent
search of the cab and trailer. We are free to affirm the
district court's decision on any grounds, see United
States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203. 1209 n. 1 (10th
Cir.2005), and begin our review with the district
court's conclusion that Officer Smid had probable
cause to conduct the challenged search.
Probable cause under the automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement exists if,
given the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair
probability that the vehicle contains contraband or
evidence. United States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d
1207. 1212 (10th Cir.200n. We review the district
court's probable cause ruling de novo, United States
v Rosborouzh. 366 F.3d 1145. 1152 (10th Cir.2004).
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government and accepting the factual findings cf
the district court unless they are clearly erroneous,
see United States v Grimmctt, 439 F.3d 1263. 1268
qOthCir.2006).
**5 HJ The district court relied on the following fifteen factual findings in concluding that Officer Smid
had probable cause to conduct a further search after
he had completed his regulatory inspection:
(1) the inconsistent weights suggested Diaz was
carrying more load than was listed on the bill of
lading; (2) Diaz's log book showed considerable

down time away from home which was odd for an
independent trucker; (3) Diaz offered inconsistent
stories regarding his illness and/or trip to Mexico;
(4) Diaz was increasingly nervous from the initial
permit process through the inspection; (5) Diaz's
explanation for why he scaled out was inconsistent
with the use of legitimate shippers; (6) Diaz's possession of four cell phones; (7) Diaz's lack of a CB
radio was suspicious; (8) Diaz's claim that he sold
the CB radio because he needed money was inconsistent with the fact that he had four cell phones to
pay for; (9) the use of a lock and seal on the trailer
was unusual given the weight and nature of the
load; (10) the seal on the trailer was not unique to
the shipper, even though Diaz claimed the shipper
sealed the trailer; (11) the large amount of dust on
the boxes was consistent with the use of a cover
load; (12) the strong odor of air freshener was consistent with an attempt to mask the odor of drugs;
(13) Diaz's hesitation and nervous laughter when
asked if he had marijuana in the truck indicated
criminal activity; (14) Diaz told Smid he had
$1,500 in cash in a bag in the tractor; and (15) the
packages in the trailer contained seat cushions in
terrible condition, indicating they were part of a
cover load.
ApltApp. at 297-98, 302.
Diaz contends that several of these factual findings
are clearly erroneous because they "were based on
nothing more than Officer Smid's bare assertions
which lacked any factual basis." Aplt Op. Br. at 24.
Specifically, Diaz argues that there was no evidence
to confirm any alleged weight discrepancy Smid
found between the bill of lading and the tractor-trailer
itself, that his logbook demonstrated that his statements regarding his downtime were not inconsistent,
that there was no *124 documented evidence of dust
on boxes or air fresheners in the trailer, and that Officer Halona's testimony indicated that Diaz was calm,
not nervous, throughout the encounter. Diaz further
argues that it was improper for the district court to
rely solely on Officer Smid's testimony to conclude
that the details of his method of operation-his four
cell phones, the use of a commercially available seal,
his lack of a CB radio, etc.-were consistent with the
practices of a drug trafficker.
Diaz's arguments are not compelling. First, as we
have previously noted, "[t]he credibility of witnesses,
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the province of the district court," Rosborouzh, 366
F.3dat 1148 (quoting United States v. Lonz. 176 F.3d
1304. 3307 (10th Cir.1999)), and Diaz provided no
evidence or direct testimony to contradict Officer
Smid at the suppression hearing. Moreover, we have
cautioned that "a court should accord deference to an
officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and
suspicious actions." United States v. GandaraSalinas. 327 F.3d 1127. 1130 (10th Cir.2003). Therefore, we cannot conclude that the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, even if they
were based solely on the testimony of Officer Smid.
**6 Thus, although our review of the record causes
us to conclude that the events which relate to the district court's final two factual findings occurred after
Officer Smid's Level Two Inspection, we accept, and
in turn rely upon the remaining findings to conclude
that by the end of his Level Two Inspection, Officer
Smid had probable cause to believe that Diaz's tractor-trailer contained contraband. See Gwathney, 465
F.3d at 1137-40 (holding that a trucker's suspicious
travel schedule, the presence of non-conforming
packages in his trailer, a receipt indicating he had
paid almost $14,000 in cash for repairs, and footprints on boxes indicating that the non-conforming
packages had been placed in the trailer last, all contributed to a finding of probable cause); United States
v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059. 1066 (10th Cir.1997)
(holding that conflicting versions of travel itinerary,
the presence of a communication device consistent
with drug trafficking and the scent of air freshener all
contributed to a finding of probable cause). In light of
this conclusion we need not address the district
court's alternative findings and conclusions which
support its conclusion that reasonable suspicion and
consent would also serve as bases for upholding the
challenged search. We conclude that the district court
was correct in denying Diaz's motion to suppress.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[21 Diaz next argues that the evidence presented at
his trial was insufficient to support his conviction.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a criminal conviction de novo. United States v. Triana, All F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir.2007). In so doing, we "ask only whether, taking the evidence-both
direct and circumstantial, together with the reason-

.M.)))
able inferences to be drawn therefrom-in the light
most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id_ (citation and alteration omitted).
To support Diaz's conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the government must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt: (1) that Diaz knowingly possessed the marijuana; and (2) that Diaz possessed the
marijuana with the specific intent to distribute it. Id^
Possession may, however, be constructive. That is,
possession may be found if the defendant knowingly
had ownership, dominion, or control over *125 the
contraband and the premises where it was found.
United States v. Reece, 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th
Cir.1996). However, "when the contraband may be
attributed to more than one individual, constructive
possession requires some nexus, link, or other connection between the defendant and the contraband."
Id
According to Diaz, the marijuana in his trailer could
reasonably be attributed either to him or to the Dollar
Store and because there was no nexus or link which
connected him to the contraband, the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction based on constructive possession. Even we assume, arguendo, that
the marijuana found in the trailer could reasonably be
attributed to the Dollar Store, Diaz's argument is unavailing because the evidence adduced at trial did
establish a nexus or link between Diaz and the contraband.
**7 Specifically, Diaz was the sole occupant of the
truck, his mode of operation and his downtime in
California supported an inference of drug trafficking,
his computer was shown to be capable of creating
bills of lading identical to the one he presented to
Officer Smid, he had a receipt for shrinkwrap which
was used to package the marijuana, and the value of
the drugs made it unlikely that they would be shipped
without the driver's knowledge. In sum, the evidence
was sufficient to support's Diaz's conviction based on
a theory of constructive possession.
C. Jwy Instruction
[31 Diaz next argues that the district court erred in
giving the jury the following instruction:
With respect to the question of whether or not a de-
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fendant knew that the controlled substance was
present, you may, but are not required to, infer that
the driver and sole occupant of a tractor trailer rig
has knowledge of the controlled substance within
it. This inference does not relieve the government
of its obligation to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Aplt.App. at 674. Diaz alleges that this permissive
inference instruction was not warranted by the evidence and as such it relieved the government of its
burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. We review the trial court's decision
to give a particular jury instruction for an abuse of
discretion, but "consider the instructions as a whole
de novo to determine whether they accurately informed the jury as to the governing law." Gwathnev,
465F.3datll42.
The instruction that Diaz challenges is the same instruction the defendant challenged in Gwathnev. See
id. at 1138. In rejecting Gwathney's challenge to the
instruction, we noted that "[a] permissive inference
instruction does not violate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights provided there is a rational connection between the facts proved by the prosecution
and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inferred fact
is more likely than not to flow from the proven
facts." Id. at 1143. We went on to hold that the district court had not abused its discretion in giving the
permissible inference instruction because the evidence strongly supported an inference that Gwathney
knew of the marijuana in his trailer. IcL_ Specifically,
Gwathney was the sole operator of the trailer containing the drugs, the load had not been sealed by the
packers which meant Gwathney could have accessed
it, and the high value of the marijuana made it
unlikely that it would be shipped without the driver's
knowledge. ld_
Diaz distinguishes the facts of his case from those
presented in Gwathnev, pointing out that he did not
own the trailer he was transporting, he was operating
pursuant* 126 to a "hook and drop" arrangement, and
the trailer he was transporting was locked and sealed
by the shipper. Diaz claims that these factual differences precluded any inference that he had knowledge
of the trailer's contents. Even assuming, arguendo,
that the facts that Diaz relies on are meaningfully
distinguishable from Gwathnev, his argument is
nonetheless unavailing because there remains a host

of evidence to support the inference that Diaz knew
about the drugs in his trailer. This evidence includes
Diaz's sole operation of the truck, the high value of
the drugs, the box of seals in the tractor which were
of the same make as the seal on the trailer, the bills of
lading presented which were the same as those Diaz's
computer could generate, the receipt for shrinkwrap
in the tractor and the various other suspicious details
of Diaz's mode of operation. Given the magnitude of
this remaining evidence, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in giving the jury the permissive
inference instruction.
D. Expert Testimony
**8 [4] Diaz next contends that the district court
erred in allowing Officer Smid and Agent Garver to
testify as expert witnesses regarding the trucking industry and/or common drug trafficking practices.
Specifically, Diaz alleges that the district court erred
in allowing Smid and Garver to offer expert testimony without first ensuring that there was a reliable
basis for their expertise.
Before trial, Diaz's counsel filed a motion in limine
on these grounds, but the district court chose to wait
until the testimony was offered and objected to before making its ruling. During the course of the trial,
however, Diaz's counsel objected on these grounds
only once toward the end of Officer Smid's re-direct
testimony and the district court correctly overruled
Diaz's objection, noting that the challenged testimony
was not expert in nature. Thus, because any objections Diaz made were untimely, he has waived this
issue and we will review the district court's admission
of this testimony only for plain error. See Macsenti v.
Becker, 131 R3d 1223. 1230-34 (10th Cir.2001)
(holding that objections made to expert testimony
after it was given were untimely and therefore reviewing the admission of the testimony only for plain
error); United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1264
(10th Cir.1999) (noting that unless the trial court
rules upon a pretrial motion in limine without
equivocation, the motion will not preserve an objection that is not renewed at the time the evidence is
introduced).
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires trial courts to
assess the reliability of expert testimony which is
based on scientific, technical, or "other specialized"
knowledge before admitting it. Dauber't v. Merrell
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Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589. 113 S.Ct.
2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); see also Kwnho Tire
Co., Ltd. v, Carmichael 526 U.S. 137. 141. 119 S.Ct.
1167. 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Thus, if expert testimony is objected to at trial "the district court is required to make specific, on-the-record findings that
the testimony is reliable under Dauheit" United
States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192. 1207 (10th
Cir.2009).
Much of the testimony of Officer Smid and Agent
Garver was not, however, expert in nature because it
was not based upon scientific, technical, or "other
specialized" knowledge. Moreover, to the extent that
either of the individuals' testimony was expert in nature, not only did the absence of an objection excuse
the district court from its duty to make "explicit onthe-record rulings" regarding reliability, see Goehel
v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d
1083. 1088 n. 2 (10th Cir.2000) ("When no objection
is raised [to *127 expert testimony], district courts
are not required to make 'explicit on-the-record rulings ....' "), but the testimony's reliability can also be
safely inferred from the breadth of each individuals'
training and experience.— In sum, the district court
did not err in allowing the testimony of either Officer
Smid or Agent Garver.
FN 1. Officer Smid testified that he has possessed a commercial driver's license since
1994, he is a certified motor carrier inspector who has attended a two-week training
course on conducting inspections, and he
has conducted approximately 2,500 commercial vehicle inspections, approximately
fifty of which had resulted in the seizure of
contraband. Agent Garver testified that in
his seventeen years as a DEA special agent
he has been involved in several hundred
drug investigations during which he has
learned about various drug trafficking practices.
E. Evidentiary Errors
**9 Diaz also argues that the district court denied
him his constitutional right to present a defense when
it refused to allow his handwriting expert to examine
the original consent form, refused to permit the telephonic testimony of his former employer and excluded evidence that Diaz lacked a motive to commit

the crime for which he was charged. We review the
district court's decision to exclude evidence for an
abuse of discretion, but review de novo the question
of whether a constitutional violation has occurred.
United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231. 1239 (10th
Cir.2005).
A defendant is afforded the constitutional right to
present a defense by the due process clauses of both
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and b> the
Sixth Amendment's right to compulsory pr-x.-.>?
This right is, however, not without limits and thi>. :r.
presenting evidence a defendant "must comply with
the established rules of evidence and procedure -•.
assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt or innocence." Id, (citation and alteration omitted). "While the trial court may not apply a
rule of evidence mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice," in order to demonstrate that his constitutional rights have been violated a defendant "must
show that the exclusion of evidence rendered his trial
fun darnentally unfair...." IdL (quotati ons omitted).
1. Handwriting Expert
[5J Shortly before trial, Diaz filed a Motion to Inspect
the Consent to Search Form in which he requested
that the district court direct the government to allow a
handwriting expert to inspect the original consent
form at his offices in nearby Santa Fe, New Mexico.
The district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing
on the matter, but denied Diaz's motion in a written
order in which it noted that the government had already complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E) by allowing Diaz to inspect and
copy the original consent form and found that denying access to the original form was not. prejudicial to
Diaz. Diaz now claims that the district court abused
its discretion both in its decision on the merits and in
issuing its order without first holding an evidentiary
hearing.
Diaz's argument is unavailing. Not only' did Diaz fail
to request an evidentiary hearing in his motion, but
he has also subsequently failed to identify what additional evidence would have been presented at such a
hearing that was not already set forth in his motion.
Further, Rule 16(a)(1)(E) makes no mention of a defendant's right to take custody of a document, but
instead requires only that the government permit the
defendant uto inspect and to copy" documents, a step
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that the government in this case had already taken.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(E). Thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in *128 denying Diaz's
motion or in doing so without first holding an evidentiary hearing.
2. Telephonic Testimony
[6] Less than a week before his trial commenced,
Diaz filed a motion requesting that the district court
permit his former employer to testify telephonically
regarding the common practices of the trucking industry. The district court denied this motion in a written order referencing the reasons set forth at a hearing
on the motion, namely that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26 requires all witnesses in a criminal trial
to testify in open court unless otherwise provided by
statute or by rule. On appeal, Diaz contends that the
district court erred in issuing its order both because it
failed to acknowledge its discretion to permit telephonic testimony, and because it failed to exercise
that discretion.
**!0 Diaz's argument is without merit. The language
of Rule 26 unequivocally states that all witnesses in a
criminal trial must testify in open court unless otherwise provided by statute or by rules adopted under 28
U.S.C. 3S 2072-2077. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 26. Diaz
has failed to point to any statute or rule which provides such an exception which would apply in this
case. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conclude that it had discretion to
permit telephonic testimony, and/or in declining to
exercise such discretion.
3. Motive Testimony
[71 In his case-in-chief, Diaz attempted to present the
testimony of Genaro Legorreta, an attorney who at
the time was representing Diaz in a California
worker's compensation proceeding. Diaz hoped that
evidence of his possible worker's compensation recovery would establish that he did not have a financial motive to traffic in marijuana. As Legorreta began to explain his representation of Diaz, however,
the district court cut off the testimony, ruling that it
was irrelevant. Diaz contends that the district court
abused its discretion in excluding Legorreta's testimony because he claims that the absence of any plausible motive for his engaging in criminal conduct is
highly relevant.
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Once again, Diaz's argument is unpersuasive. Even if
we accept Diaz's proposition that absence of a financial motive is relevant, given the potential jury confusion that an in-depth discussion of a worker's compensation proceeding might cause, the district court
had an adequate basis for excluding Legorreta's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. In fact,
the district court mentioned that it believed that if the
testimony were allowed, "[t]he jury [was] going to
think this is a civil case." Aplt.App. at 585. As "we
are required to give the trial court 'substantial deference' in Rule 403 rulings," United States v. Shumwav. 112 F.3d 1413. 1422 (10th Cir.1997) (quotation
and citation omitted), we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Legorreta's testimony.
4. Cumulation
Finally, Diaz contends that even if each of the district
court's evidentiary rulings were only harmless error,
viewed cumulatively they infringed upon his constitutional right to present a defense. Diaz's argument
fails because, as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the district court did not err in any of its evidentiary rulings.

m.
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM Diaz's
conviction under 21 U.S.C. (j 841(b)(1)(A).
C.A.10 (N.M.),2009.
U.S. v. Diaz
356 Fed.Appx. 117, 2009 WL 4730422 (C.A.10
(N.M.))
END OF DOCUMENT
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Background: Defendant was convicted in the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada,
Robert C. Jones, J., of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that:
(1) police officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong
traffic stop and broaden scope of questioning, and
(2) defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to
the search of his vehicle.
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Police officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong
traffic stop and broaden scope of questioning; officer
saw two air freshener units in the vehicle and smelled
an overwhelming odor of air freshener, there were
three cell phones in the car for only two passengers,
defendant's driver's license was from California, but
the car was registered in his name in Missouri, defendant appeared extremely nervous, and responses
given to the officer when he talked with defendant
and his passenger separately were at times vague and
contradictory. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, § 401(a)(1), (b)(l)(A)(viii), 21 U.S.C.A. §
841(a)(1). (b)(l)(A)fviii).
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and defendant thereafter gave separate consent for the
search, both verbally and in writing, and, the defendant was not in custody, the officers' guns were not
drawn, the officers did not indicate that they could
obtain a warrant if he did not consent, nor was there
evidence of other coercive tactics. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 401(a)(1),
(b)(l)(A)(viii),
21
U.S.C.A.
§
841(a)(1).
(b)(l)(A)(viii).
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada, Robert C Jones, District Judge,
Presiding. D.C. No. CR-05-00219-RCJ.
*122 Before: SCHROEDER. Chief Circuit Judge,
CANBY and McKEOWN. Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM

mi

FN* This disposition is not appropriate for
publication and is not precedent except as
provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**1 Alejandro Arana-Duarte appeals from the denial
of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a
prolonged traffic stop and from his conviction for
possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(l)(A)(viii). The district court's denial of a motion
to suppress is reviewed de novo and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v.
Garcia, 205 F.3d 1182. 1186 (9th Cir.2000). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. j? 1291, and we
affirm. The facts of this case are familiar to the parties and we recite them here only to the extent necessary to explain our decision.
[1] We reject Arana-Duarte's argument that Trooper
Moonin unlawfully prolonged the stop and broadened
the scope of questioning by asking him whether he
was carrying contraband. Even if we assume that the

ev.)))
stop was not a consensual encounter after Trooper
Moonin returned Arana-Duarte's paperwork and told
him he was free to leave, see United States v.
Chavez-Valenzuela. 268 F.3d 719, 724-25 (9th
Cir.2001). amended by 279 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.2002).
we conclude that reasonable suspicion supported the
decision to prolong the stop and broaden the scope of
questioning. Trooper Moonin testified, among other
things, that (1) he saw two air freshener units in the
vehicle and smelled an overwhelming odor of air
freshener, the smell of which is often used to mask
the odor of narcotics, see United States v. RoiasMillan. 234 F.3d 464. 470 (9th Cir.2000) (unusually
strong odor of perfume emanating from car was suspicious as possible attempt to mask smell of illegal
drugs), (2) there were three cell phones in the car for
only two passengers, which is suspicious because
drug couriers are often given a phone by drug dealers
for use to stay in contact throughout the trip, (3)
Arana-Duarte's drivers license was from California,
but the car was registered in his name in Missouri,
which can be a sign that a drug courier is legitimizing
a trip by driving a car registered in the destination
state, (4) Arana-Duarte appeared extremely nervous
and was not appeased when the officer indicated the
nature of the stop was for a traffic violation, see
United States v. Murillo. 255 F.3d 1169. 1174 (9th
Cir.2001) (unusually nervous behavior is a suspicious
factor that may contribute to a finding of reasonable
suspicion), and (5) the responses given to the officer
when he talked with Arana-Duarte and his passenger
separately were at times vague and contradictory,
thus arousing his suspicions as to the trip's purpose
and their credibility, see Roias-Millan, 234 F.3d at
470 (vague and conflicting stories from driver and
passenger was suspicious factor contributing to reasonable suspicion). Considering these factors, there
was sufficient reasonable suspicion supporting
Trooper Moonin's brief detention of Arana-Duarte
after the records check to broaden the scope of questioning to include whether any contraband was present in the vehicle. See, e.g., id.; United States v.
Perez. 37 F.3d 510. 514 (Qth Cir.l9Q4).
**2 [2] We also reject Arana-Duarte's argument that
he did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the
search of his vehicle. The district court's determination *123 of the voluntariness of consent to search is
reviewed for clear error. United States v. Todhunter,
297 F.3d 886. 891 (9th Cir.2002). The totality of the
circumstances supports the district court's finding that
Arana-Duarte voluntarily consented to the search.
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After verbally warning Arana-Duarte about speeding,
Trooper Moonin returned Arana-Duarte's paperwork
and toid him he was free to leave. Arana-Duarte
thereafter gave separate consent for the search-both
verbally and in writing.

E]STD OF DOCUMENT

At the evidentiary hearing, Arana-Duarte admitted
that he orally consented to the search in response to
Trooper Moonin's request. Arana-Duarte also admitted to filling in the proper time and signing the Spanish-language search consent form, but testified that
he did not read the form and believed he was signing
an acknowledgment of the warning he received for
speeding. In light of the officer's testimony, the district court found Arana-Duarte's explanation that he
did not read and understand the form was "dubious at
best." The district court's findings that AranaDuarte's testimony was not credible and that his consent was given separately from the warning are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.
See, e.g., Perez, 37 F.3d at 515 (consent given after
verbal warning for traffic violation and return of defendant's paperwork found voluntary under the circumstances); United States v. Gutierrcz-Mederos,
965 F.2d 800. 803 (9th Cir.1992) (oral consent was
voluntary despite defendant's claim that his background and limited ability to speak English prevented
him from voluntarily consenting).
Arana-Duarte was not in custody, the officers' guns
were not drawn, the officers did not indicate that they
could obtain a warrant if he did not consent, nor was
there evidence of other coercive tactics. We agree
with the district court's finding that under the totality
of circumstances, Arana-Duarte's consent was freely
and voluntarily given. See United States v. Castillo,
866 F.2d 107L 1082 (9th Cir.1989) (collecting factors relevant to determination of voluntariness: (1)
whether the defendant was in custody, (2) whether
the arresting officers had their guns drawn, (3)
whether Miranda warnings were given, (4) whether
the defendant was notified that he had a right not to
consent, and (5) whether the defendant was told a
search warrant could be obtained).
AFFIRMED.
C.A.9 (Nev.).2007.
U.S. v. Arana-Duarte
244 Fed.Appx. 121, 2007 WL 1852139 (C.A.9
(Nev.))
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CHRISTINE T. McMONAGLE, J.
*1 HI 1} Defendant-appellant, Jermaine Bennett, appeals the decision of the Common Pleas Court denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
(1f 2} In March 2005, the Cuyahoga County Grand
Jury indicted Bennett on three counts of drug possession, three counts of drug trafficking, one count of
possession of criminal tools, one count of having a
weapon while under a disability, and one count of
carrying a concealed weapon. The indictment arose
out of a traffic stop of Bennett's vehicle and the subsequent search of his SUV after a drug-sniffing dog
alerted to contraband within the SUV.
(U 3} Bennett filed a motion to suppress, in which he
argued that 1) the initial stop of his vehicle was
impermissibly based on his race; and 2) the police did

Dist), 2006 -Ohio- 4274

not have a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained contraband in order to detain it after the traffic
stop had been completed.
}^I 4} The trial court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Bennett's motion to suppress.
{H 5} At the hearing, police officer Michael Shippitka testified that he is a member of the High Intensity Drug Task Force ("HIDTA"), a multijurisdictional task force comprised of officers who
patrol the roads to monitor for any type of drug,
weapon or terrorist activity.
(K 6} Shippitka testified that he and his partner, police officer Gregory Tinnirello, were working as
HIDTA team members on February 14, 2005. They
were parked in a patrol car along Interstate-480 at a
turnaround. Sometime prior to 8:20 p.m., Shippitka
and Tinnirello observed a silver Ford Expedition
traveling eastbound on 1-480 and bearing what appeared to be a Texas license plate. The officers observed that the rear illumination light for the license
plate was not working and, in light of Shippitka's
experience and training that Texas is a source state
for large amounts of narcotics, they decided to make
a traffic stop based upon the lack of rear plate illumination.
!K 7} As Shippitka pulled the patrol car behind the
Expedition, he verified that there were no illumination lights on the license plate. He then pulled the
vehicle over. Shippitka approached the driver's side
of the vehicle and requested the driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. All of these items
were produced. Tinnirello, the "cover officer," stood
to the rear of the SUV and looked in the vehicle.
ffl 8} Shippitka testified that while speaking with
Bennett, he observed an air freshener on the front
vent in the vehicle, a small rubber band on the floor,
and several cell phones and a $1,000 denomination
money wrapper on the center console. Shippitka testified that these items were indicators to him of possi-
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ble criminal activity. Shippitka testified that, from his
training and experience, the air freshener could be
used to mask drug odors, small rubber bands such as
that on the floor of the SUV were used by drug dealers to package individual packages of drugs, and drug
dealers often used one cell phone for business and the
other for personal calls. Shippitka testified that the
driver, Bennett, had an Ohio driver's license with a
local address, but the registration and title to the car
were in the name of Craig Tandre, who lived in
Texas. Bennett explained to Shippitka that he had
purchased the car from Tandre, but had not completed making payments on it, so Tandre had insisted
that the title and registration remain in Tandre's
name.
*2 (If 9} Shippitka returned to his patrol car to run a
records check regarding Bennett. This check indicated that Bennett's license was valid, the car was not
stolen, and there were no warrants out for Bennett's
arrest. The inquiry did reveal, however, that Bennett
had a criminal history involving grand theft and receiving stolen property. Shippitka also ran both Bennett's and Tandre's names through the El Paso Intelligence Center database, which indicated that Bennett
had previously been questioned by a Drug Enforcement Agency agent regarding $10,000 in his possession during a trip from Cleveland to Texas and that
he had a prior drug arrest. In addition, Tandre had
been stopped at the airport by a DEA agent and questioned regarding the large sum of money he was carrying.
{*[[ 10} In light of this information, and the items Officer Shippitka had seen in the SUV, Officer Tinnirello requested that Officer John Porter, another
HIDTA member, respond to the scene with his dog.
{% 11} Shippitka returned to the SUV and asked
Bennett to exit the vehicle, and Bennett did. Shippitka advised Bennett that he would not be issuing
him a citation for the lack of rear license plate illumination violation, but then asked him about some
"green vegetable matter" that Tinnirello had observed
in the rear cargo area of the car. Bennett walked to
the rear of the car and voluntarily opened the hatch
and the officers observed what appeared to be grass
clippings in the cargo area.
{*([ 12} Shippitka testified that he also saw a couch
with a big hole in it in the cargo area. Bennett told the

officers that he had been staying at an extended stay
hotel for one month and had been forced to buy the
couch after a friend's dog had torn it up. Shippitka
found this explanation suspicious, however, because
Bennett's driver's license showed a local address and
several of the cushions were missing from the couch.
Shippitka also observed a tool kit in the wheel well
and that the carpet had been pulled away from the
trim in the cargo area. In light of these observations,
Shippitka thought that the couch might be just a
"cover load," and that there might be a compartment
in the rear of the vehicle where Bennett was transporting contraband.
(U 13} Shippitka then asked Bennett whether he
could search his vehicle, but Bennett refused. Shippitka told Bennett that he was free to leave, but advised him that he would retain the car and that a canine unit would be arriving to sniff the vehicle. Bennett refused Shippitka's offer to call a zone car to
transport him to a nearby restaurant where he could
call someone to pick him up and remained at the
scene.
flj 14} Officer Porter arrived on the scene at approximately 8:45 p.m. After Bennett exited his vehicle, Porter walked his dog around the SUV. Shippitka
testified that he did not see the dog alert on the vehicle, but was advised by Porter that it had alerted
twice to the front passenger side of the vehicle and
once to the rear. In light of the alerts by the dog, Officer Porter then searched the vehicle and found a
handgun, drugs and other contraband.
*3 (D 15} The trial court denied Bennett's motion to
suppress, and, despite a request by the defense for
findings of fact and conclusions of law (and a proffer
by the defense of same), denied the motion without
findings. After a bench trial, the court found Bennett
guilty of all counts and sentenced him to four years
incarceration and ordered him to pay a $38,500 fine.
Bennett now appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress.
H 16} Initially, we note that Crim.R. 12(F) mandates
that a trial court "state its essential findings on the
record" when "factual issues are involved in determining a motion." Here, in denying the motion to
suppress, the trial judge stated only, "motion is denied." The court made no findings of fact and gave
no reasons for its ruling. Moreover, despite defense
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counsel's request for findings and the judge's promise
to "reduce it to writing and make findings," the trial
court did not do so. Nevertheless, we conclude that
the trial court's failure to provide its "essential findings" on the record in this case is not fatal to a review
of the trial court's ruling on the motion, because the
record provides a sufficient basis to review appellant's assignments of error. See, e.g., State v. Ozletree, Cuyahoga App. No. 86285, 2006-Ohio-448. at TT
15: State v. Kins (1999). 136 Ohio App.3d 377. 381.
{TI17} In his first assignment of error, Bennett asserts
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress. Essentially he contends that 1) absent probable cause, which was not present here, the police
may not detain a vehicle after their investigation of
the traffic offense is completed; 2) a drug dog may be
used only during a traffic stop, but not after the initial
traffic stop is completed; and 3) even if the dog
alerted in this case, absent exigent circumstances,
which did not exist here, the police were required to
obtain a search warrant prior to searching the vehicle.
None of Bennett's arguments have merit.
{f 18} Our standard for review of a trial court's
judgment regarding a motion to suppress was set
forth by this court in State v. Curry (1994), 95 Ohio
App.3d 93. as follows:
(lj 19} "In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness
credibility. A reviewing court is bound to accept
those findings of fact if supported by competent,
credible evidence. However, without deference to the
trial court's conclusion, it must be determined independently whether, as a matter of law, the facts meet
the appropriate legal standard." (Citations omitted.)
JH 20} The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Tew v Ohio (1968). 3Q2 U.S.
L 88 S.Ct 1868. A traffic stop by a law enforcement
officer must comply with the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement. WTiren v. United States
(1996). 517 U.S. 806. 116 S.Ct 1769.
*4 [^ 21} A police officer may effect a traffic stop of
any motorist for any traffic infraction, even if the
officer's true motive is to detect more extensive
criminal conduct. United States v. Mesa (C.A.6

1995). 62 F.3d 159. 162. When conducting the stop
of a motor vehicle for a traffic violation, an officer
may detain the vehicle for a time sufficient to investigate the reason for which the vehicle was initially
stopped. State v. Balden, Preble App. No. CA200303-007. 2004-Ohio-184. Generally, the duration of
the stop is limited to the time necessary to effectuate
the purpose for which the stop was made. Id. This
time period includes the time necessary to run a computer check on the driver's license, registration and
vehicle plates. See Delaware v. Prouse (1979). 440
U.S. 648. 99 S.Ct. 1391. The detention may continue
beyond this time frame, however, when additional
facts are encountered that give rise to a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that
which prompted the initial stop. State v. Beltran,
Preble App. No. CA2004-11-015. 2005-Ohio-4194.
at TT 16. citing State v. Mvers (1990). 63 Ohio App.3d
765. See, also, United States v. Hill (C.A.6 1999).
iy5 r.jci iD6, zo^; Mesa, supra.
J^} 22} A lawfully detained vehicle may be subjected
during a traffic stop to a canine sniff of the exterior of
the vehicle even without the presence of a reasonable
suspicion of drug-related activity. Illinois v. Cabelles
(2005). 543 U.S. 405. 125 S.Ct. 834; United States v.
Place (1983). 462 U.S. 696. 103 S.Ct 2637: State v.
Rusnal (1997). 120 Ohio App.3d 24. However, the
police must have a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains drugs in order to detain a suspect beyond
the time necessary to complete the traffic stop while a
drug-trained canine is brought to the scene. State v.
Wilkins, Montgomery App. No. 20152. 2004-Ohio3917.atT12:ffz7/. supra.
fl[ 23} "Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal
level of objective justification for making a stop-that
is, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' but less than the level of
suspicion required for probable cause." State v..
Jones (1990). 70 Ohio App.3d 554. citing Terry, supra. We determine the existence of reasonable suspicion by evaluating the totality of the circumstances,
considering those circumstances " 'through the eyes
of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the
scene who must react to events as they unfold.' "
Heard, supra, quoting State v Andrews (1991). 57
Ohio St.3d 86. 87-88. See, also, United States v.
Townsend (2002). 305 F.3d 537.
{f 24} For example, in United States v. Alpert
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(19871 816 F.2d 958. the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the detention of a suspected drug
courier's luggage at an airport in order to subject it a
canine sniff. The suspect was informed that he was
not under arrest and that he was free to leave. In upholding the detention of the luggage, the Fourth Appellate Circuit noted that police officers who suspect
criminal activity have authority to make limited intrusions based on less than probable cause on an individual's personal security. The court reasoned that
such an intrusion is justifiable because it is substantially less intrusive than a traditional arrest and the
interests of crime prevention and detection and officer safety support the intrusion if the police have a
reasonable, articulable basis for suspecting criminal
activity. The court stated that the duration or brevity
of the stop is a key consideration in determining its
intrusiveness.
*5 H 25} Here, Officer Shippitka testified that he
and Officer Tinnirello called for a canine sniff of
Bennett's vehicle because: 1) Bennett's driver's license showed a local address, but he was driving a
vehicle with a Texas license place and the vehicle
was registered to a third party; 2) Shippitka knew that
Texas is a major source state for illegal drugs; 3) a
criminal records check revealed that Bennett had a
prior drug arrest and had been questioned recently by
a DEA agent about $10,000 in his possession during
a trip from Cleveland to Texas; 4) the party to whom
the vehicle was registered had similarly been stopped
and questioned by a DEA agent at the airport regarding the large sum of money he was carrying; 5) Shippitka had observed an air freshener on the front vent
of the vehicle and knew that such air fresheners were
used by drug dealers to mask drug odors; 6) Bennett
kept both windows of the Expedition down during
the entire stop even though it was February; 7) Shippitka observed a rubber band of the sort used to
package drugs on the floor of the Expedition; 8)
Shippitka observed more than one cell phone in the
center console of the vehicle and knew that multiple
phones are often used by drug dealers; 9) Shippitka
observed a $1,000 denomination money wrapper in
the center console; 10) Shippitka saw a tool kit in the
wheel well of the rear cargo area and observed that
the carpet had been pulled away from the trim in the
cargo area, suggesting that there was a hidden compartment for transporting contraband in the rear of
the vehicle; 11) Bennett's assertion that he had been
staying at an extended stay hotel for one month was
suspicious because his driver's license showed a local

address; and 12) Bennett's story about the damaged
couch he was transporting in the vehicle was suspect
because several cushions were missing from it.
H 26} We find, contrary to Bennett's argument, that
under the totality of the circumstances, these facts
were sufficient to give Officers Shippitka and Tinnirello reasonable suspicion that Bennett was involved
in criminal activity beyond that which prompted the
initial stop and, further, that his vehicle likely contained drugs. Accordingly, the officers were justified
in detaining Bennett's car for a short time after the
initial traffic stop had been completed until the canine sniff could be conducted.
{f 27} Bennett's assertion, in reliance on Caballes,
supra, that a dog sniff may take place only during a
traffic stop, and not after the stop has been completed, misconstrues the holding in Caballes. In Caballes, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether a canine sniff during a lawful traffic stop,
where the officers had no reasonable suspicion that
the vehicle contained drugs, violated the Fourth
Amendment. The Court concluded that the sniff did
not infringe on any constitutionally protected interest
in privacy, because the sniff would reveal no information other than the location of a substance that no
individual has a right to possess. Id. at 410. No mention was made in Caballes of canine sweeps that occur after a lawful traffic stop has ended. As the
United States Supreme Court made clear in Hill, supra, however, an officer may detain an individual
beyond the reasonable duration of the traffic stop for
the purpose of completing his investigation when the
officer has a reasonable suspicion the individual is
involved in criminal activity other than that which led
to the initial stop. Thus, in light of the officers' reasonable suspicion that Bennett was involved in drug
activity, we find no fault with the canine's sweep of
Bennett's vehicle after the initial traffic stop had concluded.
*6 m 28} Contrary to Bennett's argument, he was not
illegally detained after the traffic stop was completed.
He was informed several times that he was free to go,
and even that the officers would transport him to a
local restaurant where he could call someone for a
ride, but he refused the offer and remained on the
scene.
(T| 29} Likewise, Officer Shippitka's question to

Page 5
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2006 WL 2381646 (Ohio App. 8 Dist), 2006-Ohio-4274
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2381646 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.))
Bennett regarding whether he could search his vehicle, a question asked after Shippitka had told him he
would not be issuing a citation, did not amount to a
seizure of Bennett. "[T]he Constitution does not
mandate that a driver, after being lawfully detained,
must be released and sent on his way without further
questioning once the law enforcement officer determines that the driver has not, in fact, engaged in the
particular criminal conduct for which he was temporarily detained. * * * A law enforcement officer does
not violate the Fourth Amendment merely by approaching an individual, even where there is not reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed,
and asking him whether he is willing to answer some
questions. This includes a request for consent to
search the individual's vehicle. And, this consent is
not vitiated merely because the valid suspicion of
wrongdoing for which an individual has been stopped
proves to be unfounded or does not result in prosecution and the individual is free to go before being
asked." United States v. Erwin (C.A.6 1998). 155
F.3d 818. 820 and 823. (Citations omitted.)
fl[ 30} Furthermore, contrary to Bennett's argument,
there was no requirement that the police officers obtain a search warrant after the dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. "A warrantless search of
an automobile is permissible if probable cause exists
to believe it contains evidence of a crime. There is
probable cause to justify a warrantless search of a
vehicle once a properly trained and reliable drug detection dog alerts positively to the presence of drugs."
United States v. Perez (2006). 440 F.3d 363. 374,
citing United States v. Ross (1982). 456 U.S. 798.
809. 102 S.Ct. 2157. and Hill supra. 195 F.3d at 273.
See, also, State v. Carlson (1995). 102 Ohio App.3d
585, 600 ("Once a trained drug dog alerts to the odor
of drugs from a lawfully detained vehicle, an officer
has probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband.") Thus, the officers acted within their authority
in searching Bennett's vehicle following the alerts by
the dog.
{11 31} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Bennett's motion to suppress.
{Tj 32} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{\ 33} Bennett's second and third assignments of
error state, respectively:

(K 34} "Assuming an 'alert' by a properly trained
and reliable dog can establish 'probable cause' sufficient to justify a search, the reliability of the dog
must be established on the record. Since this did not
happen here, it follows that the court erred if its denial of the motion was influenced by the belief that
an alert was proven to have occurred."
*7 H 35} "To the extent it can be inferred (from the
court's summary ipsi [sic] dixit denial of the motion
to suppress) that: (A) the trial judge not only determined that a drug-sniffing dog 'alerted' and to the
extent it can likewise be inferred (B) the court found
this dog was appropriately qualified to do so, any
such rulings would be clearly erroneous and for that
reason the denial of the motion cannot survive meaningful scrutiny and must be reversed."
Ill 36} In these assignments of error, Bennett argues
that the State failed to prove the reliability of the dog
which alerted. Bennett's motion to suppress did not
challenge the reliability of the dog, however. As the
Supreme Court of Ohio made clear in Xenia v. Wallace (1988). 37 Ohio St.3d 216. 218. parties challenging the legality of a warrantless search or seizure
have the burden of setting forth the grounds upon
which they challenge the search or seizure in their
motion to suppress:
{K 37} "The prosecutor must know the grounds of the
challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court
must know the grounds of the challenge in order to
rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly
dispose of the merits. Therefore, the defendant must
make clear the grounds upon which he challenges the
submission of evidence pursuant to a warrantless
search or seizure. Failure on the part of the defendant
to adequately raise the basis of his challenge constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal" (Emphasis
added.)
{U 38} Bennett did not challenge the reliability of the
dog or whether it alerted in his motion to suppress.
Accordingly, he has waived these arguments for purpose of appeal.
{% 39} Appellant's second and third assignments of
error are overruled.
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(TI40} Bennett's fourth assignment of error states:
(H 41} "Assuming in the wake of the alleged alert
probable cause to search existed, the absence of exigent circumstances would then be critical, this likewise shows the court erred when she denied the motion."
{% 42} In this assignment of error, Bennett again argues that even if probable cause to search the vehicle
existed, because there were no exigent circumstances,
the officers were required to obtain a search warrant
before searching his vehicle.
(TI 43} As previously set forth in our discussion regarding assignment of error one, this argument is
without merit.
J" 44} Appellant's fourth assignment of error is
therefore overruled.
{H 45} Bennett's fifth assignment of error states:
(1f 46} "A trial court's 'essential findings' required to
be made by Rule 12(F), Rules of Criminal Procedure
and Evidence Rule 104(A), as a necessary condition
precedent to any ruling that probable cause existed
(whether expressed or inferred), as reviewed de novo
and will be held to be clearly erroneous where there
was no evidence to support such 'factual findings.' "
{* 47} In this assignment of error, Bennett argues
that because the trial court issued no findings of fact
in denying his motion, it must be presumed that the
court found, in light of the alert by the drug dog, that
probable cause existed to search his vehicle. Bennett
again asserts that, because the State did not prove the
reliability of the dog, however, there was insufficient
evidence from which the trial court could have found
probable cause.
*8 ffl 48} As noted earlier, Bennett did not dispute
the reliability of the dog in his motion to suppress
and, therefore, has waived this issue for appeal.
Moreover, as set forth in our discussion regarding
assignment of error one, it is apparent that the officers validly stopped Bennett for a traffic violation,
validly detained his vehicle after the traffic stop had
ended so a drug-sniffing dog could be brought to the
scene, and validly searched his vehicle, without a

warrant, after the drug-sniffing dog alerted three
times to the presence of drugs in the vehicle.
{f 49} Appellant's fifth assignment of error is overruled.
Affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant
costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for
this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue
out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to
carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending
appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the
mandate pursuant to Pvule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ANN DYKE, P.J., and DIANE KARPINSKL J.,
CONCUR.
N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's
decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A);
Loc.App.R. 22. This decision will be journalized and
will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is
filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the
court's decision. The time period for review by the
Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the
journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also,
S.CtPrac.R. II. Section 2(A)(1).
Ohio App. 8 Dist.,2006.
State v. Bennett
Not Reported in N.E.2d. 2006 WL 2381646 (Ohio
App. 8 Dist), 2006 -Ohio- 4274
END OF DOCUMENT
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
N.D. Oklahoma.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Stanislov AVEZOV, a/k/a Stanislov Avezlov, a/k/a
Robert Bernard, Omar Saadeldin, Defendants.
Case No. 10-CR-0085-CVE.
July 29, 2010.
Background: Defendants who were charged with
possessing Oxycodone with intent to distribute
moved to suppress evidence.

which defendants were traveling as driver and passenger had reasonable suspicion to believe that
criminal activity was afoot, and thus, trooper's decision to extend the traffic stop beyond the initial purpose of issuing a traffic citation was reasonable;
trooper observed objective indications of defendant
driver's nervousness, and the had been rented by a
third party who was not present in the vehicle, and
defendants' stories about their travel plans were inconsistent, and their stated travel plans involved
stopping to visit a friend for one night and then driving for at least 16 hours the next day. U.S C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.

121 Automobiles 48A N - " ™ " 349(2.1)
Holdings: The District Court, Claire V Eagan„ Chief
Judge, held that:
(1) trooper had reasonable suspicion to extend the
traffic stop;
(2) 70-minute length of detention was unreasonable;
(3) defendants were subject to custodial interrogation; and
(4) detention of defendants escalated into an arrest
requiring probable cause.

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(2) Grounds
48Ak349f2.1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases

Motion granted.
Automobiles 48A
West Headnotes

i l l Automobiles 48A , l W , ™"~ r 349(17)
48^ Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVTKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
Length and Character Thereof. Most Cited Cases
State trooper who conducted traffic stop of vehicle in

©^

349(5)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349f2) Grounds
48Ak349(5) k. Equipment or Inspection Offenses, m General. Most Cited Cases
A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if
the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if
the police officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred
or is occurring. U.S C.A. ConstAmend 4.
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[31 Automobiles 484

€^>

349(17)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349fl4) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k Detention, and
Length and Character Thereof Most Cited Cases

Automobiles 48A

<&z>349(18)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
484k349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or
Deposit
48Ak"49fl4) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48AU49Q8) k Inquiry, License,
Registration, or Warrant Checks Most Cited Cases
A traffic stop must not become an unnecessarily
lengthy detention, but must be limited m scope to the
purpose of the initial traffic stop, a police officer may
extend the length of the traffic stop for questioning
beyond the initial purpose of the traffic stop only if
the officer has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity hds occurred, or
the driver voluntarily consents to further questioning
U S C A Const Amend 4

[41 Automobiles 48A

€^>

349(18)

484 Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AMKB) Prosecution
48\k349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349fl4) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(18) k Inquiry, License,
Registration, or Wan ant Checks Most Cited Cases
An officer conducting a traffic stop may ask questions about the motorist's travel plans and authority to
operate the vehicle, m addition to obtaining the rele-

vant documentation, without exceeding the scope of
an investigative detention, such questioning does not
violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the questioning does not prolong the traffic stop U S C A
Const Amend 4

[51 Automobiles 48A

€==?349(17)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or
Deposit
48Ak3,49(34) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(T7) k Detention, and
Length and Character Thereof Most Cited Cases
A uiMTiut Cuuil Vnay uOnMucr vague or inconsistent
travel plans as factor to establish reasonable suspicion for extending a detention following a traffic
stop, but the identity of certain cities or states as
"source" locations for drugs is not a factor m the
court's analysis U S C A Const Amend 4

[61 Automobiles 48A

€^2

349(17)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48 WIKB) Prosecution
4SAlo49 Arrest, Stop or Inquiry, Bail or
Deposit
48AH49H4) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48AJ^9(H) k Detention, and
Length and Character Thereof Most Cited Cases
Extreme nervuu&ness of a driver oi pabNenger, m
combination with other factors, can be a factor used
to establish reasonable suspicion to continue a traffic
stop bevond its initial purpose however, this factor
must be considered with othei factors, and it may not
be used as the sole factor to establish reasonable suspicion U S C A . Const \mend 4

121 Automobiles 48A N - * " # s ' w 349(17)
48 K Automobiles
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48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or
Deposit
4SAk349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k Detention, and
Length and Character Thereof Most Cited Cases
The status of a vehicle as rented can be considered a
factor to support the existence of reasonable suspicion to continue a traffic stop beyond its initial purpose, because it is accepted that drug traffickers frequently use rental vehicles to transport illegal drugs
U S C A Const Amend 4

£81 Arrest 35

S^jjFifUPnf

63.4(1)

limited scope of an investigation detention, or the
detention may become so lengthy that the investigation detention escalates into a de facto arrest
U S C A Const Amend 4

£21 Arrest 35

€=>

63.4(2)

35. Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without
Warrant
35k63 4 Probable or Reasonable Cause
35k63 4(2) k What Constitutes Such
Cause m General Most Cited Cases
An officer has probable cause to arrest if, under the
totality of the circumstances, he learned of facts and
circumstances through reasonably trustworthy mformofiAii
a Jr av ou cj onini ou W
n i u i i u i i fliot
u i u t \vr»nl/-?
W u u i u \o*zr\
i w u u u.
uio
v nf jawr icanuti ii in
%,\j K^Iio-i
i y w n v <va w

3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 Officers and Assistants. Arrest Without
Warrant
35k63 4 Probable or Reasonable Cause
35k63 4(1) k Grounds for Warrantless
Arrest m General Most Cited Cases

Arrest 35

c^^

63.5(7)

35 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 5 Investigatory Stop or Stop-And-Fnsk
35k63 5(7) k Mode of Stop, Warnings,
Arrest Distmeuished Most Cited Cases

Arrest 35

c^>

63.5(9)

15 Arrest
3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 5 Investigatory Stop or Stop-And-Fnsk
35k63 5(9) k Duration of Detention and
Extent or Conduct of Investigation or Frisk Most
Cited Cases
If police officers' actions exceed what is reasonably
necessary under the totality of the circumstances, the
stop may only be justified by probable cause or consent, this may occur due to the use of handcuffs, firearms, or other police techniques inconsistent u ith the

that an offense has been or is being committed by the
person arrested U S C A Const Amend 4.

[101 Automobiles 48A

€=>

349(17)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k Detention, and
Length and Character Thereof Most Cited Cases
The 70-minute length of state trooper's investigative
detention of defendants following traffic stop of vehicle m which defendants were traveling as driver
and passenger, including 54-mmute delay m the arrival of a canine unit after the trooper decided to extend the traffic stop and call for a canine unit to
search the vehicle, was unreasonable, since the government failed to identify any circumstances that
would justify a 54-mmute extension of a routine traffic stop U S C A Const Amend 4

fill Arrest 35 N - / * ^ ^ 6 3 . 5 ( 0 )
^5 Arrest
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3 511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 5 Investigatory Stop or Stop-And-Fnsk
35k63 5(9) k Duration of Detention and
Extent or Conduct of Investigation or Fnsk Most
Cited Cases
Officers with reasonable suspicion to believe that the
occupants of a vehicle are engaged m the unlawful
transportation of contraband may detain the vehicle
for a reasonable time to obtain a properly trained dog
to sniff for contraband U S C A Const Amend 4

[12] Criminal Law 110

€^>

Automobiles 48A
412.2(2)

110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
llOXVIinvD Declarations
110k411 Declarations by Accused
i i ru
AI / i n I"»D r> ~i,+
~ u ±~ r^~. ~„~i r^~ *. ~~

110k412 2(2) k Accusatory Stage of
Proceedings, Custody Most Cited Cases

Criminal Law 110

c^^

412.2(3)

110 Criminal Law
110XVII Evidence
llOXVIKM) Declarations
110k411 Declarations by Accused
110k412 2 Right to Counsel, Caution
110k412 2(3) k Informing Accused
as to His Plights Most Cited Cases
The defendants were subject to custodial interrogation, so as to require Miranda warnings, dunng their
70-mmute detention following traffic stop of vehicle
m which they were traveling as driver and passenger,
state troopers separated defendants and put them m
different patrol cars while they waited for canine unit
to arrive to search the vehicle, and trooper engaged m
conversation with defendant driver for almost the
entire 54 minutes after he issued a warning citation,
including asking defendant if he "smoked weed," if
his passenger smoked weed, and whether the water
pipes he used at a hookah lounge were similar to
bongs
for
smoking
marijuana
USCA
Const \mend 4

f!31 Automobiles 48A

€^>

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIIfB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349flO) k What Is Arrest or Seizure, Stop Distinguished Most Cited Cases

349(10)

€^

349(17)

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349fl4) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349f17) k Detention, and
Length and Character Thereof Most Cited Cases
State troopers' investigative detention of defendants
following traffic stop of vehicle in which defendants
were traveling as driver and passenger escalated into
an arrest requiring probable cause, the traffic stop
lasted 70 minutes and during the 54-minute period of
time waiting for the arrival of a camne unit to search
the vehicle, the troopers placed defendants m separate patrol cars and engaged them in apparently casual conversation, but at least two of trooper's questions concerned defendant's possible involvement m
illegal activity U S C A Const Amend 4

[14] Criminal Law 110

€=>

394.1(3)

110 Criminal Law
lll'XMIEMdence
110XVIKI) Competency m General
U0k3^4 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained
110k394 1 In General
110k394 1(3) k Effect of Illegal
Conduct on Other Evidence Mo^t C^ed Cases
Under the exclusionary rule, the government may not
introduce into evidence tangible materials seized during an unlawful search or testimony concerning
knowledge acquired during an unlawful search, the
court is also required to exclude evidence discovered
as a result of the exploitation of the illegal conduct,
and this type of evidence is known as the fruit of the
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poisonous tree. U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 4.
Robert Thames Ralev, United States Attorney's Office, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff.
OPINION AND ORDER
CLAIRE V. EAGAN, Chief Judge.
*1 Now before the Court is Defendants' Joint Motion
to Suppress Tangible Evidence, Statements & Fruits
of Search (Dkt. # 20). They argue that evidence
seized during a search of a rental car on April 24 and
25, 2010 should be suppressed, because the Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) trooper continued the
traffic stop beyond its initial purpose without defendants' consent and without reasonable suspicion to
believe that defendants were involved in criminal
activity. Defendants are charged with possessing
Oxycodone with intent to distribute in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Court held an evidentiary
hearing on defendants' motion to suppress on July 23,
2010.
L
On April 24, 2010 around 11:45 p.m., OHP Trooper
Ryan Smith was on patrol on a section of Interstate
44 (1-44) known as the Turner Turnpike and observed
a gray Chrysler 300 pull into the toll booth lanes
without signaling a lane change. Smith turned on his
emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop and the vehicle pulled over to the right side of the highway.
Omar Saadeldin was driving the vehicle and Stanislov Avezov was seated in the front passenger seat.
Smith approached the vehicle from the passenger side
and asked the driver, Saadeldin, for his driver's license. Saadeldin produced a valid Arizona driver's
license. Smith asked Saadeldin to sit in his patrol car
while Smith completed a traffic citation and ran a
records check, and Saadeldin complied with Smith's
request.
Smith explained that he observed an illegal lane
change and Saadeldin acknowledged that he changed
lanes without using his turn signal. Smith asked
Saadeldin about his travel plans. Saadeldin stated that
he had driven to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma from
Phoenix, Arizona, and he decided to visit a friend in
Tulsa, Oklahoma before leaving Oklahoma. He
claimed that he was on his way to visit a friend in
Tulsa when he was stopped by Smith. Saadeldin

asked Smith if he would have to return to Oklahoma
for a court hearing, and Smith said "no." Smith asked
Saadeldin where he worked, and Saadeldin stated that
he owned two hookah lounges in Glendale and Phoenix, Arizona. Saadeldin informed Smith that the vehicle was a rental car, and the rental agreement was
in the glove box of the vehicle. Smith asked
Saadeldin who was traveling with him, and Saadeldin
stated that his friend "Stan" was the passenger. During the traffic stop, Saadeldin regularly engaged in
conversation without questioning from Smith, and
Smith testified that he perceived Saadeldin's conversation as a sign of nervousness.
Smith approached the passenger, Avezov, and asked
for the rental agreement for the vehicle. Smith also
asked Avezov about his travel plans, and Avezov
stated that they were driving from Oklahoma City to
Tulsa to visit family. Smith testified that Avezov
seemed extremely nervous and his voice was cracking. Avezov had told Smith that he was sharing driving duties with Saadeldin and Smith wanted to check
the status of Avezov's driver's license. Smith spoke
with Avezov for approximately 40 seconds. The
rental agreement showed that the vehicle was rented
by Michael Gutierrez from a Budget rental car location in Glendale, Arizona, and Saadeldin was an authorized driver for the rental car. Smith also noticed
that the vehicle had to be returned to Glendale by
Monday, April 26, 2010.
*2 Smith asked Saadeldin where he and Avezov were
staying in Tulsa, and Saadeldin stated that they were
driving to a hotel. Saadeldin knew the exact street
address of the hotel, but he could not recall the name
of the hotel. Saadeldin clarified that he was visiting a
friend named "Matthew Rosinski" in Tulsa, after
further questioning from Smith about Saadeldin's and
Avezov's purpose for visiting Tulsa. Saadeldin also
stated that they would be staying in Tulsa for only
one night, because they had to return the rental car on
Monday. Smith asked Saadeldin about his occupation, and Saadeldin explained that a hookah lounge
was a club or social lounge where guests used "middle eastern water pipes" to smoke flavored tobacco.
Smith asked Saadeldin where he and Avezov stayed
in Oklahoma City, and Saadeldin stated that they
stayed at the Biltmore hotel on Meridian Avenue.
Smith also asked Saadeldin if Avezov knew Rosinski. Saadeldin claimed that Avezov had met Rosinki
one time, but Rosinski was Saadeldin's long-time
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friend Smith pointed out the inconsistency between
Saadeldm's and Avezov's statements about their purpose for visiting Tulsa, and Saadeldm explained that
Rosinki was treated like his family because it was
such an extended friendship
Smith returned Saadeldm's driver's license and issued
a warning citation to Saadeldm Saadeldm prepared
to leave the patrol car, and Smith requested permission to ask Saadeldm some additional questions
Saadeldm agreed to answer a few questions and remained seated in Smith's patrol car Smith asked
Saadeldm if he had anything illegal in the car Specifically, he asked Saadeldm about the presence of
open containers of alcohol, weapons, illegal drugs, or
large amounts of United States currency in the vehicle, and Saadeldm responded that none of these items
were m the vehicle Smith asked for Saadeldm's consent to search the vehicle, and Saadeldm refused
Smith's request on the ground that the vehicle contamed items belonging to Avezov and he could not
agree to the search Smith asked for clarification
about his request to search the vehicle, and Saadeldm
clearly stated that he was not consenting to a search
of the vehicle Saadeldm asked if he was "good to
go," and Smith told Saadeldm to stay m Smith's patrol car Smith informed Saadeldm that he would be
calling for a canine unit and Saadeldm had to wait
until the canme unit arrived Smith then asked Avezov for his consent to search the vehicle, and Avezo\'s also denied Smiths request for consent Smith
testified that he relied on three factors as a basis for
reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop (1)
Saadeldm's and Avezov's conflicting stories about
their purpose for visiting Tulsa, (2) the rental agreement was signed by a third party who was not present
and the vehicle was rented m a "source" state and (3)
Saadeldm's and Avezov s nervous behavior The traffic stop took approximately 16 minutes from the time
of the initial stop to Smith's decision to call for a canine unit
*3 Smith called for a canine unit to perform a sniff of
the vehicle and it took 54 minutes for the drug dog to
arrive During this 54 minutes, Saadeldm remained m
the patrol car with Smith, and Avezov was placed in
a separate patrol car with OHP Trooper Paul Lakm
Neither Saadeldm nor Avezov were given Mnanda
w arnmgs, but Smith and Lakm engaged m conversation with Saadeldm and Avezov Saadeldm commented on Smith's laptop computer, and mentioned

(Ps om 0 Thomson Reuters No

that he had a laptop computer in the trunk of the vehicle Smith asked Saadeldm if he "smoked weed"
and Saadeldm denied that he used marijuana Smith
then asked Saadeldm if Avezov "smoked weed," and
Saadeldm replied that he did not know Smith asked
about Saadeldm's business operatmg a hookah
lounge, and Saadeldm explamed the process for
smoking flavored tobacco from a water pipe Smith
suggested that this process was similar to smoking
marijuana from a "bong " Much of the conversation
during this time was initiated by Saadeldm, and concerned a wide range of topics, including the equipment in the patrol car, Saadeldm's attendance at Arizona State University, and BlackBernes and cellular
telephones Saadeldm asked if he could get his cellular phone, but Smith told him to "sit tight" and did
not permit Saadeldm to get his phone
About 20 minutes after Smith called for the canine
unit, Smith asked Saadeldm if he and Avezov were at
a basketball game m Oklahoma City Saadeldm said
that they were at a basketball game between the
Oklahoma City Thunder and Los Angeles Lakers, but
they left m the third quarter Smith asked which team
was w inning the game when they left, but Saadeldm
claimed that he had been drinking alcohol and did not
remember Smith noted m his police report that he
did not detect an odor of alcohol on Saadeldm's
bieath Dkt # 20, Ex 1, at 1 Smith asked Saadeldm
about their tickets and the location of their seats, and
Saadeldm stated that they sat m section 13A or 13B
Saadeldm said the seats were "prett> high" in the
Ford Center Smith used his laptop computer and
found that there was no section 13A or 13B at the
Ford Center Smith asked how long Saadeldm had
known Avezov, and Saadeldm replied that he had
known Avezov for about six or eight months Smith
asked how well Saadeldm knew Gutierrez, and
Saadeldm claimed that he knew Gutierrez "very
well " In the other patrol car, Avezov told Lakm that
they watched the basketball game from a restaurant,
but they did not actually attend the game Avezov
also stated that he had been drinking alcohol, but
Lakm did not smell any alcohol on Avezov's breath
Assistant Chief Samuel Byrd of the Meeker Police
Department arrived with a drug dog, Brutus Brutus
is certified by the National Narcotic Detector Dog
Association to detect manjuana, methamphetamme,
herom, and cocaine See Government Exs 12-15
Byrd testified that he received a call from OHP
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around 12 15 a m on April 25, 2010 He completed
writing a ticket for a traffic stop and left Meeker
about three minutes later It took him at least 25 minutes to drive to the location of the traffic stop and he
testified that he arrived around 12 45 a m Smith testified that Byrd arrived about 45 minutes after he
requested a canine sniff of defendants' rental vehicle — Byrd allowed Brutus to become acclimated to
his surroundings before starting the sniff of the vehicle, and he led Brutus to the front of the vehicle
Brutus began his sniff at the front bumper on the
driver's side and walked counterclockwise around the
vehicle When Brutus completed a full loop around
the vehicle, Brutus alerted to the smell of illegal
drugs m front of the vehicle Brutus is a passive alert
dog and he alerts by sitting Byrd led Brutus on a
second loop around the vehicle, and Brutus made a
"head throw" near the trunk Byrd testified that a
head throw is not a formal alert by Brutus, but it suggests ihai Brutus detects a faim odor of illegal di ugj>
or that he cannot precisely locate from where the
smell is coming Brutus again alerted at t*>e front of
the vehicle after completing his second loop Byrd
conducted a third loop around the vehicle, and Brutus
lifted his nose towaid the trunk and alerted at the
front of the vehicle Based on Brutus' conduct, Byrd
informed Smith that Brutus had alerted to the presence of illegal drugs inside the vehicle
*4 Smith and Lakm conducted a vehicle search and
found a blue American Eagle bag containing a small
black container with two baggies of a green leafy
substance The substance field tested positive for
marijuana They also found $17,700 m United States
currency in the bag In a separate computer bag, police found a laptop computer and 3,000 Oxycodone
pills Saadeldm and Avezov denied that they were
aware of the drugs Smith formally arrested
Saadeldm and Avezov and transported them to the
Lincoln County jail Smith read Saadeldm his
Mn anda rights at the jail, and Saadeldm refused to
talk Lakm read Avezov nis Muanda rights at the j ail,
and Avezov also refused to speak to police Law enforcement officials subsequently sought and obtained
search warrants for the rental vehicle, as well as three
laptop computers and six cellular phones found m the
vehicle
II.
IT] Defendants argue that Smith prolonged the traffic

stop without reasonable suspicion, and any evidence
seized after the initial purpose of the traffic stop was
completed should be suppressed The government
responds that Smith had reasonable suspicion to continue the traffic stop for a canine sniff, and the length
of the detention, including the 54 mmute wait for the
canine unit to arrive, was reasonable under the circumstances Both defendants have standing under the
Fourth Amendment to challenge the validity of the
traffic stop Biendlin \ California, 551 U S 249, 127
S Ct 2400, 168 L Ed 2d 132 (2007), United States v
mute, 584 F 3d 935 945 (10th Cir 2009)
r2ir3] A traffic stop is treated as an investigative detention, and such a stop is governed by the standards
set forth m Teirw Ohio, 392 U S 1 88 S Ct 1868,
20 LEd2d 889 (19o8) United States \ Bradfoid,
423 F3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir2005) When determining the reasonableness of a traffic stop, a court
must make two separate inquiries First, aid the police officer have a valid reason for initiating the traffic stop Unite d States ^ Bot^, o-O^pina, 7 1 F 3 d ^ 8 3,
787 (10th Cirl995) "[A] traffic stop is valid under
the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer nas a
reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or
equipment violation has occurred or is occurring " Id_
Second, a traffic stop must not become an unnecessarily lengthy detention, but must be limited m scope
to the purpose of the initial traffic stop United States
^ Rice, 483 F 3d 3079. 3 083 (10th Cir2007) A police officer may extend the length of the traffic stop
for questioning beyond the initial purpose of the traffic stop only if the officer has "an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity has
occurred, or the dmer voluntarily consents to further
questioning" United States -\ Ramnez, An9 F i d
122Q 124" (10th Cir 2007)
There is no dispute that defendants' rental vehicle
was pulled over for failing to signal a lane change,
and that this traffic violation occurred See Dkt # 20,
at 8 ( In all fairness, it appears that Mr Saadeldm
admitted to the trooper that he made a last-minute
lane change ") The government has shown that the
first prong of Tei n is satisfied
*5 141 The Court must also consider whether the
length of the traffic stop was reasonable under the
second prong of Tern An officer conducting a traffic stop may request a driver's license, vehicle regis-
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tration, run a computer check, and issue a citation.
See United States v. Zubia-Melendcz, 263 F.3d 1155,
1161 (10th Cir.2001). An officer may also "ask questions about the motorist's travel plans and authority to
operate the vehicle," in addition to obtaining the relevant documentation, without exceeding the scope of
an investigative detention. United States v. AlcarazArellano, 441 F.3d 1252. 1258 (10th Cir.2006). Such
questioning does not violate the Fourth Amendment
as long as the questioning does not prolong the traffic
stop. United States v. Villa, 589 F.3d 1334. 1339
(10th Cir.2009); United States v. Wallace, 429 F.3d
969. 974 (10th Cir.2005). Police must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to continue a traffic stop beyond the purpose of issuing a
warning or citation for the traffic violation. United
States v. Kovv, 45 F.3d 1450. 1453 (10th Cir.1995).
Reasonable suspicion is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
696. U6 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). An "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' is insufficient" to
support reasonable suspicion. United States v. Hall,
978 F.2d 616. 620 (10th Cir.1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion
"represents a minimum level of objective justification
which is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing
by a preponderance of the evidence." AlcarazArellano, 441 F.3d at 1260 (quoting United States v.
Mcndez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir.1997)). In
determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the Court does not evaluate
the facts in isolation but instead construes them together based on the totality of the circumstances.
United States v. Annzu, 534 U.S. 266. 2^4, 122 S.Ct.
744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).
Defendants argue that Smith lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop beyond the purpose of
completing a traffic citation, because there was no
basis for Smith to determine that reasonable suspicion existed and defendants denied Smith's request
for consent to search the vehicle. They also argue that
the traffic stop became an arrest at some point after
Smith issued a warning citation, because defendants
were not free to leave and there was an unreasonable
delay before the canine sniff. The government argues
that Smith observed the following objective factors
supporting his decision that reasonable suspicion
existed to continue the traffic stop:

• the vehicle was a rental and was rented by a third
party not present in the vehicle
• the vehicle was rented in Phoenix, Arizona,
which is a known "source city" for illegal drugs
• defendants provided vague and inconsistent answers about their travels plans
*6 • defendants' travel plans seemed implausible
• both defendants seemed exceedingly nervous
Dkt. #27, at 9-13.
[5] The Court finds that Smith's consideration of
Phoenix as a "source" city is irrelevant and should
not be considered in determining if he had reasonable
suspicion to continue the traffic stop. The Tenth Circuit affords little or no weight to travel to or from a
"source" location in the reasonable suspicion analysis. See United States v Lopez. 518 F.3d 790. 799
(10thCir.2008); United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d
784, 788 (10th Cir.2007). In Guerrero, the Tenth
Circuit stated:
The fact that the defendants were traveling from a
drug source city ... [or state] does little to add to the
overall calculus of suspicion: "If travel between
two of this country's largest population centers is a
ground on which reasonable suspicion may be
predicated, it is difficult to imagine an activity incapable of justifying police suspicion and an accompanying investigative detention. Our holding
that suspicious travel plans can form an element of
reasonable suspicion should not be taken as an invitation to find travel suspicious per se."
Guerrero, 472 F.3d at 788 (quoting United States v.
Santos. 403 F.3d 1120. 1132 (10th Cir.2005)). The
Tenth Circuit clearly permits a district court to consider vague or inconsistent travel plans as factor to
establish reasonable suspicion, but the identity of the
cities or states as "source" locations is not a factor in
the Court's analysis.
[61 The government argues that Smith perceived both
Saadeldin and Avezov as unusually nervous during
the traffic stop, and this was a relevant factor to es-
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tabhsh reasonable suspicion Extreme nervousness of
a driver or passenger, in combmation with other factors, can be a factor used to establish reasonable suspicion to continue a traffic stop beyond its initial purpose United States v Salazcu, 609 F 3d 1059 (10th
Cir 2010) However, this factor must be considered
with other factors, and it may not be used as the sole
factor to establish reasonable suspicion In a recent
Tenth Circuit decision, United States v Simpson, 609
F3d 1140 QOthCir 2010). the Tenth Circuit stated
"We have held consistently that nervousness is 'of
limited significance' in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists " Nervousness is of limited value m assessing reasonable suspicion for two
reasons First, it is common for most citizens,
"whether innocent or guilty-to exhibit signs of
nervousness when confronted by a law enforcement officer " Further, it is natural for a motorist to
become more agitated as a stop is prolonged ana
particularly when the officer seems skeptical or
suspicious
Second, unless the police officer has had significant knowledge of a person, it is difficult, even for
a skilled police officer, to evaluate whether a person is acting normally foi them or nervously
n Id at 1147-48 (citations omitted) The Tenth Circuit clarified that "[ejxtreme and persistent nervousness 'is entitled to somewhat more weight,' " but a
court may not rely solely on a police officer's perception of nervousness and must find objective indicators of extreme nervousness Id at 1147-48 Thus, if
defendants exhibited extreme and prolonged nervousness, this is a relevant factor to determine if Smith
had reasonable suspicion under the totality of the
circumstances to extend the traffic stop beyond its
initial purpose
In this ca^e, Smith testified that he observed objective
indicia of Saadeldm's nervousness and he determined
that Saadeldms behavior was an indication that
criminal actnrty was afoot Smith testified that based
on his training and experience, he relied on
Saadeldm's excessive talkativeness and talking with
his hands, lack of eye contact, yawning and deep
breathing, coughing, and rubbing of his hands on his
legs and face as objectrve evidence that Saadeldm
was nervous beyond what should be expected in an
ordinary traffic stop However, Smith acknowledged

that, before he issued a warning citation, he did not
observe any yawning and he heaid only minimal
coughing Tne Court has \iewed the DVD of the traffic stop, and it confirms that Smith was excessively
talkative and generally failed to make eye contact
with Smith — Saadeldm did not rub his hands on his
face or legs, yawn, or cough m an excessive manner
during the first 16 minutes of the traffic stop However, the Court finds that Smith's testimony on the
issue of defendants' nervousness is otherwise credible, and the behavior Smith observed before he issued a warning citation to Saadeldm could have been
perceived as an indication of extreme or unusual
nervousness In particular, Smith could reasonably
have concluded that Saadeldm's conversation
sounded like nervous chatter and Saadeldm's demeanor could have raised some suspicion that illegal
activity was afoot As required by Tenth Circuit
precedent, the Court will not give this factor significant ^r controlling weight m the reasonable buspujoti
inquiry, and the government must show that other
objective factors supported Smith's decision that reasonable suspicion existed
The government claims that defendants provided
conflicting and vague travel plans when responding
to Smith's questions, and this is a strong factor supporting Smith's determination that reasonable suspicion existed The government also argues that defendants' travel plans were implausible and this raised
suspicion that defendants were trafficking illegal
drugs The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the
use of this factor to establish reasonable suspicion
White. 584 F3d 935 950 (10th Cir2009) ("Implausible travel plans can contribute to reasonable suspicion"), Onited States i Lai am 496 F 3d 1157,
1164-65 (10th Cir2007) (inconsistent travel plans
and confusion about travel details may be considered
m conjunction with other factors to establish reasonable suspicion), bnned Srates ^ Hunmcmt, 135 F 3d
H45, 1349 (10th Cirl Q 98) (listing inconsistent details about travel plans as a relevant factor m the reasonable suspicion inquiry)
*8 Defendants claim that the government has not
identified a true or significant inconsistency m defendants' stones and Smith failed to gather enough information to determine if defendants' stories were
actually conflicting There is a clear inconsistency
between Saadeldm's and Avezov's statements, and
Smith could have considered these inconsistencies to
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establish reasonable suspicion Saadeldin represented
to Smith that he was traveling to Tulsa to visit a
friend named "Matthew Rosinki" and Aveyoz told
Smith they were driving to Tulsa to visit family —
Defendants argue that Smith had no way to know
whether defendants' stones were actually inconsistent
or even if both stories could have been true However, defendants' stories were facially contradictory
and Smith was not required to conduct an extensive
investigation on thi^ topic before considering this
factor The Court may not second-guess Smith's decision to consider this factor, nor may defendants attempt to explain away the inconsistency after the fact
Even assuming that Smith made a mistaken assumption that the stones were inconsistent, Smith's belief
that defendants' stones were contradictory was reasonable under the circumstances See United States v
Pena-Montes. 589 F 3d 1048. 1052-53 (10th
Cir 2009) (an officer's mistaken perception of a fact
is still relevant to tne reasonable suspicion analysis if
the mistake was objectively reasonable) Smith also
testified that defendants' travel plans seemed implausible or unusual to him, because defendants were
dnvmg to Tulsa that night and planned to dnve at
least 16 hours to Phoenix the following day Smith
found defendants' travel plans suspicious or implausible, and defendants have offered no explanation
that would suggest that Smith's suspicion w as unreasonable Smith could reasonably have questioned
defendants' purpose for making such a lengthy tnp
for a limited stay m Tulsa, especially when defendants provided only a vague explanation for the trip
See Kovv 45 F 3d at 1453-54 The short turnaround
time m Tulsa and the inconsistency between
Saadeldm's and Avezov's stories provided an objective basis for Smith to suspect that defendants were
involved in illegal activity
£21 The government also argues that defendants' use
of a rental vehicle and the fact that the vehicle was
rented by a third party who was not piesent contributed to the totality of the circumstances supporting
the existence of reasonable suspicion The status of a
vehicle as a rented can be considered a factor to support the existence of reasonable suspicion, because it
is accepted that drug traffickers frequently use rental
vehicles to transport illegal drugs United States ^
Lxons. 510 F 3d 1225. 1237 (10th O r 2007), United
States v Contieias, 506 F 3d 1031 1036 (10th
Cir 2007), bnited States \ Williams 271 F 3d 1262
(10th O r 2001) It is also relevant that the vehicle
was rented by a person who was not present Lnited

States v Ma. 254 FedAppx 752 756 (10th
Or 2007) — However, there is no dispute that
Saadeldin was dnvmg the vehicle and he was an authorized dnver on the rental agreement Defendants'
use of a rental vehicle and the rental by a third party
who was not present were objective factors supporting probable cause These factors would be entitled to
more weight if there was some indication that
Saadeldin was not authorized to dnve the vehicle or
evidence suggesting that vehicle was rented under
unusual circumstances, but Smith reasonably considered these factors to support the existence of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot
*9 The Court finds that Smith had reasonable suspicion to believe that cnmmal activity was afoot, and
his decision to extend the traffic stop beyond the initial purpose of issuing a traffic citation was reasonable Smith observed objective indications of
Saadeldm's nervousness, and reasonably considered
this factor as part of the totality of the circumstances
Smith also considered the status of the vehicle as
rented and found it unusual that the vehicle was
rented by a third party who was not present in the
vehicle Smith testified that he found defendants' stones about their travel plans inconsistent, and the
travel plans were implausible if the purpose of their
trip to Tulsa was a social visit The Court gives no
weight to Smith's consideration of Phoenix as a
source city for illegal drugs The Court notes that this
is a close case and Smith did not have any clear indications that defendants were engaged in illegal acti\ it) However Smith's testimony about the factors he
considered before he extended the traffic stop was
credible, and he gathered sufficient objective evidence to determine that reasonable suspicion of illegal activity existed
[ R ir Q in01 Defendants argue that the investigation
detention became an arrest, because they were not
free to leave and the length of the detention was excessive The government responds that the investigative detention did not become an arrest, because the
length of time between the issuance of the traffic citation and the arrival of the canine unit was reasonable
An investigative detention may be "transformed" into
an arrest under the Fourth Amendment under certain
circumstances United States ^ Hamilton, 587 F 3d
1199 1215 (10th Or 2009) "[I]f police officers' actions exceed what is reasonably necessary under the
totality of the circumstances, the stop may only be
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justified by probable cause or consent" United States
^ Mclendez-Gai cia, 28 F3d 1046, 1051 (10th
Cir 1994) This may occur due to the use of handcuffs, firearms, or other police techniques inconsistent with the limited scope of an investigation detention, or the detention may become so lengthy that the
investigation detention escalates into a de facto arrest White, 584 F 3d at 952-53 "An officer has probable cause to arrest if, under the totality of the circumstances, he learned of facts and circumstances
through reasonably trustworthy information that
would lead a reasonable person to believe that an
offense has been or is being committed by the person
arrested " Lnited States v Rodi izuez-Rodi mtez, 550
F3d 1223 1227 (10th Cir 2008) (quoting United
States ^ Munoz-Nava, 524 F 3d 1137 1144 (10th
Or 2008))
I'll] Defendants argue that the length of time between the completion of the traffic stop and the dog
sniff was excessive, but the mere fact that defendants
were not free to leave while Smith waited for a canine unit to arrive did not automatically escalate the
investigative detention into an arrest "Officers with
reasonable suspicion to behe\ e that the occupants of
a vehicle are engaged in the unlawful transportation
of contraband may detain the vehicle for a reasonable
time to obtain a properly trained dog to sniff for contraband" United States ^ Mendoza, 468 F 3d 1256,
1261 (10th Cir 2006) (40 minute detention was reasonable while police waited for nearest drug dog to
arrive from approximately 50 miles away) Based on
Tenth Circuit cases, traffic stops totaling 50 minutes
and delays up to 38 minutes for a canme unit have
been found to be reasonable See Santos, 403 F 3d at
1124 (22 minute delay between denial of consent and
arrival of drug dog was reasonable), Lnited Stales •>
Cenine, 347 F 3d 865 (10th Cn 2003) (50 minutes
for combination of traffic stop and dog sniff was reasonable), United States i J illa-Chapano 115 F 3d
797 802 (10th Cir 1997) (38 minute delay was reasonable) The Tenth Circuit has suggested that a
lengthier delay may not violate the Fourth Amendment if police were acting diligently to expedite the
traffic stop but encountered unexpected delays
United States v Roshoiouzh 366 F 3d 1145 1151
(10th Cir 2004)
*10 The government argues that the delay in this case
was not unreasonable, because a canine unit was not
available when Smith made his request and it took

additional time to obtain a canine umt to search defendants' vehicle The government states and the evidence shows that 54 minutes passed from Smith's
decision to extend the traffic stop and the arrival of
the canine umt Smith testified that he was given a
choice between an OHP canine unit or the next available camne umt He informed the dispatcher that he
would prefer an OHP canine unit, but he would accept the next canine unit that became available Byrd
testified that he received a call from dispatch around
12 15 a m and left Meeker about three minutes later
after completing a traffic stop He states that it took
him approximately 25 minutes to reach the location
on 1-44 where Smith stopped defendant's vehicle He
testified that he was not familiar with the area and he
stopped to ask directions from another police officer
on his way Smith testified that the traffic stop began
around 11 45 p m on April 24, 2010 and it took
about 16 minutes before he decided to extend the
traffic stop and request a canine unit Smith requesTed
a canine unit almost immediately after informing
Saadeldm that he could not leave, and this means that
it took approximately 14 minutes before dispatch
contacted Byrd and asked him to assist Smith This
additional 14 minutes is not attributable to any conduct of Smith, as his testimony and the DVD show
that he promptly requested a canine unit However,
this does not excuse the delay and it suggests that
OHP did not act with urgency to obtain a canme unit
While there is no evidence of bad faith or intentional
delay, there was a substantial delay before a camne
unit arrived and the length of the delay exceeds the
delay approved m any Tenth Circuit decision The
total time of the traffic stop up to the time of the canine sniff, including the 54 minutes of delay for a
canine unit to arme, was 70 minutes This period of
time reaches the outer boundaries for a limited investigative detention under the circumstances Other
circuit courts of appeals have approved delays of up
to one hour between a request for and the arrival of a
canine unit if the delay was justified under the circumstances Lnited States i J cza, n2 F 3d 507 51 S16 (7th Cir 1995), Lnited States i Bloomftcld, 40
F 3d 910 917 (8th Cir 1994), United States v Fiost,
Q99 F2d 737 (3d CirI9Q3) However, the government has not identified any circumstances that would
justify a 54 minute extension of a routine traffic, and
the length of the investigative detention was unreasonable

© 2010 Thomson Reuters No Claim to One US Gov Works

Page 12
— F Supp 2d — , 2010 WL 3022909 (N D Okla)
(Cite as: 2010 WL 3022909 (N.D.Okla.))
ri2iri3] Even assuming that the delay is not pei se
unreasonable, the Court must also consider whether
the investigation escalated into an arrest before the
canine unit arrived and if police needed probable
cause, rather than reasonable suspicion, to continue
the detention until the camne unit arrived Smith and
Lakm separated Saadeldm and Avezov and put them
in different patrol cars while they waited for the canine unit to arrive Smith testified that neither
Saadeldm nor Avezov were given Miranda warnings
while they waited for the canine unit to arrive The
government argues that Mn anda warnings were unnecessary, because defendants were not under arrest
and they were not subjected to custodial interrogation The government is correct that Miranda v Arizona, 384 U S 436 86 S Ct 1602. 16 LEd2d 694
(1966), is generall> not implicated by a routme traffic
stop and a Muanda warning is not usually required m
a valid Tern stop United States ^ Eckhart, 569 F 3d
1263 1275 (10th Cir2009) However, this was not a
routine traffic stop Defendants were detained for
approximately 70 minutes and were held m separate
patrol cars m the presence of a police officer The
DVD from Smith's patrol car shows that he engaged
m casual conversation with Saadeldm for almost the
entire 54 minutes after he issued a warning citation
and Saadeldm did not initiate all of the convei sation
Smith asked Saadeldm if he "smoked weed" and
asked Saadeldm if the water pipes used at a hookah
lounge were similar to bongs for smoking marijuana
Smith also asked Saadeldm if Avezov "smoked
weed " Even if Smith's questions did not constitute a
direct interrogation, questioning implying that
Saadeldm or Avezov engaged m illegal activity
closely approximates police interrogation and a
Mn anda warning was required Rhode Island \ hints, 446 U S 291, 100 S Ct 1682 64 LEd2d 297
(1980) ( Mn anda implies to express questioning or
its "functional equivalent" that is likely to invoke an
incriminating response from a suspect) Saadeldm
was not free to leave the patrol car and he was subjected to questioning about criminal activity Given
the manner and length of the detention and the nature
of the conversation, Mn anda warnings should have
been given to Saadeldm and Avezov if Smith and
Lakm intended to converse with Saadeldm and Avezov before the canine unit arrived Considering the
totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the
investigative detention did escalate into an arrest and
police needed probable cause to continue the detention The traffic stop lasted 70 minutes and this alone
may have transformed the investigation detention

into an arrest During the 54 minute period of time
waiting for the camne unit, Smith and Lakm placed
defendants in separate patrol cars and engaged defendants in apparently casual conversation However, at
least two of Smith's questions concerned Saadeldm's
possible involvement m illegal activity, and Smith
did not give Saadeldm a Mnanda warning While it
was permissible for Smith to briefly extend the traffic
stop if a canine unit was not immediately available,
this detention became excessively lengthy and it appears that police used this additional time to gather
additional information about defendants' background
and travel plans The Court noted that this is a close
case as to the existence of reasonable suspicion, and
probable cause is a higher standard The facts known
by Smith at the time he called for a canine unit do not
give rise to probable cause to arrest defendants for
drug trafficking or any other cnme Thus, the traffic
stop became an unlawful arrest under the Fourth
Amendment
*11 [14] Defendants argue mat any evidence during
the search of their rental vehicle or discovered as a
result of that search must be suppressed under the
exclusionary rule Under the exclusionary rule, "the
government may not introduce into evidence 'tangible materials seized during an unlawful search [or]
testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an
unlawful search " tinned States \ Henderson, 595
F3d 1198 1201 (10th Or 2010) (quoting Mwias ^
United States, 487 U S 533 536 108 S Ct 2529,
101 L Ed 2d 472 (1988)) The Court is also required
to exclude evidence discovered as a result of the exploitation of the illegal conduct, and this type of evidence is known as the fruit of the poisonous tree
Worn* Sun \ United States, 371 U S 471 488 83
SCt 407 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) Evidence discovered only as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation may not be admitted at trial United States ^
PetnzicM 468 F ^d 626 6^4 (10th O r 2006) In this
case, police found two plastic baggies of marijuana
and $17,700 of United States currency m a blue
American Eagle bag and 3 000 Oxycodone pills m a
separate computer bag in defendant's rental vehicle
Police later obtained search warrants for six cellular
phones and three laptop computers found in the rental
vehicle, as well as a search warrant for the vehicle
itself None of this e\ idence would have been found
but for the illegal detention of defendant on April 24
and 25, 2010, and none of this evidence is admissible
at trial ^
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants'
Joint Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence, Statements & Fruits of Search (Dkt # 20) is granted, and
any evidence seized during the search of defendants'
rental vehicle or that was discovered as a result of
this search is suppressed.
FN1 The DVD does not clearly show when
Byrd arm ed, but it does show when the canine sniff started The amount of time between the completion of the initial purpose
of the traffic stop and the initiation of the
canine sniff is approximately 54 minutes
The government states that Byrd arrived 54
minutes after Smith requested a canine unit
Dkt # 27, at 12 This statement is supported
by the evidence and the Court finds that defendants were detained 54 minutes while
waiting for the canine unit to arrive

the source of this evidence is not clear from
defendants' motion, and the Court will not
consider the admissibility of this evidence in
this Opinion and Order However, this evidence may be the fruit of the poisonous tree
N D Okla ,2010
U S v Avezov
— F Supp 2d — , 2010 WL 3022909 (N D Okla)
END OF DOCUMENT

FN2 The Court questioned Smith as to
whether he could observe Saadeldm's eye
movement and facial expressions m the patrol car, and Smith testified that he could see
Saadeldm's eyes and facial expressions using his peripheral vision The Court finds
that Smith's testimony is credible on this
point
FN3 The inconsistency about the Lakers
game may not be considered because Smith
did not become aware of this inconsistency
until after he decided to continue the traffic
stop and call for a canme unit Smith's police
report suggests that he learned these facts
before he issued a warning citation, see dkt
# 20, Ex 1, at 1 but the DVD confirms that
this topic did not arise until Smith had already requested a canme unit
FN4 Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive
value See Fed RApp -2 1 l"th Cir Pv
32 1
FN5 Defendants argue that other evidence,
such as recordings of jailhouse telephone
calls and surveillance videos, may also be
fruit of the poisonous tree The parties have
not pro\ ided this evidence to the Court and
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